One Hundred and Twenty-Third Day:
Tuesday, 7th May, 1946 [Page 189]
With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall first submit a
number of documents, and I shall use the document book of
the prosecution and the document books which I have
submitted. These Document Books consist of four volumes. The
table of contents is in Volume I and in Volume 3.
In the first document of the Document Book of the
prosecution, USA No. 12, I should like to correct an error
in translation which may be of significance. It says there,
in the German text, under "1939," " Konter-Admiral,
Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote," and that in the English
text has been translated by "Commander-in-Chief." The
correct translation should be "Flag Officer of Submarines."
That point is of importance in regard to the fact that
Admiral Donitz, until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy in 1943, was not a member of the group which the
prosecution terms criminal.
I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal back to
Exhibit GB 190. That is a sea-chart which the prosecution
has submitted. This chart shows the position of the German
submarines to the West of England on 3rd September, 1939,
and the prosecution uses that chart as evidence for the
question of aggressive war.
The prosecution says, rightly, that these U-Boats must have
left their home bases at an earlier date. The first document
which I offer as Donitz 1, is to prove,
[Page 190]
I shall read from this document, Document Book, Page 1. It
is an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operational
Staff of September, 1939, and I read the entry of 15th
August:-
DR. KRANZBCHLER: Page 1 of the Document Book, Volume I.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUHLER: "15. 8. Prepared (for case Weiss) the
following measures:-
"On 22.8. Transport Westerrvald ready to sail.
"On 25.8. Deutschland ready to sail."
"23.8. Report B service: Continuation of French
'Spartingsmassnahmen' of fleet to 3rd grade. English and
French blockade measures off ports.
"25.8. B Service reports: German and Italian steamers are
being watched and reported by France."
"In case of opening of hostilities by Western powers:
Defence only economical use of forces. Reserve start of
aggressive operations. The army to hold the 'Westwall.'
Naval economic war concentrated against England. To
augment effect probable declaration of zones of danger.
Prepare these and submit them. The Baltic to be
safeguarded against enemy invasion."
I come now to the document with reference to which Admiral
Donitz is accused of participating in the planning of the
attack against Norway. That is Exhibit GB 83. The
prosecution has submitted it as proof of the fact that
Admiral Donitz played a decisive part in the occupation of
Norway. I shall refer to this document in more detail when
examining the witness. I merely want to establish certain
dates now. On the document - and I am about to submit the
original to the Tribunal - there is a stamp which
establishes when the document was received at the High
Command. This stamp shows the date 11th October, 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking of Exhibit GB 83?
DR. KRANZBUHLER: Yes. And I refer now to Exhibit GB 81,
which appears on Page 6 of my Document Book. According to
this the decisive report by Grand Admiral Raeder to the
Fuehrer had already been made on 10th October, 1939, that
is, a day before Exhibit GB 83 was received at the High
Command.
[Page 191]
It is a question of Murmansk, in connection with "Base
North," as can be seen from Document Donitz 4, and it is
known that these considerations were in full accord with the
Soviet Union.
Furthermore, I should like to show that the question of
bases continuously comes up in enemy navy without reference
to -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, you are going a little bit
fast over these documents and I am not quite sure that I am
quite following what use you are making of them. This base
mentioned in the report is Murmansk?
DR. KRANZBUHLER: Yes, Murmansk.
And I want to use it as proof, Mr. President, that the
question of bases has nothing to do with the question of
whether one wants to wage aggressive war with the country in
which these bases are situated. The considerations as to
Murmansk were taken in full accord with the Soviet Union,
and in the same manner Admiral Donitz took the question of
Norwegian bases into consideration. That is the subject of
my proof.
THE PRESIDENT: But the fact that Murmansk was suggested as a
base, to be taken with the consent of the Soviet Union - if
it was the case - doesn't have any relevance, does it, to
taking a base in Norway without the consent of Norway.
DR. KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, the relevancy seems to me to
exist in the fact that Admiral Donitz as Commander of the U-
Boats in both cases received merely the order to state his
opinion about bases in a certain country, but that in the
last analysis, he had as little to say in the case of Narvik
and Trondheim as in the case of Murmansk.
COLONEL POKROVSKY (of the Russian Prosecution): In Document
No. 3, the one just being referred to by the Defence Counsel
for the defendant Donitz, mention is definitely made of the
Northern bases, but nothing is said, in this document, of
any plans of the Soviet Union. And to discuss, here and now,
some plan or other of the Soviet Union is, in my opinion,
quite out of order, since there are no plans of the Soviet
Union in connection with the Northern bases, and there never
have been.
DR. KRANZBUHLER: If the representative of the Soviet Union
has any doubts that this base was considered in full accord
with the Soviet Union, then I shall prove that by calling a
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Anyhow, the document does not say anything
about it.
DR. KRANZBUHLER: The document says nothing about it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think you ought to make
statements of that sort without any evidence, and at the
moment you are dealing with a document which does not
contain any evidence of the fact.
[Page 192]
THE PRESIDENT: It is Donitz 3, is it not?
DR. KRANZBUHLER: I have now come to Donitz 4. I had read
from Donitz 3. I shall now read from Donitz 4, the entries
for 17th April, 1939:-
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
Dr. Kranzbuhler, the Tribunal thinks you ought not to make
these observations on these documents which really do not
support what you are saying. Document No. 3, for instance,
does not bear any such interpretation, because it refers to
attacks which it was suggested should be made against ships
coming from Russian ports, in paragraph 2. And equally the
other document you referred to, Donitz 4, on Page 5, does
not bear the interpretation which you are putting upon it.
DR. KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, I am afraid that the
contents of both documents have been presented too quickly
by me. For anyone who is familiar with such war diaries,
many things are self-evident which otherwise are not so easy
to understand.
Document Donitz 3 states, in that part which I have read,
that possibilities for the establishment of a Base North
exist. These possibilities can be only political
possibilities, because one can establish a base in a foreign
country only if that country agrees.
The Document Donitz 4 shows that the base in question is
Murmansk, and that this base is being tried out with a
supply ship, a fishing steamer, and a U-boat. That
convincingly shows in my opinion -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): The objection the Tribunal was
raising was to the statement by you that the Soviet Union
had agreed, and these documents do not bear out any such
statement.
DR. KRANZBUHLER: I am of the opinion, that in Document
Donitz 4 that can clearly be seen. It is not possible -
COLONEL POKROVSKY: I definitely protest against the fact
that apart from what has been stated in the documents,
certain unfounded conjectures or assertions have been made
with a view to interpreting the documents in the manner in
which Dr. Kranzbuhler has endeavoured to interpret them from
the initial stages of his defence. I do not belong to the
category of fortune tellers and palmists. I cannot
conjecture what hypothetical conclusions may be drawn from
one or another of the documents. I am a lawyer and I am
accustomed to operate with documents such as they appear,
and I am accustomed to operate with the contents of a
document such as they are expressed.
I consider that the Tribunal has quite correctly expressed
to the Defence Counsel the absolute impossibility of drawing
the conclusions he is attempting to reach, and I would ask
that Counsel for the Defence be reminded of his duty to
limit himself exclusively to such interpretations as may be
deduced from the document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Your Honour, I would be grateful if
the Tribunal would consider a general point of procedure. We
have a number of objections to a considerable number of Dr.
Kranzbuhler's documents. I have prepared a short list
grouping as far as is possible our objections, which I can
hand to the Tribunal, and, of course, to Dr. Kranzbuhler
now. It is a matter for con-
[Page 193]
I suggest that to the Tribunal for their consideration as
perhaps the most profitable procedure under the
circumstances.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you suggesting that at a certain point of
time we should adjourn for the consideration of your list,
and then hear Dr. Kranzbuhler on it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what you suggest?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, sir. I was going to explain my
list, put my list to the Tribunal and explain it, and then
the Tribunal could hear Dr. Kranzbuhler upon it, and adjourn
at whatever time it is suitable.
DR. KRANZBUHLER: May I make a statement in that regard?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
DR. KRANZBUHLER: I do not agree with such a proceeding, Mr.
President. Before this Tribunal I have said very little as
Defence Counsel so far; but I am of the opinion that it is
my turn now, and that I have to be granted permission to
submit my documents in that order in which I plan to and
which I consider correct for my defence.
I ask the Tribunal just to imagine what would have happened
if before the presentation of its case by the prosecution I
had said that I should like to speak about the relevancy of
the documents of the prosecution. I believe that this
comparison shows that I should not have thought of
proceeding in this way.
I shall try, before submitting my documents, to explain
their relevancy to a greater extent than I have thought
necessary up until now. But I ask the Tribunal to grant that
I present my case now and to limit the prosecution to making
their suggestions when I submit my documents individually.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The inconvenience of that course, my
Lord, is that I shall then be interrupting Dr. Kranzbuhler
every two or three documents, and making a specific
objection to an individual document, which will take a great
deal of time. I thought it would be more convenient if I
indicated to the Tribunal my objections to the documents in
the usual way by classes rather than individually.
I put it to the Tribunal to rule on whatever method they
think would be most convenient for them.
The last thing I want is to interfere with Dr. Kranzbuhler's
presentation but, on the other hand, the method that he
suggests will mean individual objections, because, of
course, an objection is useless if it is put in after Dr.
Kranzbuhler has dealt with the document. Or, if it is not
useless, it is at any rate of very much less weight.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, supposing that Sir David
presents his objections to the documents now, whether in
groups or in whatever way he likes, and you then answer him
individually upon each document, pointing out the relevance
in your view of each document; how does it harm you? The
Tribunal will then consider your arguments and will rule
upon them, and then you will know what documents the
Tribunal have ruled out, and you can then refer to any of
the other documents in any way you please?
The only object of it and the only effect of it is to
prevent the prosecution having to get up and interrupt, put
on the earphones, and take the time for an individual
objection to each document to which it wishes to object as
it turns up. I cannot see that it can interfere with you in
the least.
[Page 194]
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal would like you to
state now your objections to these documents. They will then
allow Dr. Kranzbuhler to proceed with his discussion of the
documents, answering your argument as to the admissibility
of each document that you object to when he comes to it.
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(Part 9 of 10)
"Prepared (for Case Weiss) the following measures:"
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
"On 15.8. Spee and all Atlantic submarines ready to sail.
And then we find the list of these ships:-
"21.8. Report B service about "Sparungsmassnahmen" of
French fleet.
And then the instructions:-
"31.8. Arrival Order 1 of OKW for conduct of war:
Forcible solution in the East, attack against Poland 1
September, 0445 hours. In the West responsibility for
starting hostilities unequivocally to be left to England
and France. Strictly respect neutrality of Holland,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland. The western border not
to be crossed. At sea no hostile actions or such that
could be interpreted as hostile. Air force only in
defence.
With the next document, Donitz No. 2, I should like to prove
that the British submarines, too, were active before the
start of the war and appeared in the Bay of Heligoland at
the very beginning of the war. It is on Page 2 of the
Document Book. I probably need only point out that as early
as 1st September the sound of electric motors was heard in
the Bay of Heligoland, and that on 4th September, several
reports arrived concerning English submarines sighted in the
Bay of Heligoland.
"At the same time Naval Operational Staff reports that
there are possibilities for the establishment of a 'Base
North' which seem to be very promising. In my opinion the
immediate introduction of all possible steps in order to
arrive at a clear judgement of the existing possibilities
is of the greatest importance."
And then there follows a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of such a base, which is absolutely identical
with the considerations mentioned in Exhibit GB 83.
It seems to me that this entry very clearly shows that that
could have happened only in accord with the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, I want to show that considerations as to bases
-
"Commander of U-boats receives instructions from Naval
Operational Staff to try out Base North. Naval
Operational Staff considers the trying out of the base by
'U 36,' due to sail within the next days, highly
desirable. Supply goods for tanker Phoenizia, in
Murmansk, going with fishing steamer to Murmansk on 22
November."