One Hundred and Fiftieth Day:
Saturday, 8th June, 1946
[Page 49]
After the Fuehrer's entourage had left, I requested an
interview with Kaltenbrunner in the passage. Essential
points:
Kaltenbrunner: 'The Fuehrer has completely mistaken
ideas. The duties of the SD are also constantly
misunderstood. Those things are no concern of the SD.
Moreover, no German soldier would do what the Fuehrer
demands, it is not in his line. He does not kill
prisoners; if individual fanatical party followers of
Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier
intervenes. The Fuehrer has a completely false idea of
the views held by our soldiers. Moreover, I myself will
do nothing in the matter either. I have no intention of
doing anything. We must just see how we can get out of
it, otherwise we will be the first to go. We must gain
time. I am leaving Berlin again at once for a fairly
long time anyway.'
Koller: 'Then we are agreed on the main point. Your
leaving Berlin is favourable. But we must have another
way out as far as the Fuehrer is concerned, for it is
possible that he may again refer to his order tomorrow.
Later on, if it goes to extremes, we will have to see
how we can put a stop to the business, or what is going
to happen to us?' [Page 50]
All members of air crews previously captured not in the
hands of the Luftwaffe, but dispersed under the control
of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE); time of capture
not known to a central office. It would therefore be a
lengthy and difficult process to determine the number of
air personnel captured during the last few months. Also,
preparations must be made in detail for getting them out
without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go
automatically, to interrogation centres. Those are in
process of transfer owing to operations. Liaison is bad.
Therefore, detailed discussions and agreements with the
SD are necessary. In order to preserve the appearance of
discussion, the Ic officer of the High Command of the
Luftwaffe (Ic des OKL) should go to a delegate of
Kaltenbrunner, who, however, would first have to be
appointed.
After the Fuehrer's conference, I spoke to Field-Marshal
Keitel in the entrance of the air raid shelter and said:
'The Fuehrer's order is insane ! ' (Keitel put in: 'It
certainly is.') 'The Luftwaffe must keep its escutcheon
clean. The order cannot be carried out. I am convinced
that the Reichsmarschall is entirely of my opinion. To
issue such an order - and verbally - and, moreover, with
such threats of punishment! He must sign an order of this
kind with his own name. It may or may not be carried out
- but not by the Luftwaffe. Not by the SD, either. I have
spoken to Kaltenbrunner.'
Koller: 'The Luftwaffe cannot join in this in any
circumstances. We will not assume such a
responsibility.'
Field-Marshal Keitel: 'You are right; neither can I. I
must think over what I can do about it and how I can do
it.'
After refreshments in a side-room of the air raid shelter
I had to cross the antechamber of the conference room
again to reach the cloakroom and exit. Hitler happened to
come out of the room to give an order to an orderly; and
he called me as I was passing. The door leading to the
conference room was open and Ley was sitting at the
table.
Hitler said to me:
Koller: 'The Air Defence and our crews do what they can
and what is humanly possible. Our neglect of air
armament and the enemy's present technical and
numerical superiority cannot be eliminated or remedied
overnight. When the searchlight units at last get
stronger, the air situation over Germany will be more
in our favour.'
Hitler: 'I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be
responsible to the German people for the continuation
of this situation in the air. If those flyers realize
that they will be liquidated as terrorists, they will
think twice about flying here.' [Page 51]
Hitler: 'No, the Japanese method is the best.'
After my arrival at the Luftwaffe Headquarters (Kurfurst)
I told Colonel von Brauchitsch what had happened and
ordered him to report it to the Reichsmarschall as soon
as possible. I myself could not contact the
Reichsmarschall at the moment. During our conversation
Brauchitsch also expressed disapproval of the Fuehrer's
order.
An hour or two later the Reichsmarschall called me and
began with the following words:
[Page 52]
I cannot judge as to whether Hitler deliberately let
matters drop or whether he forgot about it under the
pressure of events.
I know that about two or three weeks later an OKW
directive was issued - I think a teletype - in which, as
I recall, mention was made of the eye-witness report that
occasioned it. It disclosed the fact that the Fuehrer had
expressed his displeasure that German soldiers had taken
action against their own people.
No mention was made of the main point of Hitler's order.
If I remember correctly, the directive was signed by
Keitel and must be regarded as an attempt to cover
himself as far as the Fuehrer was concerned. In my
opinion, General Jodl had nothing to do with the affair
at all."
[HERBERT BUCHS] A. I remember personally something like the following
expression by the Fuehrer "This comes of the fact that in
the Luftwaffe the conduct of war is based on a mutual policy
of 'Live and let live'." That was the sentence which
impressed me most strongly, which emphasises what was said -
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Then I need not ask you any
further questions on this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, we will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken.)
Q. Witness, I assume that you can still recollect how the
offices of the Fuehrer's headquarters were furnished.
A. Yes, I can still remember.
Q. In the offices occupied by the Fuehrer the Field-Marshal,
the General and yourself, were there maps on the wall?
A. Yes, and also in East Prussia - particularly the
Headquarters - the Fuehrer had a topographic map of Germany
as well as a political map of Europe, and there were similar
maps in the various other rooms.
Q. Were maps of Germany hanging there too?
A. Yes.
Q. And the neighbouring territories on which concentration
camps and penal institutions were indicated with a red or
blue ring?
A. No. Neither in the Headquarters in East Prussia nor in
the Reich Chancellery in Berlin nor at the Berghof in
Berchtesgaden have I ever seen such a map.
Q. At 12.30 midday on 11th May, 1946, the Munich radio
station broadcast a letter from a painter asserting that he
had seen maps in the Fuehrer's Headquarters which could only
be intended to show the location of concentration camps. Is
that possible?
A. That is quite out of the question.
Q. Was there any more detailed statement about -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need go into the broadcast
from Munich. We have no evidence of a broadcast from Munich.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I did not
ask him whether he heard it, but I wanted to illustrate how
the public had come to believe that there were such maps.
Thank you, I have no further question.
THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that it ought not
to be referred to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which
you alleged, that there was a broadcast, ought not to be
referred to.
[Page 53]
Q. Major Buchs, during the time you spent as commanding
officer attached to Fuehrer Headquarters were you regularly
present at the daily discussions of the situation?
A. Yes, I participated in the daily military situation
discussions.
Q. Do you still remember whether you attended the situation
conference of 27th January, 1945, at which the fate of the
10,000 air force officers imprisoned in the Sagan camp was
discussed?
A. I can remember something like this: Fegelein must have
raised the question of evacuating that camp on the approach
of the Russian troops. These captured officers were asked
whether they wished to remain in the camp and be handed over
to the Russian Army, or whether they wanted to be taken away
in the course of the evacuation of Silesia. As far as I
remember, they definitely decided on the latter alternative,
that is to say, to be taken away; and I believe that the
only question still to be decided was how their transport
was to be arranged.
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(Part 3 of 6)
[DR. JAHRREISS continues his direct examination of Herbert Buchs] Hitler turned angrily to me and said excitedly:
'I have already issued one order that bomber crews
which bale out are not to be protected against the
population. These people only murder German women and
children. It is unheard of that German soldiers should
take measures to protect these against our own
population, which is acting from motives of justifiable
hate. Why are my orders not carried out?'
Surprised by this attack I replied something like this:
'I know nothing about any such order; and it would in
any case be a practical impossibility.'
Hitler turned to me and said very loudly and sharply:
'The reason why my orders are not carried out is only
the cowardice of the Luftwaffe, because the gentlemen
of the Luftwaffe are cowards and are afraid that
something might happen to them too. The whole thing is
nothing more than a cowardly pact between the Luftwaffe
and the British and American airmen.'
Hitler turned then also to Kaltenbrunner, who happened to
be present in the background, and went on, addressing
him, but sometimes not looking at him .
'I hereby order that all bomber crews who baled out in
the last few months, as well as all bomber crews baling
out in future, are to be turned over immediately by the
Luftwaffe to the SD and are to be liquidated by them.
Anyone failing to carry out my orders or taking action
against the population is liable to the death penalty
and is to be shot.'
Hitler then further expressed in general terms his
indignation and his views on the matter. The assembled
officers gave an impression of general surprise and
disapproval.
Koller: 'It is impossible to carry out those orders.
The Luftwaffe will have nothing more to do with them, I
myself in no circumstances whatsoever and I can say as
much for the Reichsmarschall. It is entirely out of the
question that the Luftwaffe will agree to this in any
shape or form.'
The following was decided at my suggestion: no order on
the lines decreed by the Fuehrer would be issued by the
Luftwaffe or the SD. Surrenders to the SD - none. In case
the Fuehrer should refer to his order again, then, first
of all, prevent further action through explanations of
the following kind
Field-Marshal Keitel: 'He will not sign such orders
then, and everything is always left on the shoulders of
the OKW. But I'll be damned if I issue such an order.'
The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was
called to the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and
annoyed about the Fuehrer's order.
'I must come back to my order once more. You must all
help me, for matters cannot go on like this any longer.
The Luftwaffe, or at least the Reich Defence
Organization, has failed. What am I to do against the
frightful bombing terror which is murdering only German
women and children?'
Koller: 'That will certainly not improve the situation
in the air. On the contrary, it will make it worse.'
Hitler's manner was now calm again - at least in
comparison with what it had been at the gathering. He
appeared more approachable. Experience had shown that it
was better to talk to him alone than in the presence of
others. I thought it was a good opportunity to attack the
whole problem and declared:
'If I may state my point of view, I think that this
will not do. Measures of this kind are in such crass
opposition to the education, feelings and way of
thinking of all soldiers, that they cannot be carried
out. One cannot train soldiers on the regulations
governing warfare and decent conduct and then order
actions which are repulsive to everyone. You must not
forget, my Fuehrer, that enemy airmen also carry out
orders and do their duty just as ours do. If they are
shot down or make forced landings, they are defenceless
and unarmed prisoners. What would the world think of
us? And the first thing the enemy would do would be to
treat our air crews in the same way. That is something
for which we cannot answer to our men and their
relatives. All their willingness to serve and their
discipline would collapse at one blow.'
Up to that point the Fuehrer had not interrupted me.
After his first glance at me he looked away again and
seemed to be lost in thought. He had been listening;
however, and at that point he interrupted me and said
quietly and earnestly:
'So the Luftwaffe is afraid after all. That is all very
well; but I am responsible for the protection of the
German people and have no other means except this.'
Hitler turned away and went back into the conference
room.
'Tell me, has he gone quite mad now?'
It was quite clear who was meant. I myself reported the
principal happenings and the conversation with
Kaltenbrunner to the Reichsmarschall again and added:
'I will not carry out this order or anything connected
with it. I will endeavour to handle the situation so as
to gain time just now, in any case, and will do
everything in my power to protect any of us from
disastrous consequences. Perhaps after the last
conference the Fuehrer will not refer to his order
again, If he does, however, a very difficult situation
will arise; and you will have to go to the Fuehrer
yourself. What he has ordered must in no case be
allowed to happen.'
The Reichsmarschall expressed strong disapproval of
Hitler's attitude and agreed with me in every point. He
ordered me to act as I had suggested, to inform him
immediately when necessary, and ended the interview with
these words:
'This is all insane and cannot be done.'
Measures against Allied airmen on the basis of the
above-mentioned Fuehrer order were taken neither by the
Luftwaffe nor by the SD. This order did not become known,
in my opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or
its offices, as the Replacement Army Command was not
present at the Fuehrer's meeting and the order was not
transmitted by the High Command of the Armed Forces
(OKW).
Hitler made no further reference to his order, neither to
the Reichsmarschall nor to myself, nor to my
representative, nor, I think, to Kaltenbrunner. To be
sure, I never spoke to the latter again about this
matter.
Witness, as far as you were present at this meeting, is the
picture presented by General Koller correct?