The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

Fifty-Seventh Day: Tuesday, 12th February, 1946
(Part 16 of 18)


The third satellite of Germany, Hungary, is not mentioned at all in Case "Barbarossa."

However, this certainly cannot be taken to mean that the participation of Hungary in the aggression against the Soviet Union had not been planned by the Fascist conspirators.

I ask permission to refer to the testimony of Paulus (although he has already testified before the Tribunal) which shows very clearly...

THE PRESIDENT: You aren't going to give us Paulus' affidavit over again, are you? We have already had Paulus' evidence in full.

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, I have already mentioned that this testimony has been presented as Exhibit USSR 182. It is the record of the interrogation of Paulus by General Rudenko. A copy of this record may be produced before the Tribunal now and, furthermore, it is on Page 143 of the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: We have got his actual oral evidence; we don't want his interrogation.

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: But I really need one particular paragraph of his testimony in order to show the connection between the subsequent documents relating to Hungary and the contents of my statement. It is just a few lines only.

THE PRESIDENT: It is surely cumulative, is it not?

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: That which was presented to the Tribunal I could express in my own words in two sentences.

PRESIDENT: Is it in any way different from what Paulus has already said?

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: Yes. If you will forgive me. I have just been told that Colonel Pokrovsky has already read that extract into the record. I shall therefore merely give a very brief summary of the extract and then pass on to a further subject and shall not repeat myself.

I have in mind, on the one hand, those paragraphs of Paulus' affidavit which state that the leading factor of Hungary's policy was the full recognition of Germany's leading rule and was determined by two basic factors, one, the desire for territorial conquests with the help of Germany, and two, the fear of the growing power of Roumania as Germany's ally, and, on the other hand, I have in mind that passage where Paulus states that Hitler was far more prudent in disclosing his plans to Hungary than to the other satellites, because he considered the Hungarians as garrulous. It is true that Paulus immediately adds (on Page 2 of his affidavit) that:

[Page 290]

"The main reason was Hitler's unwillingness to give Hungary a chance of seizing the oil fields in the Russian oil district of Drogobytch."
Following the opening of the offensive against the Soviet Union, the Supreme Command of the Army (O.K.H.) issued an order to the 17th Army to seize Drogobytch before the arrival of the Hungarians.

Further, Paulus describes the circumstances of his negotiations with the Hungarians regarding armament supplies. This -- all this -- has already been mentioned by Colonel Pokrovsky. I wish only to refer to the fact that this testimony of Paulus' has undoubtedly lifted a corner of the veil of mystery shrouding the mutual relations between the German and Hungarian aggressors.

In this connection, I consider it imperative to return to the depositions by Ruskizai-Ruediger which are already at the disposal of the Tribunal. This document has been presented as Exhibit USSR 294.

Touching on the occupation by Hungary of the Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1939, Ruskizai-Ruediger testified (see Page 3, Paragraph 3, of the Russian text of the depositions which can be found on Page 101 of the document book), the following quotations are underlined:

"_This took place _ not long before the outbreak of the German-Polish war. It then appeared as if economic advantages and shaking off the fetters of the Trianon Treaty were, for Hungary, the primary objectives of the occupation.

But from the time when the region of the Transcarpathian Ukraine acquired a common boundary with Soviet Russia _ we began to attach a entirely different significance to this region which we had occupied.

It was clear to us, the high-ranking officers, that the political leadership of both Germany and Hungary also considered this region strategically important for future military operations against Soviet Russia."

On Page 9, paragraph 2 from the bottom, Ruskizai-Ruediger tells us of a conference which took place at the end of March, 1941, in the course of which the Hungarian Minister of War, Barta, outlined the objectives of the war with Yugoslavia. Among these objectives Barta pointed directly to the necessity of eliminating Yugoslavia as a possible ally of the Soviet Union.

However, a more complete picture of German-Hungarian relations, which were determined by the preparation of an attack against the Soviet Union, is contained in the statement by the Hungarian Major-General, Esteban Ujszaszy.

From 1st May, 1939, to 1st July, 1942, Ujszaszy was Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the Hungarian General Staff. In his official capacity during these years, he had inside information on the secrets which shrouded this preparation.

Some of the things which he knew, he communicated to us in the document which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR 155. I ask you to accept this document as evidence.

I will read into the record that part of Ujszaszy's statement which may clarify the question at issue. Beginning from Page 2 of the Russian text (this corresponds to Page 149 of the document book) we find Section 2 entitled, "Preparation of Germany and Hungary for War against Soviet Russia." Paragraph 1 of this section is devoted to "Halder's letters." I quote:

"In November, 1940, the German Military Attach’ in Budapest, Colonel Guenther Krappe of the German General Staff, was received in audience by the Chief of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, Henry Werth. Krappe brought a letter from the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, Colonel-General Halder.

In that letter Halder informed Werth that in the spring of 1941, Yugoslavia would have to be compelled, if necessary by force of arms, to take a

[Page 291]

definite line in order to exclude, at a later date, the menace of a Russian attack from the rear. In this preventive war, possibly against Yugoslavia and definitely against Soviet Russia, Hungary would have to participate if only in her own interests.

Werth replied that he agreed with Halder's concept but drew attention to the lack of equipment in the Hungarian Army, which, at that time, was not ready for war against Soviet Russia. His reply, in the main, was a request for the completion, by Germany, of Hungary's armaments.

I was informed of Halder's letter and Werth's reply thereto, by General Werth in person. After that a Hungarian armament commission was invited to Berlin. It consisted of officer-specialists from the Main Ordinance Supply Division of the Royal Hungarian War Ministry, and, in December, 1940, the Commission left for Berlin. The Hungarian requests were as follows: delivery of outstanding balance of order for 10-cm. So- called Goering field howitzers and of up-to-date tanks for the two mobile divisions."

THE PRESIDENT: General, could you not pass on to December, 1940, where Field Marshal Keitel invites the Hungarian Minister of Defence to come to Berlin. It is just a few sentences down.

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, I am passing on to this paragraph:

"In December, 1940, the Chief of Staff of the O.K.W., Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, invited the Hungarian Minister War, General Carl Barta, to come to Berlin in order to:
a) discuss personally the problem of armaments;

b) elaborate a plan of military and political collaboration between Germany and Hungary for 1941.

This invitation was transmitted to Budapest through the Royal Hungarian Military Attach’ in Berlin, Colonel Alexander Homlok. At the same time, I received a similar invitation from Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Ausland Abwehr section of the O.K.W."
I omit a long list given by Ujszaszy of persons who accompanied Barta on his trip and I read further from Page 151 of the document book:
"_an agreement was reached on the following:

_In the spring of 1941 the position of Yugoslavia will be clarified, the menace of a Russian Soviet attack in the rear eliminated. For this purpose the Hungarian Army, reinforced by the delivery of 10-cm. field howitzers and with up-to-date tanks for a 'Mobile Brigade,' will be ready for action. For the war against Russia, Hungary must place at the disposal of Germany, 15 operational units including three mobile, one cavalry and one tank unit; she must also complete, by 1st June, 1941, the erection of fortifications in Transcarpathian Russia, facilitate the advance of the German troops in the areas adjacent to the Hungarian- Yugoslav and the Hungarian-Soviet frontiers, and the passage of supplies for the troops through Hungary. The details for the preparation of operations will be determined later by representatives of the German General Staff about to be sent to Hungary. As a political compensation for her participation in the war, Hungary will receive territory in Yugoslavia and in Russia, the ancient Principality of Galitz, and all the land at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains, up to the River Dniester."

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