The Trial of German Major War Criminals
Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany
7th January to 19th January, 1946
Thirty-Fourth Day:
Tuesday, January 15th, 1946
(Part 7 of 10)
[MAJOR ELWYN JONES continues]
[Page 271]
The next entry, for 19th March, 1941, which is at Page 54 of
the document book, shows that by March of 1941 Raeder had
begun to consider what prospects of naval action the Russian
aggression had to offer. There is the entry:
"In case of 'Barbarossa,' Supreme Naval Commander
describes the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute
necessity for the Navy, Chief of the Supreme Command
Armed Forces considers compliance very difficult."
In the meantime, the entries in this document show that
Mussolini, the flunkey of Nazism, was crying out for a more
active Nazi Mediterranean policy. I refer the Court to Page
57 of the document book, the entry for 30th May:
"Duce demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for
autumn 1941; 12 divisions are needed for that; 'That
stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than
the capture of London'; Chief, Naval Operations agrees
completely."
And then, finally, the entry for 6th June, indicating
strategic views of Raeder and the German Navy at this stage,
reads as follows. It is at Page 58 of the document book:
"Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Memorandum of
the Chief, Naval Operations. Observation on the strategic
situation in the Eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan
campaign, and the occupation of Crete, and further
conduct of the War."
A few sentences below:
"The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the
decisive aims of the war in the Near East, which have
been made tangible by the successes
[Page 272]
in the Aegean area. The memorandum emphasises that the
offensive utilisation of the present favourable situation
must take place with the greatest acceleration and
energy, before England has again strengthened her
position in the Near East with help from the United
States of America. The memorandum, however, realises the
unalterable fact that the campaign against Russia would
be opened very shortly, demands that the undertaking
'Barbarossa'' which, because of the magnitude of its
aims, naturally stands in the foreground of the
operational plans of the Armed Forces leadership, must
under no circumstances lead to an abandonment,
diminishing or delay of the conduct of the War in the
Eastern Mediterranean."
Thus Raeder was, throughout, seeking an active role for his
Navy in the Nazi war plans.
Now, once Hitler had decided to attack Russia, Raeder sought
a role for the Navy in the campaign against Russia, and the
first naval operational plan against Russia was a
particularly perfidious one. I refer the Tribunal to
Document C-170 from which I have just been reading, at Page
59 of the document book. There the Tribunal will see an
entry for 15th June, 1941:
"On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations, use of arms
against Russian submarines, South of the Northern
boundary of the Oland danger zone (declared area) is
permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is to be
aimed at."
The defendant Keitel provided a characteristically dishonest
pretext for this action in his letter, Document C-38, which
is at Page 11 of the document book and which will be Exhibit
GB 223. The Tribunal sees that Keitel's letter is dated 15th
June, 1941:
"Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in
the Baltic Sea.
To:
High Command of the Navy-O.K.M. (S.K.L.).
Offensive action against submarines South of the line
Memel-Southern tip of Oland is authorised if the boats
cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the
approach by German naval forces.
The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval
forces are believed to be dealing with penetrating
British submarines."
Now, that was on 15th June, 1941, and the Tribunal will
remember that the Nazi attack on Russia did not take place
until the 22nd of June of 1941. In the meantime, Raeder was
urging Hitler, as early as 18th March, 1941, to enlarge the
scope of the world war by inducing Japan to seize Singapore.
The relevant document is C-152, Exhibit GB 122, at Page 23
of the document book. There is just one paragraph which I
would like to be permitted to read. The document describes
the audience of Raeder with Hitler on 18th March and the
entries in it, in fact, represent Raeder's own views:
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as
possible, since the opportunity will never again be as
favourable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness
of U.S.A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U.S.
Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making
preparations for this action, but according to all
declarations made by Japanese officers she will only
carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.
Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on
spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has
Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the
U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines,
Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She
can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as
possible."
The Japanese, of course, as events proved, had different
ideas from that.
[Page 273]
By 20th April, 1941, the evidence is that Hitler had agreed
with this proposition of Raeder's of inducing the Japanese
to take offensive action against Singapore. I refer the
Tribunal again to Document C-170 and to an entry at Page 56
of the document book, for 20th April, 1941. A few sentences
from that read:
"Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme
Commander asks about result of Matsuoka's visit, and
evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact. Fuehrer has informed
Matsuoka, 'that Russia will not be touched if she behaves
in a friendly manner according to the treaty. Otherwise,
he reserves action for himself.' Japan-Russia pact has
been concluded in agreement with Germany, and is to
prevent Japan from advancing against Vladivostok, and to
cause her to attack Singapore."
Now an interesting commentary upon this document is found in
Document C-66, at Page 13 of the document book. At that time
the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on
Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to
Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was
frequently changing, and there follows this interesting
sentence:
"The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a
camouflage measure and to ensure surprise."
The Axis partners were not even honest with each other, and
this, I submit, is typical of the kind of jungle diplomacy
with which Raeder associated himself.
I now, with the Tribunal's permission, turn from the field
of diplomacy to the final aspect of the case against Raeder,
namely, to crimes at sea.
The prosecution's summary is that Raeder throughout his
career showed a complete disregard for any international
rule or usage of war which conflicted in the slightest with
his intention of carrying through the Nazi programme of
conquest. I propose to submit to the Tribunal only a few
examples of Raeder's flouting of the laws and customs of
civilised States.
Raeder has himself summarised his attitude in the most
admirable fashion in Document U.K. 65, which the Tribunal
will find at Page 98 of the document book, and which will be
Exhibit GB 224. Now that document, UK 65, is a very long
memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German Naval War Staff
on 15th October, 1939: that is to say, only a few weeks
after the war started. It is a memorandum on the subject of
the intensification of the war at sea, and I desire to draw
the Tribunal's attention to the bottom paragraph at Page 98
of the document book. It is headed: "Possibilities of future
naval warfare."
"1. Military requirements for the decisive struggle
against Great Britain.
Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military
means at our disposal as expeditiously as possible.
Military success can be most confidently expected if we
attack British sea communications wherever they are
accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; the
final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into
and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the
interests of neutrals in so far as it is possible without
detriment to military requirements. It is desirable to
base all military measures which may be taken on existing
International Law; however, measures which are considered
necessary from a military point of view, provided a
decisive success can be expected from them, will have to
be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing
International Law. In principle, therefore, any means of
warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance
should be used on some legal conception," - the nature of
which is not specified - "even if that entails the
creation of a new code of naval warfare.
The Supreme War Council will have to decide what measures
of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has
been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most
ruthless form, in fulfilment of military
[Page 274]
requirements, this decision is to be adhered to under all
circumstances, and under no circumstances may such a
decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare,
once it has been made, be dropped or released under
political pressure from neutral powers; that is what
happened in the World War to our own detriment. Every
protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even
threats of further countries, including the U.S. coming
into the war, which can be expected with certainty should
the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation
in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The
more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier
will it show results and the sooner will the war come to
an end. The economic effect of such military measures on
our own war economy must be fully recognised and
compensated through immediate re-orientation of German
war economy, and the re-drafting of the respective
agreements with neutral States; for these are the final
words: for this, strong political and economic pressure
must be employed if necessary."
I submit that those comments are most revealing, and the
general submission of the prosecution is that, as an active
member of the inner council of the Nazi State up to 1943,
Raeder, promoting such ideas as these, must share
responsibility for the many War Crimes committed by his
confederates and underlings in the course of the war.
But quite apart from this over-all responsibility of Raeder,
there are certain crimes which the prosecution submits were
essentially initiated and passed down the naval chain of
command by Raeder himself.
I refer to Document C-27, at Page 7 of the document book,
which will be Exhibit GB 225. These are minutes of a meeting
between Hitler and Raeder on 30th December, 1939. 1 will
read, with the Court's approval, the second paragraph
beginning:
"The Chief of the Naval War Staff requests that full
power be given to the Naval War Staff in making any
intensification suited to the situation and to the means
of war. The Fuehrer fundamentally agrees to the sinking
without warning of Greek ships in the American prohibited
area, and of neutral ships in those sections of the
prohibited American area in which the fiction of mine
danger can be upheld, e.g., the Bristol Channel."
At this time, of course, as the Tribunal knows, Greek ships
were neutral. I submit that this is yet another
demonstration of the fact that Raeder was a man without
principle.
This incitement to crime was, in my submission, a typical
group effort, because in Document C-12, which is at Page 1
of the document book, the Tribunal will see that a directive
to the effect of those naval views was issued on 30th
December, 1939, by the O.K.W., being signed by the defendant
Jodl. And that Document C-12 will be Exhibit GB 226. It is
an interesting document. It is dated 30th December, 1939,
and it reads:
"On 30th December, 1939, according to a report of the
Oberbefehlshaberder Marine, the Fuehrer and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces decided that:
(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England
declared by U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated
as enemy vessels.
(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be attacked
without warning where the impression of a mining incident
can be created.
Both measures are authorised to come into effect
immediately."
Another example of the callous attitude of the German Navy
when it was under Raeder's command, towards neutral
shipping, is found in an entry in Jodl's diary -
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you should read the pencil
note, should you not?
[Page 275]
MAJOR ELWYN JONES: The pencil note on Document C-12 reads:
"And to (1) Attack must be carried out without being
seen. The denial of the sinking of these steamships in
case the expected protests are made must be possible."
As I was saying, my Lord, another example of the callous
attitude of Raeder's Navy towards neutral shipping is found
in an entry in Jodl's diary for 16th June, 1942, at Page 112
of the document book, which is Document 1807-PS, and will be
Exhibit GB 227. This extract from Jodl's diary is dated 16th
June, 1942, and it reads:
"The operational staff of the Navy (S.K.L.), applied on
29th May for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and
air forces. The S.K.L. considers that a sudden blow
against the Brazilian warships and merchant ships is
expedient at this juncture (a) because defence measures
are still incomplete; (b) because there is the
possibility of achieving surprise; and (c) because Brazil
is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea."
This, the Tribunal will see, was a plan for a kind of
Brazilian "Pearl Harbour" because the Tribunal will
recollect that war did not in effect break out between
Germany and Brazil until 22nd August, 1942.
Raeder himself also caused the Navy to participate in War
Crimes ordered by other conspirators, and I shall give one
example only of that. On 28th October, 1942, as Document C-
179, Exhibit USA 543, at Page 63 of the document book shows,
the head of the operations division of the Naval War Staff
promulgated to naval commands Hitler's notorious order of
18th October, 1942, with regard to the shooting of
Commandos, which, in my submission, amounted to denying the
protection of the Geneva Convention to captured Commandos.
The Tribunal will remember the document is dated 28th
October, 1942, and it reads:
"Enclosed please find a Fuehrer order regarding
annihilation of terror and sabotage units.
This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla
leaders, Section Commanders or Officers of this rank.
After verbal notification to subordinate sections the
above officers must hand this order over to the next
higher section which is responsible for its withdrawal
and destruction."
What clearer indication could there be than the nature of
these instructions as to the naval command's appreciation of
the wrongfulness of the murders Hitler ordered?
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for ten minutes?
(A recess was taken.)
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