Thirty-Third Day:
Monday, January 14th, 1946
[Page 223]
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: Oh, yes, I should have read that
sentence; I am obliged to your Honour.
I pass to the second report, D641/b. It is part of the same
document and is put in as Exhibit GB 191. It is a report
covering the next six months from 1st September, 1940 -
THE PRESIDENT: Are you not reading Page 3?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: If your Lordship pleases, I have read a
great deal of the report and there, are passages that I had
not considered important.
THE PRESIDENT: I have not myself read it, but I think -
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: If I might read the first two paragraphs
on Page 3:
[Page 234]
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, some of it is. The difficulty
is to leave those parts and take in the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: The third paragraph, if I might leave
the rest of the second, is as follows:
That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard
for the area is proved by the fact that of the thirty-
eight ships referred to at least sixteen were torpedoed
outside the limits of the war-zone."
I turn to the next document, D-641/C, which is part of
Exhibit GB 191.
THE PRESIDENT: It is clear, I suppose, from that statement
of facts that there was no warning whatever given?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: No, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: We think that you should read the next
paragraph too.
[Page 235]
The next document, D-641/C, is merely a certificate giving
the total sinkings by U-boats during the War (1939 to 1945)
as 2,775 British, Allied and neutral ships totalling
14,572,435 gross registered tons.
My Lord, it is perhaps worth considering one example not
quoted in the above reports of the ruthless nature of the
actions conducted by the defendants' U-boat commanders,
particularly as both British and German versions of the
sinkings are available. I turn to the next document, "The
sinking of S.S. Sheaf Mead." That is D-644, which I put in
as Exhibit GB 192. If I might read the opening paragraph:
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: This is actually in the form of a
British report. It includes the German account in the shape
of a complete extract from the log.
THE PRESIDENT: It bears the words, Top Secret?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: Yes, my Lord, this was at the time a top
secret document. That was some while ago.
Then the next page of that document contains an extract from
the report of the Chief Engineer of the Sheaf Mead. The
relevant paragraphs are the first and the last:
[Page 236]
They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs
of us in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but
said nothing. Then she submerged and went off, without
offering us any assistance whatever."
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: No, my Lord. It is quite clear, indeed,
that it was not.
Under the time, 14.14, there is a description of the
sighting of the ship and the difficulty in identifying; and
then at the top of the page:
Now that it is possible to examine some of the actual
documents by which the defendant and his fellow conspirators
issued their orders in disregard of International Law, you
may think the compilers of the above reports understated the
case. These orders cover not only the period referred to in
the reports, but also the subsequent course of the war. It
is interesting to note in them the steps by which the
defendants progressed. At first they were content with
breaching the rules of International Law to the extent of
sinking merchant ships, including neutral ships, without
warning, where there was a reasonable prospect of being able
to do so without discovery. The facts already quoted show
that the question of whether ships were defensively armed or
outside the declared operational areas was, in practice,
immaterial.
I go to the next document in the document book, C-191, which
I put in as Exhibit GB 193. That is a memorandum by the
German Naval War Staff, dated 22nd September, 1939. It sets
out:
U-boat commanders should be informed by word of mouth,
and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in
the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a
warship or an auxiliary cruiser. In the meanwhile, U-
boats in the English Channel have received instructions
to attack all vessels sailing without lights." [Page 237]
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: Yes, if your Lordship pleases. It is
important. The others are much to the same effect. If I
might read it:
"According to this, the Fuehrer, on report of Commander-
in-Chief in Navy, has decided:
(a) Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy
vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain.
(b) In the British Channel all ships may be attacked
without warning. For external consumption these attacks
should be given out as hits by mines.
Both measures may be taken with immediate effect."
The next extract, report by Ia, that is, the Staff Officer
Operations on the Naval War Staff on Directive of Armed
Forces High Command, dated 30th December:
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(Part 3 of 5)
"By the middle of October, submarines were sinking
merchant vessels without any regard to the safety of the
crews. Yet four months later the Germans were still
officially claiming that they were acting in accordance
with their Prize Ordinance. Their own semi-official
commentators, how-ever, had made the position clear. As
regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in February
stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily
or under compulsion bound for an enemy port - including
contraband control harbours - thereby loses its
neutrality and must be considered hostile. At the end of
February the cat was let out of the bag by a statement
that a neutral ship which obtained a navicert from a
British Consul, in order to avoid putting into a British
contraband control base, was liable to be sunk by German
submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral port
to another. As regards Allied ships, in the middle of
November, 1939, a Berlin warning was issued against the
arming of British vessels. By that date a score of
British merchantmen had been illegally attacked by
gunfire or torpedo from submarines, and after that date
some fifteen more unarmed Allied vessels were torpedoed
without warning. It is clear therefore, that not only
was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure,
but also that neither before nor after this German
threat did the German submarines discriminate between
armed and unarmed vessels."
The last paragraph is merely a summing up; it does not add
anything.
Turning to 641/b, which is a similar report covering the
next six months, if I might read the first five paragraphs
of Page 1:
"On the 30th January, 1941, Hitler proclaimed: 'Every
ship, with or without convoy, which appears before our
torpedo tubes is going to be torpedoed.'"
"From one point of view it probably matters little what
exactly was Hitler's meaning, since the only conclusion
that can be reached, after a study of the facts of enemy
warfare on merchant shipping, is that enemy action in
this field is never limited by the principles which are
proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but solely by the
opportunities or lack of them which exist at any given
time."
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, is not this document you
are now reading really legal argument?
"The effect of the German total blockade is to prohibit
neutral ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea
round Britain (the area extends to about 500 miles west
of Ireland, and from the latitude of Bordeaux to that of
the Faroe Islands), upon pain of having their ships sunk
without warning and their crews killed. As a matter of
fact, at least thirty-two neutral ships, exclusive of
those sailing in British convoys, have been sunk by
enemy action since the declaration of the 'total
blockade.'"
Then the last sentence in the following paragraph deals with
the sinking of merchant ships without warning:
"Yet, though information is lacking in many cases,
details are available to prove that, during the period
under review, at least thirty-eight Allied merchant
ships exclusive of those in convoys have been torpedoed
without warning in or near the 'total blockade' area.
My Lord, the next page deals with a specific case
illustrating the matter set out above. It is in the first
paragraph of that page, the third sentence:
"The sinking of the City of Benares on the 17th
September, 1940, is a good example of this. The City of
Benares was an 11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on
board, including nearly 100 children. She was torpedoed
without warning just outside the 'war zone,' with the
loss of 258 lives, including 77 children. It was blowing
a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very rough sea
when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p.m. In the
darkness, and owing to the prevailing weather
conditions, at least four of the twelve boats lowered
were capsized. Others were swamped and many people were
washed right off. In one boat alone 16 people, including
11 children, died from exposure; in another 22 died,
including 15 children: In a third 21 died. The point to
be emphasised is not the unusual brutality of this
attack, but rather that such results are inevitable when
a belligerent disregards the rules of sea warfare as the
Germans have done and are doing."
I think the rest of that paragraph is not important.
"There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of
voyages for days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men
in the water clinging for hours to a raft and gradually
dropping off one by one, of crews being machine-gunned
as they tried to lower their boats or as they drifted
away in them, of seamen being blown to pieces by shells
and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know that such
things are the inevitable result of the type of warfare
he has chosen to employ."
My Lord, the rest is very much to the same general effect.
"The British S.S. Sheaf Mead was torpedoed without
warning on 27th May, 1940 - "
THE PRESIDENT: This is the German account, is it not?
"The British S.S. Sheaf Mead was torpedoed without
warning on 27th May, 1940, with the loss of 31 of the
crew. The commander of the U-boat responsible is
reported to have behaved in an exceptionally callous
manner towards the men clinging to upturned boats and
pieces of wood. It was thought that this man was
Kapitanleutnant Ohrn of U-37: The following extract from
his log for 27th May, 1940, leaves no doubt on the
matter and speaks for itself as to his behaviour."
Again, turning to the relevant extract from the log, on the
second page, the time is marked on the document as 15.54.
"Surface. Stern is under water" - referring to the ship
which has been torpedoed - "Stern is under water. Bows
rise higher. The boats are now on the water. Lucky for
them. A picture of complete order. They lie at some
distance. The bows rear up quite high. Two men appear
from somewhere in the forward part of the ship. They
leap and rush with great bounds along the deck down the
stern. The stem disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a
boiler explosion. Two men fly through the air, limbs
outstretched. Bursting and crashing. Then all is over. A
large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to
identify the name. The crew have saved themselves on
wreckage and capsized boats. We fish out a buoy. No name
on it. I ask a man on the raft. He says, hardly turning
his head -'Nix Name.' A young boy in the water calls
'Help, help, please!' The others are very composed. They
look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of cold
hatred is on their faces. On to the old course. After
washing the paint off the buoy, the name comes to light:
Gretastone, Glasgow, 5,006 gross registered tons."
"On to the old course" means merely that the U-boat makes
off.
"When I came to the surface I found myself on the port
side, that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only
about five yards away. The submarine captain asked the
steward the name of the ship, which he told him, and the
enemy picked up one of our life-buoys, but this had the
name Gretastone on it, as this was the name of our ship
before it was changed to Sheaf Mead last January."
In the last paragraph:
"She had cut-away bows, but I did notice a net-cutter.
Two men stood at the side with boat-hooks to keep us
off.
THE PRESIDENT: Is. there any suggestion in the German report
that any warning was given?
"The distance apart is narrowing. The, steamship draws
in quickly, but the position is still 40-50. I cannot
see the stern yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The
gunnery crews are also prepared. On the ship's side a
yellow cross in a small, square, dark blue ground.
Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope a little.
Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an ack-ack gun or something
similar. Fire! It cannot miss..."
and then the sinking.
"Flag Officer U-boats intends to give permission to U-
boats to sink without warning any vessels sailing
without lights."
Reading from the third sentence:
"In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at
night, as the U-boats cannot identify a target which is
a shadow, in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being
made. If the political situation is such that even
possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be
forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters where
French and English naval forces or merchant ships may be
situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only
English units are to be expected, the measures desired
by Flag Officer U-boats can be carried out; permission
to take this step is not to be given in writing, but
need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the
Naval War Staff.
"(1) Report by Ia." - That is the Staff Officer
Operations on the Naval War Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Should not you read above that, paragraph 1
(b)?
"Report by Ia," - This is one report by Ia on Directive
of Armed Forces High Command of 30th December.
"Referring to intensified measures in naval and air
warfare in connection with 'Fall Gelb.'
In consequence of this directive, the Navy shall
authorise, simultaneously with the general
intensification of the war, the sinking by U-boats,
without any warning, of all ships in those waters near
the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this
case, for external consumption, pretence should be made
that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of
weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose."
And then the third extract, dated 6th January, 1940:
" ... the Fuehrer has in principle agreed (see minutes
of report of C.-in-C. Navy of 30th December) to
authorise firing without warning whilst maintaining the
pretence of mine hits, in certain parts of the American
blockade zone."
Well, then the order is given to Flag Officer U-boats
carrying out that decision.