Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression It is stated that "the orders issued with regard to the
operation against Greece remain valid so far as not affected
by this order. On the 5th April, weather permitting, the Air
Forces are to attack troops in Yugoslavia, while
simultaneously the attack of the 12th Army begins against
both Yugoslavia and Greece" (R-95). As we now know, the
invasion actually commenced in the early hours of the 6th
April.
Treaties, Pacts, Assurances -- obligations of any kind --
are brushed aside and ignored wherever the aggressive
interests of Germany are concerned.
I turn now to the last act of aggression in Europe with
which these Nazi conspirators are charged -- the attack upon
Russia. In August 1939 Germany although undoubtedly
intending to attack Russia at some convenient opportunity,
sufficiently deceived the Russian Government to secure a
pact of non-aggression between them. It followed, therefore,
that when Belgium and the Low Countries were occupied and
France collapsed in June 1940, England-although with the
inestimably valuable moral and economic support of the
United States of America-was left alone as the sole
representative of Democracy in the face of the forces of
aggression. Only the British Empire stood between Germany
and the achievement of her aim to dominate the Western
world. Only the British Empire -- only England as its
citadel. But it was enough. The first, and possibly the
decisive, military defeat which the enemy sustained was in
the campaign against England, and that defeat had a profound
influence on the future course of the war. On 16 July 1940
Hitler issued to Keitel and Jodl a Directive for the
invasion of England. It started off by stating -- and
Englishmen will be forever proud of it -- that
"Since England, despite her militarily hopeless
situation, shows no signs of willingness to come to
terms, I have decided to prepare a landing operation
against England and if
[Page 639]
necessary to carry it out. The aim is *** to eliminate
the English homeland as a base for the carrying on of
the war against Germany. The preparations for the
entire operation must be completed by mid-August." (442-PS)
But the first essential condition for that plan was "that
the English Air Force must morally and actually be so far
overcome that it does not any longer show any considerable
aggressive force against the German attack." (442-PS)
The German Air Force made the most strenuous efforts to
realize that condition, but, in one of the most splendid
pages of our history, it was decisively defeated. And
although the bombardment of England's towns and villages was
continued throughout that dark winter of 1940-41 the enemy
decided in the end that England was not to be subjugated by
these means, and accordingly Germany turned back to the
East, the first major aim achieved.
On 22 June 1941, German Armed Forces invaded Russia without
warning, without declaration of war. It was a breach of the
Hague Conventions; it was a violation of the Pact of Paris
of 1928: it was in flagrant contradiction of the Treaty of
nonaggression which Germany and Russia had signed on 23
August 1939.
But that Treaty, perhaps more blatantly than any other, was
made without any intention of being observed and only for
the purpose of assisting the German Government to carry out
their aggressive plans against the Western democracies
before eventually turning east in their own good time.
Hitler himself in referring to the Agreement said agreements
were only to be kept as long as they served a purpose.
Ribbentrop was more explicit. In an interview with the
Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on 23 February 1941 he made it
clear that the object of the agreement had merely been to
avoid a two front war. (1834-PS)
In contrast to what Hitler and Ribbentrop were planning
within the councils of Germany, we know what they were
saying to the rest of the world.
On the 19th July Hitler spoke in the Reichstag:
"In these circumstances I consider it proper to
negotiate as a first priority a sober definition of
interests with Russia. It would be made clear once and
for all what Germany believes she must regard as her
sphere of interest to safeguard her future and, on the
other hand, what Russia considers important for her
existence.
"From the clear delineation of the sphere of interest
on either
[Page 640]
side, there followed the new regulation of Russo-German
relations. Any hope that now at the end of the term of
the agreement a new Russo-German tension could arise is
childish. Germany has taken no step which would lead
her outside her sphere of interest, nor has Russia. But
England's hope, to achieve an amelioration of her own
position through the engineering of some new European
crisis, is, in so far as it is concerned with Russo-
German relations, an illusion.
"British statesmen perceive everything somewhat slowly,
but they too will learn to understand this in course of
time."
Yet it was not many months after that that the arrangements
for attacking Russia were put in hand. Raeder gives us the
probable reasons for this sudden decision in a note to
Admiral Assmann
"The fear that control of the air over the Channel in
the Autumn of 1940 could no longer be attained, a
realization which the Fuehrer no doubt gained earlier
than the Naval War Staff, who were not so fully
informed of the true results of air raids on England
(our own losses), surely caused the Fuehrer, as far
back as August and September, to consider whether, even
prior to victory in the West, an Eastern campaign would
be feasible with the object of first eliminating our
last serious opponent on the continent. The Fuehrer did
not openly express this fear, however, until well into
September."
He may not have told the Navy of his intentions until later
in September, but by the beginning of that month he had
undoubtedly spoken of them to Jodl.
Dated 6 September 1940 we have a directive of the OKW signed
by Jodl: "Directions are given for the occupation forces in
the east to be increased in the following weeks. For
security reasons this should not create the impression in
Russia that Germany is preparing for an Eastern offensive."
Directives are given to the German Intelligence Service
pertaining to the answering of questions by the Prussian
Intelligence Service. "The total strength of the German
troops in the East to be camouflaged by frequent changes in
this area. The impression is to be created that the bulk of
the troops in the south have moved whilst the occupation in
the north is only very small." (1229-PS)
Thus we see the beginning of the operations.
On 12 November 1940 Hitler issued a directive signed by Jodl
in which he stated that the political task to determine the
attitude of Russia had begun, but without reference to the
result
[Page 641]
of preparations against the East, which had been ordered
orally before it could be carried out.
On the same day Molotov visited Berlin. At the conclusion of
conversations between himself and the German Government a
communique was issued in the following terms:
"The exchange of ideas took place in an atmosphere of mutual
trust and led to a mutual understanding on all important
questions interesting Germany and the Soviet Union."
It is not to be supposed that the USSR would have taken part
in those conversations or agreed to that communique if it
had been realized that on the very day orders were being
given for preparations to be made for the invasion of Russia
and that the order for the operation "Barbarossa" was in
preparation. Four days later that order was issued -- "The
German armed forces have to be ready to defeat Soviet Russia
in a swift campaign before the end of the War against Great
Britain" (446-PS). And later in the same instruction,
"All orders which shall be issued by the High
Commanders in accordance with this instruction have to
be clothed in such terms that they may be taken as
measures of precaution in case Russia should change her
present attitude towards ourselves." (446-PS)
The
original plaintext version
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Opening Address for the United Kingdom
(Part 15 of 17)