Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression The background of the German intrigue in Slovakia is
outlined in two British diplomatic despatches (D-571, D-572)
and excerpts from despatches sent by M. Coulondre, the
French Ambassador in Berlin to the French Foreign Office
between 13 March 1939 and 18 March 1939, and published in
the French Yellow Book. (2943-PS)
In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On
that day the Czechoslovakian government dismissed those
members of the Slovak Cabinet who refused to continue
negotiations with Prague, among them Prime Minister Tiso and
Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this act of
the Czech government as an excuse for intervention. On the
following day, 11 March, a strange scene was enacted in
Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is related in the report
of the British Minister in Prague to the British government:
"Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German
generals came at about 10 P. M. on the evening of
Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting in
progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government
that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia.
When M. Sidor (the Prime Minister) showed hesitation,
Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that
Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of
Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore,
to proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would
otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor
thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said
that he must discuss the situation with the Government
at Prague." (D-571)
Events were now moving rapidly. Durcansky, one of the
dismissed ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna,
where the facilities of the German broadcasting station were
placed at his disposal. Arms and ammunition were brought
from German
[Page 569]
Offices in Engerau, across the Danube, into Slovakia where
they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guard to create
incident and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as
an excuse for military action. The situation at Engerau is
described in an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks:
"I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn,
depose and state as follows:
"1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the
winter of 1939 I was stationed in Berlin, working in
Amt VI, Chief Sector South East. Early in March, four
or five days before Slovakia declared its independence,
Heydrich, who was chief of the SD, ordered me to report
to Nebe, the chief of the Reich Criminal Police. Nebe
had been told by Heydrich to accelerate the production
of explosives which his department was manufacturing
for the use of certain Slovak groups. These explosives
were small tins weighing approximately 500 grams.
"2. As soon as forty or fifty of these explosives had
been finished, I carried them by automobile to a small
village called Engerau, just across the border from
Pressburg in Slovakia. The Security Police had a
Service Department in this village for the handling of
SD activities. I turned over the explosives to this
office and found there a group of Slovaks, including
Karmasin, Mach, Tuka and Durcansky. In fact, three of
these people then present later became ministers in the
new Slovak government. I was informed that the
explosives were to be turned over to the Hlinka Guards
across the border in Slovakia and were to be used in
incidents designed to create the proper atmosphere for
a revolution.
"3. I stayed in Engerau for a day and a half and then
returned to Berlin.
"4. One or two weeks later I met in Berlin the same
Slovak delegation, including Mach, Tuka, Durcansky and
Karmasin, which I had seen in Engerau. They had flown
to Berlin for a conference with Goering. Heydrich asked
me to look after them and to report to him what
developed during the conference with Goering. I
reported this conference in detail to Heydrich. It
dealt principally with the organization of the new
Slovak state.. My principal recollection of the
conference is that the Slovaks hardly got a word in
because Goer ing was talking all the time.
"The facts stated above are true; this declaration is
made by
[Page 570]
me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading
over the statement I have signed and executed the same
at NURNBERG, Germany this 20th day of November 1945.
"(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks"
At this time the German press and radio launched a violent
campaign against the Czechoslovak government. And,
significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in
Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed prime minister, was summoned
by Hitler to an audience in the German capital. A plane was
awaiting him in Vienna. (998-PS; 3061-PS; 2943-PS)
M. Occupation of Czechoslovakia Under Threat of Military
Force.
At this point, in the second week of March 1939,
preparations for what the Nazi leaders liked to call the
"liquidation" of Czechoslovakia were progressing with a
gratifying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and
propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in
close coordination. As during Case Green of the preceding
summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary to
participate in the attack. It appears from a letter Admiral
Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, wrote to Hitler on 13 March
1939, which was captured in the German Foreign Office files,
that Horthy was flattered by the invitation:
"Your Excellency, "My sincere thanks.
"I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head
Water Region -- I dislike using big words -- is of
vital importance to the life of Hungary.
"In spite of the fact that our recruits have only been
serving for 5 weeks we are going into this affair with
eager enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been
made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier
incident will take place which will be followed by the
big blow on Saturday.
"I shall never forget this proof of friendship and your
Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all
times. "Your devoted friend.
"(Signed) HORTHY "
From this letter it may be inferred that the Nazi conspirators had already informed the Hungarian government of their plans
[Page 571]
for military action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned
out, the timetable was advanced somewhat.
On the diplomatic level Ribbentrop was active. On 13 March,
the same day on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop
sent a cautionary telegram to the German minister in Prague,
outlining the course of conduct he should pursue during the
coming diplomatic pressure:
"Telegram in secret code
"With reference to telephone instructions given by
Kordt today.
"In case you should get any written communication from
President HACHA, please do not make any written or
verbal comments or take any other action on them but
pass them on here by cipher telegram. Moreover, I must
ask you and the other members of the Embassy to make a
point of not being available if the Czech government
wants to communicate with you during the next few days.
"(Signed) RIBBENTROP". (2815-PS)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia<(Part 24 of 29)
ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS"(3030-PS)
Budapest. 13 March 1939." (2816-PS)