Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression On the afternoon of 13 March, Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by
Durcansky and by Karmasin, the local Nazi- leader, arrived
in Berlin in response to the summons from Hitler. Late that
afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler in his study in the
Reichs Chancellery and was presented with an ultimatum. Two
alternatives were given him: either to declare the
independence of Slovakia or to be left, without German
assistance, to the mercies of Poland and Hungary. This
decision, Hitler said, was not a question of days, but of
hours. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of this
meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13 March show that in the
inducements Hitler held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed
his customary disregard for truth:
"*** Now he [Hitler] had permitted Minister Tiso to
come here in order to make this question clear in a
very short time. Germany had no interests east of the
Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to him what
happened there. The question was whether Slovakia
wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not
wish for anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge
his people or even a single soldier to something which
was not in any way desired by the Slovak people. He
would like to secure final confirmation as to what
Slovakia really wished. He did not wish that reproaches
should come from Hungary that he was preserving
something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He
took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in
general, but in this connection, unrest was only an
outward indica-
[Page 572]
tion of interior instability. He would not tolerate it,
and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in
order to hear his decision. It was not a question of
days, but of hours. He had stated at that time that if
Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would
support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would
stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it
clear that she wished for independence. If she
hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection
with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to
the mercy of events, for which he was no longer
responsible. In that case he would only intercede for
German interests and those did not lie east of the
Carpathians. Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia.
She had never belonged to Germany.
"The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister if he had
any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also
emphasized for his part the conception that in this
case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He
showed the Fuehrer a message he had just received which
reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak
frontiers. The Fuehrer read this report, mentioned it
to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would
soon decide clearly for herself." (2802-PS)
Those present at this meeting included Ribbentrop, Keitel,
State Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, and
Minister of State Meissner.
While in Berlin, the Slovaks also conferred separately with
Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials. Ribbentrop
solicitously handed Tiso a copy, already drafted in SIovak,
of the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia. On the
night of 13 March a German plane was placed at Tiso's
disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the
wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the Diet of Bratislava
proclaimed the independence of Slovakia.
With Slovak extremists, acting at Nazi bidding, in open
revolt against the Czechoslovak government, the Nazi leaders
were now in a position to move against Prague. On the
evening of 14 March, at the suggestion of the German
Legation in Prague M. Hacha, the president of the
Czechoslovak republic, and M. Chvalkovsky, his foreign
minister, arrived in Berlin. The atmosphere in which they
found themselves was hostile. Since the preceding weekend
the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of using violence
against the Slovaks and especially against members of the
German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and
radio
[Page 573]
proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger, that
the situation was intolerable and that it was necessary to
smother as quickly as possible the focus of trouble which
Prague had become in the heart of Europe.
After midnight on the 15 March, at 1:15 in the morning,
Hacha and Chvalkovsky were ushered into the Reichs
Chancellery. They found there Hitler, von Ribbentrop,
Goering, Keitel, and other high Nazi officials. The captured
German Foreign Office account of this meeting furnishes a
revealing picture of Nazi behaviour and tactics. It must be
remembered that this account of the conference of the night
of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and must be read
as an account biased by its source.
Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory, even
humble. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and said he knew
that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Fuehrer's
hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been
forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because
of the great age of the President. (Hacha was then in his
seventies.) But this journey, Hitler told the President,
could be of great advantage to his country, because "it was
only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene." The
conference proceeded as follows, with Hitler speaking:
"Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If
Slovakia had kept closer to Germany, it would have been
an obligation to Germany, but he was glad that he did
not have this obligation now. He had no interests
whatsoever in the territory east of the Lower
Carpathian Mts. Last autumn he had not wanted to draw
the final consequences because he had believed that it
was possible to live together. But even at that time,
and also later in his conversations with Chvalkovsky,
he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this
state if Benes' tendencies were not completely revised.
Chvalkovsky understood this and asked the Fuehrer to
have patience. The Fuehrer saw this point of view, but
the months went by without any change. The new regime
did not succeed in eliminating the old one
psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth
to mouth propaganda, dismissals of Germans and many
other things which, to him, were a symbol of the whole
situation. At first he had not understood this but when
it became clear to him he drew his conclusions because,
had the development continued in this way, the
relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have
become the same as six months ago. Why did
Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its army to a
reasonable size? Such
[Page 574]
an army was a tremendous burden for such a state
because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign
political mission of the State. Since Czechoslovakia no
longer has a foreign political mission, such an army is
meaningless. He enumerates several examples which
proved to him that the spirit in the army was not
changed. This symptom convinced him that the army would
be a severe political burden in the future. Added to
this were the inevitable development of economic
necessities and, further, the protests from national
groups which could no longer endure life as it was.
"Last Sunday, therefore, for me the die was cast. I
summoned the Hungarian envoy and notified him that I
was withdrawing my [restraining] hands from the
country. We are now confronted with this fact. He had
given the order to the German troops top march into
Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into
the German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia
fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a larger
extent than she had ever enjoyed during Austrian rule.
Germanys attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be
determined tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the
Czechoslovakian military towards the German troops. He
no longer trusts the government. He believes in the
honesty and straight forwardness of Hacha and
Chvalkovsky but doubts that the government will be able
to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army
had already started out today, and at one barracks
where resistance was offered, it was ruthlessly broken;
another barracks had given in at the deployment of
heavy artillery.
"At 6 oclock in the morning the German army would
invade Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German air
force would occupy the German air fields. There existed
two possibilities. The first one would be that the
invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle.
In this case the resistance will be broken by all means
with physical force. The other possibility is that the
invasion of the German troops occurs in Bearable form.
In that case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give
Czechoslovakia at the new organization of Czech life a
generous life of her own, autonomy and a certain
national liberty.
"We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-
point. He would not like to torture and de-nationalize
the Czechs. He also did not do all that because of
hatred but in order to protect Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of
[Page 575]
last year would not have yielded, the Czech people
would have been exterminated. Nobody could have
prevented him from doing that. It was his will that the
Czech people should live a full national life and he
believed firmly that a way could be found which would
make far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If
fighting would break out tomorrow, the pressure would
result in counter-pressure One would annihilate one
another and it would then not be possible any more for
him to give the promised alleviations. Within two days
the Czech army would not exist any more. Of course,
Germans would also be killed and this would result in a
hatred which would force him because of his instinct of
self-preservation not to grant autonomy any more. The
world would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the
Czech people when he read the foreign press. It gave
him the impression expressed in a German proverb: The
Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go.
"That was the state of affairs. There were two courses
open to Germany, a harder one which did not want any
concessions and wished in memory of the past that
Czechoslovakia would be conquered with blood, and
another one, the attitude of which corresponded with
the proposals stated above.
"That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come
here. This invitation was the last good deed which he
could offer to the Czech people. If it would come to a
fight, the bloodshed would also force us to hate. But
the visit of Hacha could perhaps prevent the extreme.
Perhaps it would contribute to finding a form of
construction which would be much more far-reaching for
Czechoslovakia than she could ever have hoped for in
old Austria. His aim was only to create a necessary
security for the German people.
"The hours went past. At 6 oclock the troops would
march in. He was almost ashamed to say that there was
one German division to each Czech battalion. The
military action was no small one, but planned with all
generosity. He would advise him now to retire with
Chvalkovsky in order to discuss what should be done."
(2798-PS)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia<(Part 25 of 29)