Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression With these developments of Nazi aggression my United States
colleagues have already dealt. But it is obvious that the
acquisition of these two countries, and of their resources
in manpower and in the production of munitions of war,
immensely strengthened the position of Germany as against
Poland. It is, therefore, not surprising that, just as the
defendant Goering assured the Czechoslovak Minister in
Berlin, at the time of the Nazi invasion of Austria that
Hitler recognized the validity of the German-Czechoslovak
Arbitration Treaty of 1925, and that Germany had no designs
against Czechoslovakia herself -- "I give you my word of
honor" said Goering -- so also continued assurances should
be given during 1938 to Poland in order to keep that country
from interfering with the Nazi aggression on Poland's
neighbors.
Thus, on 20 February 1938 on the eve of his invasion of
Austria, Hitler, referring to the fourth anniversary of the
Polish-Pact, permitted himself to say this to the Reichstag:
"*** and so a way to a friendly understanding has been
successfully paved, an understanding which beginning
with Danzig has today succeeded in finally taking the
poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland
and transforming them into a sincere friendly
cooperation. Relying on her friendships, Germany will
not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which
provides the foundation for the task ahead of us --
Peace". (2357-PS)
Still more striking are the cordial references to Poland in
Hitler's speech in the Sportpalast at Berlin on the 26
September 1938.
He then said:
"The most difficult problem with which I was confronted
was that of our relations with Poland. There was a
danger that Poles and Germans would regard each other
as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I know
well enough that I should not have been successful if
Poland had had a demo-
[Page 616]
cratic constitution. For these democracies which
indulge in phrases about peace are the most
bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no
democracy, but a man: and with him I succeeded, in
precisely twelve months, in coming to an agreement
which, for ten years in the first instance, entirely
removed the danger of a conflict. We are all convinced
that this agreement will bring lasting pacification. We
realize that here are two peoples which must live
together and neither of which can do away with the
other. A people of 33 millions will always strive for
an outlet to the sea. A way for understanding, then,
had to be found, and it will be ever further extended.
Certainly things were hard in this area. *** But the
main fact is that the two Governments, and all
reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two
peoples and in the two countries, possess the firm will
and determination to improve their relations. It was a
real work of peace, of more worth than all the
chattering in the League of Nations Palace at Geneva".
Thus flattery of Poland preceded the annexation of Austria
and renewed flattery of Poland preceded the projected
annexation of Czechoslovakia. The realities behind these
outward expressions of goodwill are clearly revealed in the
documents relating to Fall Gruen, which are already before
the Tribunal. They show Hitler as fully aware that there was
risk of Poland, England and France being involved in war to
prevent the German annexation of Czechoslovakia, and that
this risk though realized was also accepted. On the 25th
August top secret orders to the German Air Force in regard
to the operations to be conducted against England and France
if they intervened pointed out that, as the French-
Czechoslovak Treaty provided for assistance only in the case
of "unprovoked" attack, it would take a day or two for
France and England to decide whether legally the attack was
unprovoked or not. A blitzkrieg accomplishing its aims
before effective intervention became possible was the object
to be aimed at.
On the same day an Air Force memorandum on future
organization was issued to which was attached a map on which
the Baltic States, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland are
all shown as part of Germany and preparations for expanding
the Air Force "as the Reich grows in area", as well as
dispositions for a two front war against France and Russia
are discussed (L-43; Chart No. 10). And on the following day
von Ribbentrop is being minuted about the reaction of Poland
towards the Czechoslovak problem:
"The fact that after the liquidation of the Czech
question
[Page 617]
it will be generally assumed that Poland will be next
in turn" is recognized but, it is stated, "the later
this assumption sinks in, the better". (TC-76)
I will pause at the date of the Munich Agreement for a
moment and ask the Tribunal to consider what the evidence of
documents and historical facts shows up to that time. It has
made undeniable the fact both of Nazi aggressiveness and of
active aggression.
Not only does the Conference of 1937 reveal Hitler and his
associates deliberately considering the acquisition of
Austria and Czechoslovakia, if necessary by war, but the
first of those operations had been carried through in March
1938 and a large part of the second, under threat of war,
though without actual need for its initiation, in September
of the same year. More ominous still, Hitler had revealed
his adherence to his old doctrines of Mein Kampf, those
essentially aggressive to the exposition of which in Mein
Kampf long regarded as the Bible of the Nazi Party we shall
draw attention. He is in pursuit of Lebensraum and he means
to secure it by threats of force or, if they fail, by force,
by aggressive war.
So far actual warfare has been avoided because of the love
of peace, the lack of preparedness, the patience or the
cowardice -- which you will -- of the democratic Powers.
But, after Munich, the questions which filled the minds of
all thinking people with acute anxiety was, "Where will this
end? Is Hitler now satisfied, as he declares he is? Or will
his pursuit of Lebensraum lead to further aggressions, even
if he has to make an openly aggressive war to secure it?"
It was in relation to the remainder of Czechoslovakia and to
Poland that the answer to these questions was to be given.
So far no direct and immediate threat to Poland had been
made. The two documents from which I have just quoted (L-43;
TC-76) show that high officers of the defendant Goering's
Air Staff already regarded the extension of the Reich and,
it would appear, the destruction and absorption of Poland as
a foregone conclusion. They were already anticipating,
indeed, the last stage of Hitler's policy stated in Mein
Kampf, war to destroy France and to secure Lebensraum in
Russia. And the writer of the Minute to Ribbentrop already
took it for granted that, after Czechoslovakia, Poland would
be attacked. More impressive than these two documents is the
fact that, as I have said, the record of the Conference of 5
November 1937, shows that war with Poland, if she should
dare t to attempt to prevent German aggression against
Czechoslovakia, had been coolly contemplated and that the
Nazi leaders were ready to take the risk. So also had the
risk of war with England and
[Page 618]
France under the same circumstances been considered and
accepted. Such a war would, of course, have been an
aggressive war on Nazi Germany's part. For to force one
State to take up arms to defend another against aggression
in order to fulfill treaty obligations is to initiate
aggressive war against the first State.
Yet it remains true that until Munich the decision for
direct attack upon Poland and her destruction by aggressive
war had apparently not as yet been taken by Hitler and his
associates. It is to the transition from the intention and
preparation of initiating an aggressive war, evident in
regard to Czechoslovakia, to the actual initiation and
waging of aggressive war against Poland that I now pass.
That transition occupies the eleven months from 1 October
1938 to the actual attack on Poland on 1 September 1939.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
[
Previous |
Index |
Next ]
Home ·
Site Map ·
What's New? ·
Search
Nizkor
© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012
This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and
to combat hatred.
Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.
As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may
include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and
provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist
and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.
Volume
I Chapter IX
Opening Address for the United Kingdom
(Part 8 of 17)