Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression The earlier discussions between the German and Polish
governments on the question of Danzig, which commenced
almost immediately after the Munich crisis in September
1938, began as cautious and friendly discussions, until the
remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March
of the following year. A document taken from the Official
Polish White Book, gives an account of a luncheon which took
place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on 25 October,
where Ribbentrop had discussions with M. Lipski, the Polish
ambassador to Germany. The report states:
"In a conversation on 24 October, over a luncheon at
the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was
present, von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a
general settlement of issues (Gesamtloesung) between
Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig
with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the
retention of railway and economic facilities there.
Poland would agree to the building of an extra-
territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze.
In exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility
of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by
twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-German
frontiers."
*******
"Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von
Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an
agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with
the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the
substance of this conversation to you." (TC-73 No. 44)
It seems clear that the whole question of Danzig, as indeed
Hitler himself said, was no question at all. Danzig was
raised simply as an excuse, a justification, not for the
seizure of Danzig but for the invasion and seizure of the
whole of Poland. As the story unfolds it will become ever
more apparent that that is what the Nazi conspirators were
really aiming at, only providing themselves with some kind
of crisis which would afford some kind of justification for
attacking Poland.
Another document taken from the Polish White Book (TC-73 No.
45) sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish
Foreign Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German
government in reply to the suggestions put forward by
Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on 24 October. The first part
reviews he history of Polish-German relationship and
emphasizes the needs of Poland in respect to Danzig.
Paragraph 6 of the document states:
"In the circumstances, in the understanding of the
Polish government, the Danzig question is governed by
two factors: the right of the German population of the
city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life
and development; and the fact that in all matters
appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected
with Poland. Apart from the national character of the
majority of the population, everything in Danzig is
definitely bound up with Poland." (TC-73 No. 45)
The document then sets out the guarantees to Poland under
the statute, and continues as follows:
"Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration,
and desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations
by way of a friendly understanding with the government
of the German Reich, the Polish government proposes the
replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its
prerogatives by a bi-lateral Polish-German Agreement.
This agreement should guarantee the existence of the
Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national
and cultural life to its German majority, and also
should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the
complications involved in such a system, the Polish
government must state that any other solution,
[Page 684]
and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free
City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a
conflict. This would not only take the form of local
difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of
Polish-German understanding in all its aspects.
"In face of the weight and cogency of these questions,
I am ready to have final conversations personally with
the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it
necessary, however, that you should first present the
principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual
contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be
dangerous for the future." (TC-73 No. 45)
The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely
successful from the German point of view. The Nazis had put
forward a proposal, the return of the City of Danzig to the
Reich, which they might well have known would have been
unacceptable. It was unacceptable and the Polish government
had warned the Nazi government that it would be. The Poles
had offered to enter into negotiations, but they had not
agreed, which is exactly what the German government had
hoped for. They had not agreed to the return of Danzig to
the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been
accomplished.
Shortly afterwards, within a week or so, and after the
Polish government had offered to enter into discussions with
the German government, another top secret order was issued
by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed by Keitel
(C-137). Copies went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. The order is
headed "First Supplement to Instruction dated October 21
1938," and reads:
"The Fuehrer has ordered: Apart from the three
contingencies mentioned in the instructions of October
21 1938, preparations are also to be made to enable the
Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by
surprise.
"The preparations will be made on the following basis:
Condition is quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig,
exploiting a politically favorable situation, not a war
against Poland." (C-137)
The remainder of Czechoslovakia had not yet been seized, and
therefore the Nazis were not yet ready to go to war with
Poland. But Keitel's order shows how the German government
answered the Polish proposal to enter into discussions.
On 5 January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler.
(TC-73 No. 48). Ribbentrop was also present. In the first
part of that conversation, of which that document is an
account, Hitler offered to answer any questions. He said he
had always followed the policy laid down by the 1934
agreement. He discussed
[Page 685]
the question of Danzig and emphasized that in the German
view it must sooner or later return to Germany. The
conversation continued:
"Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very
difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's
suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland,
and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only
people thinking politically but the widest spheres of
Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this
matter.
"In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve
this -problem it would be necessary to try to find
something quite new, some new form, for which he used
the term 'Korperschaft,' which on the one hand would
safeguard the interests of the German population, and
on the other the Polish interests. In addition, the
Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at
ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and
nothing would be done to render difficult the situation
of the Polish Government." (TC-73 No. 48)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Poland, Danzig, England &
; France
(Part 5 of 21)