Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression A memorandum dated 2 May 1938, and entitled, "Organizational
Study 1950," originated in the office of the Chief of the
Organizational Staff of the General Staff of the Air Force.
Its purpose was said to be: "The task is to search, within a
framework of very broadly-conceived conditions, for the most
suitable type of organization of the Air Force." (L-43). The
result gained is termed, Distant Objective." From this is
deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the
process, which is called, "Final Objective 1942." This in
turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal
for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group
Commands, Air Gaus, Air Divisions, etc. (L-43)
The Table of Contents is divided into various sections.
Section I is entitled, "Assumptions." In connection with the
heading "Assumption I, frontier of Germany", a map is
enclosed (Chart No. 10). The map shows that on 2 May 1938
the Air Force was
[Page 680]
in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Austria, and Hungary, all of which are shown as within the
boundaries of the Reich.
The following is a pertinent extract from the memorandum:
"Consideration of the principles of organization on the
basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in
Section 1:
"1. Attack Forces: Principal adversaries: England,
France, and Russia." (L-43)
The study then goes on to show all the one hundred forty-
four Geschwader employed against England, very much
concentrated in the Western half of the Reich; that is to
say, they must be deployed in such a way that by making full
use of their range, they can reach all English territory
down to the last corner. Under the paragraph "Assumption"
double heading 2, the "Organization of Air Force in
peacetime" is shown and seven group commands are indicated:
(1) Berlin; (2) Brunswick; (3) Munich; (4) Vienna; (5)
Budapest; (6) Warsaw; and (7) Koenigsberg. (L-43)
Finally, the study declares:
"The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air
Force grows in strength, the more imperative it
becomes, to have locally bound commands ***" (L-43)
The original of this document is signed by an officer who is
not at the top rank in the German Air Force, and the
inferences that can be drawn from it should therefore not be
over-emphasized. At least, however, it shows the lines upon
which the General Staff of the Air Force were thinking at
that time.
On the 26 August 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign
Minister succeeding von Neurath, a document was addressed to
him as "The Reich Minister, via the State Secretary." The
document reads as follows:
"The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech
problem, might easily, but must not lead to a conflict
with the Entente. Neither France nor England are
looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both
would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she
should, without direct foreign interference and through
internal signs of disintegration, due to her own
faults, suffer the fate she deserves. This process,
however, would have to take place step by step and
would have to lead to a loss of power in the remaining
territory by means of a plebiscite and an annexation of
territory.
"The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough
for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch
inactively, and not even if this action should come
quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any
definite time and this fruit could be plucked without
too great a risk. She can only prepare the desired
developments.
"For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at
present of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten-
Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to
now, is to be taken up gradually. The international
conviction that the choice of nationality was being
withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework,
notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of
dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not
be finally speeded up by the mechanical means as well.
The fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however,
would not as yet be clearly decided by this, but would
nevertheless be definitely sealed.
"This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to
be recommended because of our relationship with Poland.
It is unavoidable that the German departure from the
problems of boundaries in the southeast and their
transfer to the east and northeast must make the Poles
sit up. The fact [is] that after the liquidation of the
Czech question, it will be generally assumed that
Poland will be the next.in turn.
"But the later this assumption sinks in in
international politics as a firm factor, the better. In
this sense, however, it is important for the time
being, to carry on the German policy, under the well
known and proved slogans of 'the right to autonomy' and
'Racial unity'. Anything else might be interpreted as
pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance
to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more
energetically, than our forces could stand up to." (TC-76)
That was on 26 August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was
leading up to the Munich settlement. While at Munich, a day
or two before the Munich agreement was signed, Herr Hitler
made a speech. On 26 September he said:
"I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that
when this problem is solved there will be no more
territorial problems for Germany in Europe." (TC-29)
A letter from Admiral Carl, dated some time in September,
with no precise date, and entitled "Opinion on the 'Draft
Study of Naval Warfare against England'," stated as follows:
"There is full agreement with the main theme of the
study."
*******
"If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to
acquire a position as a world power who needs not only
sufficient
[Page 682]
colonial possessions but also secure naval
communications and secure access to the ocean." (C-25)
That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich
agreement in September 1938. The gains of Munich were not,
of course, so great as the Nazi Government had hoped and
intended. As a result, the conspirators were not prepared
straight away to start any further aggressive action against
Poland or elsewhere. But with the advantages that were
gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, it is obvious now
that they intended and had taken the decision to proceed
against Poland so soon as Czechoslovakia had been entirely
occupied. As Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent occasions,
Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the attack on
Poland.
It is known now from what Hitler said in talking to his
military commanders at a later date, that, in his own words,
from the first he never intended to abide by the Munich
agreement, but that he had to have the whole of
Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed
in full force against Poland, after September 1938 they did
at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of
Danzig until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in
March. Immediately after the Sudetenland had been occupied,
preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland,
which would and was to eventually lead to the Nazi excuse or
justification for their attack on that country.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Poland, Danzig, England &
; France
(Part 4 of 21)