Fifty-Seventh Day: Tuesday, 12th February, 1946
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, General.
MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: Yesterday I stopped at the questions
connected with the relations between the Fascist
conspirators and the Roumainian aggressors. It seems to me
that now is the most opportune moment to read into the
record the testimony of Ion Antonescu, which the Soviet
prosecution has at its disposal.
The interrogation of Ion Antonescu was conducted in
conformanity with the laws of the Soviet Union and I present
to the Tribunal, as Exhibit U.S.S.R. 153, the record of his
deposition, which is of exceptional importance in making
clear the characteristics of the relationship between
Germany and her satellites.
[Page 273]
I consider it necessary to read the greater part of these
depositions, beginning with the second paragraph on Page 1
of the record. It corresponds to Pages 63 and 64 of the
document book.
I assured Hitler that Roumania remained true to the
previously concluded agreement regarding Roumania's
adherence to the `Tripartite Pact.' In reply to my
assurances of loyalty to the pact with Germany, Hitler
declared that the German soldiers would guarantee the
frontiers of Roumania. At the same time, Hitler told me
that the Vienna Arbitration should not be considered as
final, and thus gave me to understand that Roumania
could count on a revision of the decision previously
made in Vienna, on the question of Transylvania. Hitler
and I agreed that the German Military Mission in
Roumania should continue its work of reconstructing the
Roumainian Army on German lines, and that it should
also conclude an economic agreement, in accordance with
which the Germans would at a later date supply Roumania
with Messerschmidts 109, tanks, tractors, anti-aircraft
and anti-tank guns, automatic rifles and other
armaments, while they, in return, would receive from
Roumania, wheat and oil for the needs of the German
armies. To the question put to me as to whether this,
my first conversation with Hitler, could be regarded as
the beginning of my agreement with the Germans
concerning the preparations for war against the Soviet
Union, I replied in the affirmative. There is no doubt
that Hitler had this fact in mind, when he elaborated
his plans for the attack on the Soviet Union.
In January, 1941, through the offices of the German
Ambassador in Roumania, Fabricius, I was invited to
Germany and had my second meeting with Hitler at
Berchtesgaden. The following persons were present:
Ribbentrop, Fabricius, and the newly appointed German
Ambassador to Bucharest, Killinger. Besides these,
Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl were also present
as representing the German Armed Forces.
At the beginning of the conversation Hitler introduced
Killinger to me, emphasizing that the latter was one of
his closest friends. After this, Hitler, describing the
military situation in the Balkans, declared that
Mussolini had appealed to him for help in connection
with the Italian failures in the war against Greece and
that he, Hitler, intended to give this help to Italy.
While on this subject Hitler asked me to allow the
German troops concentrated on Hungarian territory to
pass through Roumania, so that they could render speedy
assistance to the Italians.
Knowing that the passage of German troops through
Roumania to the Balkans would constitute an unfriendly
act towards the Soviet Union, I asked Hitler what, in
his opinion, would be the subsequent reaction of the
Soviet Government.
Hitler reminded me that at our first meeting, in
November, 1940, he had already given appropriate
guarantees to Roumania and had taken upon himself the
obligation of protecting Roumania by force of arms. I
expressed my fears that the passage of German troops
through Roumania [Page 274]
Satisfied with Hitler's declaration, I agreed to the
passage of German troops through Roumainian territory.
General Jodl, who was present at this conference,
described to me the strategic dispositions of the
German Army and stressed the necessity for an attack
against Greece launched from Bulgaria.
My third meeting with Hitler took place in Munich in
May, 1941. At this meeting at which, in addition to
ourselves, there were present Ribbentrop and Hitler's
personal interpreter, Schmidt, we reached a final
agreement with regard to a joint attack on the Soviet
Union.
Hitler informed me that he had decided on an armed
attack on the Soviet Union. 'Once we have prepared this
attack,' said Hitler, 'we must carry it out without
warning, along the entire extent of the Soviet
frontier, from the Black to the Baltic Seas.
The unexpectedness of the military attack,' Hitler went
on to say, would in a short time give Germany and
Roumania a chance to liquidate one of our most
dangerous adversaries.'
In accordance with his military plans, Hitler asked me
to permit the use of Roumainian territory for
concentrations of German troops, and, at the same time,
requested me to participate directly in the attack on
the Soviet Union.
Hitler stressed the point that Roumania must not remain
outside this war, for, if she wished to have Bessarabia
and North Bukovina returned to her, she had no other
alternative but to fight on Germany's side. At the same
time he pointed out that, in return for her assistance
in the war, Roumania would be allowed to occupy and
administer other Soviet territories, right up to the
River Dnieper.
Since Hitler's offer to initiate a joint campaign
against the U.S.S.R. corresponded to my own aggressive
intentions, I announced my agreement to participate in
the attack on the Soviet Union and pledged myself to
prepare the necessary number of Roumainian troops and,
at the same time, to increase deliveries of the oil and
food required by the German armies.
Before Hitler and I took the decision to attack Russia,
I asked Hitler whether he had any understanding with
Hungary regarding her participation in the war. Hitler
replied that the Hungarians had already given their
consent to participate in the war against the U.S.S.R.
in alliance with Germany. When, exactly, the Germans
had agreed on this joint attack with the Hungarians,
Hitler did not specify.
On my return from Munich to Bucharest I began active
preparations for the coming campaign."
[Page 275]
Premier, Michael Antonescu, who was also interrogated by the
Soviet authorities at the request of the Soviet prosecution;
I now submit his testimony as Exhibit USSR l52. I shall not
quote these depositions in detail since their greater part
is a repetition of some of the facts described already in
the testimony of Ion Antonescu. I shall only refer to a few
paragraphs. I would refer you to Page 1 of the Russian text,
paragraphs 1, 2, and 5. This corresponds to Page 68 of the
document book:
During the negotiations with Hitler, Marshal Antonescu
signed the agreement for Roumania's adherence to the
'Tripartite Pact' and received Hitler's promise for the
later revision, in favor of Roumania, of the decisions
of the Vienna Arbitration.
The first journey of Marshal Antonescu was the initial
step of a policy which subsequently led to a joint
German and Roumainian attack on the Soviet Union."
1. The decision to send to Roumania a military mission of
the German General Staff for the reorganisation of the
Roumainian Army, in order to prepare for and subsequently to
attack the U.S.S.R., was taken no later than September,
1940, i.e., no less than nine months prior to the attack on
the U.S.S.R.
2. In November of the same year, Roumainian war preparations
had been fully developed.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break
off.
(A recess was taken.)
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(Part 9 of 18)
(General Zorya comes to the microphone.)
"Throughout the entire period during which I held
office in Roumania" -- testifies Ion Antonescu -- "I
followed the policy of strengthening the alliance with
Germany and resorted to her help for retraining and
rearming the Roumainian army. For this purpose I had
several meetings with Hitler. The first meeting with
Hitler took place in November, 1940, soon after I
became the head of the Roumainian Government. This
meeting took place on my initiative at Hitler's
official residence in Berlin, in the presence of the
German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, and Hitler's
personal interpreter, Schmidt. The conversation with
Hitler lasted over four hours.
might serve as a pretext for military operations on the
part of the Soviet Union, and that Roumania would then
be in a difficult position, since the Roumainian Army
had not been mobilized, to which Hitler declared that
he would give orders for some of the German troops
intended for participation in the operations against
Greece to be left in Roumania. Hitler also stressed
that, according to the information at his disposal, the
Soviet Union did not intend to fight either Germany or
Roumania.
Antonescu concludes his testimony in the following words. I
refer to Page 67 in the document book, the last paragraph of
the testimony.
"After the invasion of Soviet territory, the Roumanian
troops under my supreme command rendered great
assistance to the Germans, and Hitler accordingly sent
a letter addressed to me expressing his gratitude to me
and to the Roumanian Army."
The date of the beginning of Roumainian preparations for war
against the U.S.S.R. can be established from the depositions
furnished by the former Vice-
"In November, 1940, Marshal Antonescu, accompanied by
the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Struza,
left for Germany, where he had a meeting with Hitler.
Your Honours, the evidence of the witness, Paulus, as well
as the testimonies of Ion Antonescu and Michael Antonescu
which have just been submitted to the Tribunal, justify the
Soviet prosecution in making the following statement: