One Hundred and Fifty-Sixth Day:
Monday, 17th June, 1946 [Page 303]
What do you say about Mr. Messersmith's statement?
[Franz von Papen] A. The details given by Mr. Messersmith show that this is
obviously an agent's report on my trip to Berlin received by
the Austrian Foreign Minister. The contents of that report
are largely incorrect. The inaccuracy of the passage
referring to Dr. Schacht has already been shown by Dr.
Schacht's testimony. But in that report there is something
which is true. At that time there was a so-called relief
fund in Austria, which was managed by a certain Herr
Langott.
It has already been testified here in the witness box that
this relief measure, which was intended to benefit wives and
children of Austrian National Socialists who had emigrated
to Germany, existed with the knowledge of the Austrian
Government and police. But I neither requested Herr Schacht
to make available official funds for this relief fund, nor
did I myself pay out such moneys. Obviously this money
originated from Party sources in Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection therewith, I refer to the
testimony of Glaise-Horstenau, who stated here that the
Austrian Government knew of the "Langott" relief fund.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Messersmith believes that from information received
from the Austrian Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg, he can
reproduce the following statement made by you at the
beginning of 1935:
A. Such a statement would have been not only extremely
foolish from a diplomatic point of view, but actually
impossible, because it would certainly have put an end to
all diplomatic activity.
In no case could the co-operation, which Mr. Messersmith
states was carried on successfully for years, or the
political activity which he describes as also being
[Page 304]
Q. Mr. Messersmith goes on to say in this affidavit, that
you had publicly stated that you wished to get rid of
certain members of the Austrian Government, among them
Chancellor Schuschnigg. Is that true?
A. The contrary is true. I never aimed at the removal of
Chancellor Schuschnigg; it was rather my aim to give him
confidence in my policy, in the policy of reconciliation. I
not only knew Herr von Schuschnigg to be an upright Austrian
patriot but also a man who was far from wishing to deny his
German ties, and in spite of many differences in policy,
these German antecedents of his made an excellent basis for
collaboration. I can ask only in addition whether a
diplomat, who desires a change to come about in the
government to which he is accredited, would proclaim it from
the roof-tops?
Q. The prosecution have submitted a report which you made to
Hitler, dated 17th May, 1935, as proof of your desire to
steer Schuschnigg into a government collaborating with the
National Socialists. This is Exhibit USA 64, included again
in my Document book under Document 66, on Pages 159 and 160.
Witness, what were your intentions, actually?
A. I must be a little more explicit with reference to this
document. This report was written eight months after the
Dollfuss murder, that is, within the first two years, during
which period the prosecution themselves admit that I had
instructions to remain entirely passive. When this report
was written we had news that Starhemberg, in conjunction
with Mussolini, was pursuing a policy which would have put
serious difficulties in the way of an understanding between
Austria and Germany. For this reason I suggested to Hitler a
drastic intervention: I proposed that Schuschnigg and the
Christian Socialist elements, which were hostile to a
Heimwehr dictatorship, should be played off against
Starhemberg by the offer of a final agreement on
German-Austrian interests. This report states that if
Germany were to recognize the national independence of
Austria and were to undertake to refrain from influencing
the opposition in Austria, by which I meant the Nazis, a
coalition between these factions would be bound to result.
The consequence would be that Germany would participate in
the Danube agreement, which would be tantamount to a
peaceful solution of the entire European situation.
Q. You have just explained that you were pursuing an honest
policy of balancing interests?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal would like to
understand more clearly what the defendant means by what he
has just said.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have just been told that the translation
came over very badly; the English translation is said to
have come through very badly. Would you suggest, Mr.
President, that the defendant repeat the entire answer?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, most certainly. That is the best way. I
think it is very likely that the English translation came
over badly.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Witness, will you please repeat your answer but rather
more slowly so that the interpreters will have no
difficulty?
A. When this report was written, we had news that
Starhemberg - Starhemberg was the chief of the Heimwehr -
wanted to link himself with Mussolini in a policy which
would be hostile in future to any Germanophile tendencies in
Austria. In order to counter Prince Starhemberg's manoeuvre,
I advised Hitler to suggest to Schuschnigg that, instead of
forming a coalition with the Heimwehr, he should do so with
the Christian Socialist elements, who were not opposed to a
reconciliation of Germany with Austria. In order to induce
him to enter into such a coalition, Hitler was to offer
Schuschnigg a final settlement of German and Austrian
interests. In other words, Hitler was to tell him that
Germany would recognize the national independence of Austria
and would undertake not to interfere in future in the
internal affairs of Austria.
[Page 305]
THE PRESIDENT: You are not forgetting your hopes which you
expressed this morning?
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. You have just said that you pursued an honest policy of
co-ordination of interests.
Is it true that you persuaded Hitler to make a statement in
favour of Austria's independence in his Reichstag speech on
21st May, 1936?
A. Yes, that is perfectly true, because that statement was
the prerequisite for any normal settlement of interests in a
revolutionary way; for our joint policy could only be
advanced by Austria. Austria had been ordered by the peace,
treaty of St. Germain and the protocol of Geneva to remain
aloof from Germany. If Austria, therefore, were to take the
initiative and improve her relations with Germany, it was
essential that we should first recognize her sovereignty.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I draw your attention to a mistake in the
translation. In the English translation the words
"revolutionary way" should read "evolutionary way."
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Will you please comment on the pact of 11th July, 1936?
A. The agreement of 11th July has been described by Sir
David as a deceptive manoeuvre and an attempt to get the
Austrian Government into new difficulties, to undermine it
by introducing men of pro-German sympathies, like
Glaise-Horstenau or Foreign Minister Schmidt. This judgement
passed upon the pact is entirely incorrect, and I think
historically untenable; and I believe that that has been
proved by examinations here and the statements of the
Austrian Foreign Minister.
The pact was the result of my efforts over two years to
re-establish normal relations between the sister nations.
The agreement was desired by both governments, not by the
German Government only, and Chancellor Schuschnigg admitted
that himself, as mentioned in a report of mine, dated 1st
September, 1936, on a speech made by Schuschnigg to Austrian
workers. Why should the Austrian Government have concluded
this pact? It was not compelled to conclude it, unless it
wanted to bring about normal, friendly relations with the
German Reich.
For that very reason I had asked Hitler to proclaim Austrian
sovereignty in his Reichstag speech. That agreement was
certainly not intended to imply our willingness to give up
the idea of union at a later date, which we wanted, but it
acknowledged Austria's full independence of action. But the
aim of union of the two States was now to be pursued in a
regular and evolutionary manner.
This corresponded with the agreement which I had made with
Hitler on 26th July. There was a second part to that
agreement which was not published. It contained all the
elements necessary for pacification - an amnesty, the
regulation of our Press relations and the lifting of the
so-called "1,000 mark bar." This was a frontier bar imposed
by Hitler's decree upon people travelling into Austria. Any
German wishing to go to Austria at that time had to pay
1,000 marks. This bar was removed. Herr Schuschnigg, for his
part, promised in this unpublished part of the agreement
that men in his confidence, who were members of the national
[Page 306]
Mr. Messersmith, if I may add, stated incorrectly in his
affidavit:
On the whole, world public opinion at that time regarded
this agreement as an instrument of peace and a great step
forward. It was left to the prosecution to call it a
deceptive manoeuvre.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Prince Erbach's affidavit,
Document 96, of the English book, Pages 233 and 234,
questions 4 to 7 and questions 12 and 13, dealing with the
subject which we have just discussed.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Did you, after the conclusion of the July Agreement,
regard your mission in Austria as terminated?
A. Yes, I regarded it as terminated. That is proved by the
resignation which I tendered to Hitler on 16th July, 1936.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 71, Page 165 of the
second Document Book. I quote the beginning:
"With the agreement signed on 11th July, the decisive
step has been taken in this direction."
Q. The Prosecution have used the report you made to Hitler
on 1st September, 1936, 2246-PS, and they accuse you of
remaining in contact with the illegal leaders of the
Austrian National Socialists, of attempting to bring that
opposition into the Fatherland Front and of desiring to
change the Schuschnigg regime.
A. In the report mentioned I wrote:
[Page 307]
If I am accused by the prosecution of having had contacts
with the Nazi opposition, although the July Agreement had
excluded all intervention in Austrian affairs, I must point
out that I was perfectly entitled to these contacts because
I was interested in ascertaining whether and how far Herr
von Schuschnigg kept his promise to draw men in whom he had
confidence from the nationalist opposition for
collaboration. Just how far the Nazi opposition submitted to
that agreement of 11th July is shown by Leopold's statement
in January, 1937, which Mr. Messersmith has attached to his
own affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 75, Page 171, which
contains this file note of Leopold. The document is
identical with Exhibit USA 57. There is an error in the
English translation. In the fifth last line, on Page 1, the
word "Anschluss" has been translated by "annexation."
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Witness, what do you have to say about Leopold's
proposals?
A. Leopold's proposals show the following. The leaders of
the Austrian Nazis fully accepted the policy of the July
Agreement. They recognized that in future the question of
the Anschluss would be an internal Austrian affair to be
settled by the Austrian Government. They proposed that this
solution should be found in an evolutionary manner by the
Austrian Government and the Party. In favour of this
solution is the fact that by means of the declaration of the
sovereignty of Austria, these arguments could, in the
future, no longer represent foreign political dangers for
Austria, that is, that the agreement of July was approved of
by the Austrian National Socialists, and that they were
prepared to proceed in a legal way with the Austrian
Government.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 18th June, 1946, at 1000
hours.)
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(Part 8 of 8)
"Yes, now you have your French and English friends, and
you can have your independence a little longer."
Did you make such a statement?
"Part II of this pact contained a clause that a number of
persons who were in the Chancellor's (Hitler's)
confidence should be called to positions in the cabinet."
That, obviously, is a mistaken conclusion on Mr.
Messersmith's part, because we were not concerned with
people who had Hitler's confidence, but with those who had
Schuschnigg's confidence. This was an agreement made by
Schuschnigg. Apart from this, Mr. Messersmith says with
reference to this agreement:
"The first penetration of German nationals into the
Austrian Government was achieved through the nomination
of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs."
This is entirely wrong. Dr. Schmidt was an Austrian and
directed Austrian policy; he represented Austrian interests,
as was natural, and at no time did Germany exert any
influence to make him, Dr. Schmidt, Foreign Minister.
"On 26th July, 1934, you proposed to the late Field
Marshal that I should be sent to Vienna on a temporary
mission to restore normal and friendly relations.
In a later part of the document, he asks to be recalled. I
go on to quote the last but one paragraph:
"Even though the 'German question' will need very careful
and considerate handling in the future too - especially
after the incredible difficulties which have gone before
- I would like now, at the end of the task you entrusted
to me, to place my resignation in your hands."
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
"In the normalisation of relations to Germany, progress
has been hindered by the stubbornness of the Ministry of
Security, where the old anti-National-Socialist officials
are located. Changes in regime are, therefore, urgently
required."
The expression which I used in this report, "Changes in
regime," actually means "Changes in personnel"; in that
connection I also go on to say, in the