Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression On 6 April 1941 German armed forces invaded Greece and
Yugoslavia. Again the blow was struck without warning and
with the cowardice and deceit which the World now fully
expected from the self-styled "Herrenvolk". It was a breach
of the Hague Convention of 1899. It was a breach of the Pact
of Paris of 1928. It was a breach of a specific assurance
given by Hitler on 6 October 1939.
"Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss", he
said, "I informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the
frontier with this country will also be an unalterable
one and that we only desire to live in Peace and
Friendship with her". (TC-43)
But the plan for aggression against Yugoslavia had, of
course, been in hand well before that. In the aggressive
action eastward towards the Ukraine and the Soviet
territories security of the Southern flank and the lines of
communication had already been considered.
The history of events leading up to the invasion of
Yugoslavia by Germany is well known. At 3 o'clock on the
morning of 28 October 1940 a 3-hour ultimatum had been
presented by the Italian Government to the Greek Government
and the presentation of this ultimatum was followed by the
aerial bombardment of Greek provincial towns and the advance
of Italian troops into Greek territory. The Greeks, not
prepared for such an assault, were at first forced to
withdraw. Later the Italian advance was first checked, then
driven towards the Albanian frontier, and by the end of 1940
the Italian Army had suffered severe reverses at Greek
hands.
Of German intentions there is the evidence of what occurred
when, on 12 August 1939, Hitler held his meeting with Ciano.
You will remember Hitler said:
"Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be
for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other.
This process could be carried out more easily if on
every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the
other while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral.
Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this
kind." (TC-77)
Later again on the second day of the conversation, 13th
August, he said:
"In general, however, from success by one of the Axis
partners not only strategical but also psychological
strengthening of the other partner and also of the
whole Axis would ensue.
[Page 636]
Italy carried through a number of successful operations
in Abyssinia, Spain and Albania and each time against
the wishes of the Democratic Entente. These individual
actions have not only strengthened Italian local
interests but have also reinforced her general
position. The same was the case with German action in
Austria and Czechoslovakia. *** The strengthening of
the Axis by these individual operations was of the
greatest importance for the unavoidable clash with the
Western Powers."
Once again we see the same procedure being followed. That
meeting had taken place on the 12 August 1939 --13 August
1939. Less than two months later, on 6 October 139 Hitler
was giving his assurance to Yugoslavia that Germany only
desired to live in peace and friendship with the Yugoslav
State, the liquidation of which by his Axis partner he had
himself suggested.
On 28 October 1940 the Italians presented a 3 hour ultimatum
to Greece and commenced war against her. Eventually the
advance was checked, then driven back, and the Italians
suffered considerable reverses at Greek hands.
We have an undated letter from Hitler to Mussolini which
must have been written about the time of the Italian
aggression against Greece. (2762-PS)
"Permit me at the beginning of this letter to assure
you that within the last 14 days my heart and my
thoughts have been more than ever with you. Moreover,
Duce, be assured of my determination to do everything
on your behalf which might ease the present situation
for you. *** When I asked you to receive me in
Florence, I undertook the trip in the hope of being
able to express my views prior to the beginning of the
threatening conflict with Greece, about which I had
only received general information. First, I wanted to
request you to postpone the action, if possible until a
more favorable time of year, at all events, however,
until after the American presidential election. But in
any case, however, I wanted to request you, Duce, not
to undertake this action without a previous lightning-
like occupation of Crete and. for this purpose, I also
wanted to submit to you some practical suggestions in
regard to the employment of a German parachute division
and a further airborne division. *** Yugoslavia must
become disinterested, if possible, however from our
point of view interested in cooperating in the
liquidation of the Greek question. Without assurances
from Yugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful
operation in the Balkans. *** Unfortunately I must
stress the fact that waging
[Page 637]
war in the Balkans before March is impossible. Hence it
would also serve to make any threatening influence upon
Yugoslavia of no purpose, since the Serbian General
Staff is well aware of the fact that no practical
action could follow such a threat before March. Here
Yugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by
other means and other ways."
On the 12th November in his Top Secret Order No. 18 Hitler
ordered the OKH to make preparations to occupy Greece and
Bulgaria if necessary. Approximately 10 divisions were to be
used in order to prevent Turkish intervention. To shorten
the time the German divisions in Rumania were to be
increased. On 13 October 1940 Hitler issued an order to OKW,
OKL, OKH, OKM and General Staff on the operation Marita,
which was the invasion of Greece. In that order it is stated
that the invasion of Greece is planned and is to commence as
soon as the weather becomes advantageous. Further orders
were issued on the 13th December and 11th January. (448-PS;
1541-PS)
On the 28th January Hitler saw Mussolini. Jodl, Keitel, and
Ribbentrop were present at the meeting and it is from Jodl's
notes of what took place that we know that Hitler stated
that one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in
Rumania was for use in his plan for the operation against
Greece.
On 1 March 1941 German troops entered Bulgaria and moved
towards the Greek frontier. In the face of this threat of an
attack on Greece by German as well as Italian forces British
forces were landed in Greece on the 3d March in accordance
with the declaration which had been given by the British
Government on 13 April 1939 that Great Britain would feel
bound to give Greece and Rumania respectively all the
support in her power in the event of either country becoming
the victim of aggression and resisting such aggression.
Already the Italian aggression had made this pledge
operative.
On 25 March 1941 Yugoslavia joined the 3-Power Pact which
had already been signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. The
preamble of the Pact stated that the 3 Powers would stand
side by side and work together.
On the same day Ribbentrop wrote two notes to the Yugoslav
Prime Minister assuring him of Germany's full intention to
respect the sovereignty and independence of his country.
That declaration was yet another example of the treachery
employed by German diplomacy. We have seen already the
preparations that had been made. We have seen Hitler's
efforts to tempt the Italians into an aggression against
Yugoslavia. We have seen in January his orders for his own
preparation to invade Yugoslavia
[Page 638]
and Greece and now on the 25th March he is signing a pact
with that country and his Foreign Minister is writing
assurances of respect for her sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
As a result of the signing of that Pact the anti-Nazi
element in Yugoslavia immediately accomplished a coup d'etat
and established a new Government. Thereupon the decision was
taken to invade immediately and on the 27th March, two days
after the 3-Power Pact had been signed by Yugoslavia, Hitler
issued instructions that Yugoslavia was to be invaded and
used as a base for the continuance of the combined German
and Italian offensive against Greece. (C-127)
Following this, further deployment and other instructions
for the action Marita were issued by Von Brauchitsch on 30
March 1941. (R-95)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Opening Address for the United Kingdom
(Part 14 of 17)