Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression After Hitler had remilitarized the Rhineland and had
repudiated the Locarno Pact, England and France sought to
reestablish
[Page 632]
the position of security for Belgium which Hitler's action
had threatened. They, therefore, themselves gave to Belgium
on 24 April 1937, a specific guarantee that they would
maintain in respect of Belgium, undertakings. of assistance
which they had entered into with her both under the Locarno
Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. On the 13
October 1937 the German Government also made a declaration
assuring Belgium of its intention to recognize the
inviolability and integrity of that country.
It is, perhaps, convenient to deal with the remaining
assurances as we review the evidence which is available as
to the preparations and intentions of the German Government
prior to their invasion of Belgium on 10 May 1940.
As in the case of Poland, as in the case of Norway and
Denmark, so also here the dates speak for themselves.
As early as August 1938 steps were being made to utilize the
Low Countries as defense bases for decisive action in the
West in the event of France and England opposing Germany in
it aggression upon Czechoslovakia.
In all air force letter dated 25 August 1938 which deals
with the action to be taken if England and France should
interfere in the operation against Czechoslovakia, it is
stated:
"It is not expected for the moment that other States
will intervene against Germany. The Dutch and the
Belgian area assumes in this connection much more
importance for the prevention of the war in Western
Europe than during the world war. This mainly is an
advance base for the air war." (375-PS)
In the last paragraph of that order it is stated "Belgium
and the Netherlands when in German hands represent an
extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war
against Great Britain as well as against France." (375-PS)
That was in August 1938. Eight months later (on 28 April
1939) Hitler is declaring again, "I was pleased that a
number of European states availed themselves of this
declaration by the German Government to express and
emphasize their desire to have absolute neutrality."
A month later, on 23 May 1939, Hitler held the conference in
the Reich Chancellery, to which we have already referred.
The Minutes of that meeting report Hitler as saying:
"The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by
armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be
ignored. If England and France enter the war between
Germany and Poland they will support Holland and
Belgium in their neutrality.
[Page 633]
** Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the
Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning
speed. We must aim at securing new defense lines on
Dutch soil up to the Zuyder Zee". (L-79)
Even after that he was to give his solemn declarations that
would observe Belgian neutrality. On 26 August 1939 when the
crisis in regard to Danzig and Poland was reaching its
climax, declarations assuring the Governments concerned of
the intention to respect their neutrality were handed by the
German ambassadors to the King of the Belgians, the Queen of
the Netherlands, and to the Government of the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg in the most solemn form. But to the Army -- "If
Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held" --
it was said -- "a successful war against England will be
secured."
On the 1st September Poland was invaded, and two days later
England and France came into the War against Germany in
pursuance of the treaty obligation already referred to. On
the 6th October Hitler renewed his assurances of friendship
to Belgium and Holland. But on the 9th October, before any
kind of accusation had been made by the German Government of
breaches of neutrality by Belgium, the Netherlands, or
Luxembourg, Hitler issued a directive for the conduct of the
war.
In that directive he stated:
"1. If it becomes evident in the near future that
England and France acting under her leadership, are not
disposed to end the war, I am determined to take firm
and offensive action without letting much time elapse.
"2. A long waiting period results not only in the
ending of the advantage to the Western Powers, of
Belgium and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality, but also
strengthens the military power of our enemies to an
increasing degree, causes confidence of the neutrals in
German final victory to wane, and does not help to
bring Italy to our aid as brothers-in-arms.
"3. I therefore issue the following orders for the
further conduct of military operations:
"(a) Preparations should be made for offensive action
on the Northern flank of the Western front crossing the
area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack
must be carried out as soon and as forcefully as
possible.
"(1) The object of this attack is to defeat as many
strong sections of the French Fighting Army as
possible, and her ally and partner in the fighting, and
at the same time to acquire as great an area of
Holland, Belgium and Northern
[Page 634]
France as possible, to use as a base offering good
prospects for waging aerial and sea warfare against
England and to provide ample coverage for the vital
district of the Ruhr."
Nothing could state more clearly or more definitely the
object behind the invasion of these countries than that
document. On 15 October 1939 Keitel wrote a most secret
letter concerning Fall Gelb, which was the code name for the
operation against the Low Countries. In it he stated:
"The protection of the Ruhr area by moving A/C
reporting service and the air defense as far forward as
possible in the area of Holland is significant for the
whole conduct of the war. The more Dutch territory we
occupy the more effective can the defense of the Ruhr
area be made. This point of view must determine the
choice of objectives of the army even if the army and
navy are not directly interested in such territorial
gain. It must be the object of the army's preparations,
therefore, to occupy on receipt of a special order the
territory of Holland in the first instance in the area
of the Grebbe-Marse line. It will depend on the
military and political attitude of the Dutch as well as
on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether objects
can and must be further extended." (C-62)
The operation had apparently been planned to take place at
the beginning of November. We have in our possession a
series of 17 letters dated from 7th November until the 9th
May postponing almost from day to day the D-day of the
operation, so that by the beginning of November all the
major plans and preparations had been made. (C-72)
On 10 January 1940 a German aeroplane force landed in
Belgium. In it was found the remains of a half-burnt
operation order setting out considerable details of the
Belgian landing grounds that were to be captured (TC-58).
Many other documents have been found which illustrate the
planning and preparation for this invasion in the latter
half of 1939 and early 1940, but they carry the matter no
further, and they show no more clearly than the evidence to
which I have already referred, the plans and intention of
the German Governments and its armed forces.
On 10 May 1940 at about 0500 hours in the morning the German
invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg began.
Once more the forces of aggression marched on. Treaties,
assurances, the rights of Sovereign States meant nothing.
Brutal force, covered by as great an element of surprise as
the Nazis could secure, was to seize that which was deemed
necessary for
[Page 625]
striking the mortal blow against England, the main Enemy.
The only fault of these unhappy countries was that they
stood in the path of the German invader. But that was
enough.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Opening Address for the United Kingdom
(Part 13 of 17)