Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Within six months of the signature of the Munich Agreement
the Nazi Leaders had occupied the remainder of
Czechoslovakia which by that agreement they had indicated
their willingness to guarantee. On 14 March 1939, the aged
and infirm President of the "Rump" of Czechoslovakia, Hacha,
and his Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, were summoned to
Berlin. At a meeting held between 1.15 and 2.15 a.m. in the
small hours of the 15th March in the presence of Hitler and
the defendants Ribbentrop, Goering, and Keitel, they were
bullied and threatened and informed bluntly that Hitler "had
issued the order for the German troops to march into
Czechoslovakia, and for the incorporation of this country
into the German Reich". It was made quite clear to them that
resistance would be useless and would be crushed "by force
of arms with all available means". It was thus that the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up and that
Slovakia was turned into a German satellite, though
nominally independent, state. By their own unilateral
action, on pretexts which had no shadow of validity, without
discussion with the Governments of any other country,
without mediation and in direct contradiction of the sense
and spirit of the Munich Agreement, the Germans acquired for
themselves that for which they had been planning in
September of the previous year, and indeed much earlier, but
which at that time they had felt themselves unable
completely to secure without too patent an exhibition of
their aggressive intentions. Aggression achieved whetted the
appetite for aggression to come. There were protests.
England and France sent diplomatic notes. Of course there
were protests. The Nazis had clearly shown their hand.
Hitherto they had concealed from the outside world that
their claims went beyond incorporat-
[Page 619]
ing into the Reich persons of German Race living in
bordering territory. Now for the first time, in defiance of
their own solemn assurances to the contrary, non-German
territory had been seized. This acquisition of the whole of
Czechoslovakia, together with the equally illegal occupation
of Memel on the 22d March, resulted in immense strengthening
of the German position, both politically and strategically,
as Hitler had anticipated it would when discussed the matter
at his conference on 5 November 1937. (386-PS)
Long before the consummation by the Nazi Leaders of their
aggression against Czechoslovakia, however, they had already
begun to make demands upon Poland. On 25 October 1938, that
to say within less than a month of Hitler's reassuring
speech about Poland already quoted and of the Munich
Agreement itself, M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in
Berlin, reported to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister,
that at a luncheon at Berchtesgaden the day before (October
24th) the defendant Ribbentrop had put forward demands for
the reunion of Danzig with the Reich and for the building of
an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across
Pomorze, that is, the province which the Germans called the
Corridor. From that moment onwards until the Polish
Government had made it plain, during a visit of the
defendant Ribbentrop to Warsaw which ended on 27 January
1939, that they would not consent to hand over Danzig to
German Sovereignty negotiations on these German demands
continued. Even after Ribbentrop's return Hitler thought it
worth while in his Reichstag Speech on 30 January 1939 to
say --
"We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the
conclusion of our nonaggression pact with Poland. There
can scarcely be any difference of opinion today among
the true friends of peace as to the value of this
agreement. One only needs to ask oneself what might
have happened to Europe if this agreement, which
brought such relief, had not been entered into five
years ago. In signing it, the great Polish marshal and
patriot rendered his people just as great a service as
the leaders of the National-Socialist State rendered
the German people. During the troubled months of the
past year the friendship between Germany and Poland has
been one of the reassuring factors in the political
life of Europe".
That utterance, however, was the last friendly word from
Germany to Poland and the last occasion upon which the Nazi
Leader mentioned the German-Polish Agreement with
approbation. During February 1939 silence fell upon German
demands. But as soon as the final absorption of
Czechoslovakia had taken place,
[Page 620]
and Germany had also absorbed Memel, Nazi pressure upon
Poland was at once renewed. In two conversations between
himself and the defendant Ribbentrop, held on March 21st and
March 26th respectively (Polish White Book Number 61 and
Number 63), German demands upon Poland were renewed and
further pressed. In view of the fate which had overtaken
Czechoslovakia and of the grave deterioration in her
strategical position towards Germany it is not surprising
that the Polish Government took alarm at these developments.
Nor were they alone in this. The events of March 1939 had at
last convinced both the English and French Governments that
the Nazi designs of aggression were not limited to men of
German race and that the spectre of European war resulting
from further aggressions by Nazi Germany had not been
exorcised by the Munich Agreement.
As a result, therefore, of the concern of Poland, England,
and France at the events in Czechoslovakia and at the newly
applied pressure on Poland, conversations between the
English and Polish Governments had been taking place, and,
on 31 March 1939, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the
House of Commons, stated that His Majesty's Government had
given an assurance to help Poland in the event of any action
which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the
Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist
(TC-72 No. 17). On 6 April 1939 an Anglo-Polish communique
stated that the two countries were prepared to enter into an
Agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character to replace
the present temporary and unilateral assurance given by His
Majesty's Government. (TC-72, No. 18)
The justification for such concern is not difficult to find.
With the evidence which we now have of what was happening
within the councils of the German Reich and its armed forces
during these months it is manifest that the German
Government were intent on seizing Poland as a whole, that
Danzig -- as Hitler was to say himself a month later -- "was
not the subject of the dispute at all". The Nazi Government
was intent upon aggression and the demands and negotiations
in respect of Danzig were merely a cover and excuse for
further domination.
As far back as September 1938 plans for aggressive war
against Poland, England, and France were well in hand. While
Hitler, at Munich, was telling the world that the German
people wanted peace and that, having solved the
Czechoslovakian problem, Germany had no more territorial
problems in Europe, the staffs of his armed forces were
already preparing plans. On 26 September 1938 he had said:
[Page 621]
"We have given guarantees to the States in the West. We
have assured all our immediate neighbours of the
integrity of their territory as far as Germany is
concerned. That is no mere phrase. It is our sacred
will. We have no interest whatever in a breach of the
peace. We want nothing from these peoples."
The world was entitled to rely upon these assurances.
International cooperation is impossible unless one can
assume good faith in the leaders of the various States. But
within two months of that solemn and considered undertaking,
Hitler and his confederates were preparing for the seizure
of Danzig. To recognize these assurances, these pledges,
these diplomatic moves as the empty frauds they were, one
must go back to enquire what was happening within the inner
councils of the Reich from the time of the Munich Agreement.
Written some time in September 1938 is an extract from a
file on the Reconstruction of the German Navy (C-23). Under
the heading "Opinion on the Draft Study of Naval Warfare
against England" it is stated:
"1. If, according to the Fuehrer's decision, Germany is
to acquire a position as a world power, she needs not
only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure
naval communications and secure access to the ocean.
"2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in
opposition to Anglo-French interests and would limit
their position as world powers. It is unlikely that
they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to
make Germany a world power, therefore, forces upon us
the necessity of making the corresponding preparations
for war.
"3. War against England means at the same time war
against the Empire, against France, probably against
Russia as well and a large number of countries
overseas, in fact, against It half to one-third of the
world.
"It can only be justified and have a chance of success
if it is prepared economically as well as politically
and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for
Germany an outlet to the ocean." (C-23)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Opening Address for the United Kingdom
(Part 9 of 17)