Fifteenth Day:
Friday, 7th December, 1945
[Page 185]
The Court has already received in evidence and heard read
material parts of Document C-66, which was the report of
Raeder to Admiral Assmann, which disclosed how, in December,
1939, the defendant Raeder did in fact meet Quisling and
Hagelin.
I now invite the Court to look at Document C-64 which, for
the purpose of the record, will be Exhibit GB 86. The Court
will observe that that is a report by Raeder of the meeting
of the Naval Staff with Hitler on 12th December, 1939, at
1200 hours, in the presence of the defendants Keitel and
Jodl and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to
Hitler.
The report is headed "Norwegian Question", and the first
sentence reads:
(b) To agree to do so by force." [Page 186]
"Thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who
came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were
taken to the Fuehrer - "
MAJOR ELWYN JONES: I beg your Lordship's pardon; it is
Document C-66, the second page, headed "Weserubung", in the
second paragraph.
The report continues
Until that moment the Naval War Staff had taken no part
in the development of the Norwegian question, and
continued to be somewhat sceptical about it. The
preparations, which were undertaken by Captain Crank in
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded,
however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff."
If the Court will now turn to Document 007-PS, which is
further on in the document book, and which the Court will
remember is Rosenberg's report on the activities of his
organisation - it is after the "D" documents - if the Court
will turn to about ten lines from the bottom of the first
page of Annex 1, dealing with Norway, the Court will see
that there were further meetings between Quisling and the
Nazi chiefs in December, and I am going to read now the
section beginning:
The report continues
[Page 187]
Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining
liaison with Quisling. In the course of further
developments he was assigned to the Naval Attache in
Oslo. Orders were given that the whole matter be handled
with strictest secrecy".
The information that is available to the prosecution as to
the events of January, 1940, is not full, but the Court will
see that the agitation of the defendants Raeder and
Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the Court to
consider a letter of Keitel's, Document C-63, which, for the
purposes of the record, will be Exhibit GB 87. The Court
will observe that that is an order - a memorandum - signed
by the defendant Keitel, dated the 27th January, 1940. It is
marked "Most Secret, five copies; reference, Study 'N'" -
which was another code name for the Weserubung Preparations
- "Access only through an officer".
It is headed: "C.-in-C. of the Navy" - that is to say, the
defendant Raeder - "has a report on this."
The document reads:
A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces Headquarters for this purpose, and
this represents, at the same time, the nucleus of a
future operational staff."
Prior to this date, 27th January, 1940, the planning of the
various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had
been confined to a relatively small group, whose aim had
been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking
this Norwegian operation. The issuance of this directive of
Keitel's on 27th January, 1940, was the signal that the
Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the O.K.W., had
accepted the proposition of
[Page 188]
The Court will observe that from January onward the
operational planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark
was started through the normal channels.
And now I would refer the Court to some entries in the diary
of the defendant Jodl, to see how the preparations
progressed. That is Document 1809-PS, which will be, for the
purposes of the record, Exhibit GB 88. That, the Court will
observe, is the last document in the document book.
There is a slight confusion in the order in which the
entries are set out in the diary, because the first three
pages relate to entries which will be dealt with in another
part of the case.
I invite the Court's attention to Page 3 of these extracts
from Jodl's diary, beginning at the bottom, 6th February.
The entry under the date line of 6th February, 1940 starts:
"New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only and
guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war."
I would like to repeat that entry, if I may be permitted to
do so
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean: "To carry
out 'H'"?
MAJOR ELWYN JONES: That is a reference to another code word,
"Hartmut", which the Court will see disclosed in a
subsequent document. That is another code word for this
Norwegian and Danish operation.
The entry of 21st February in Jodl's diary reads: "Fuehrer
has talked with General von Falkenhorst and charges him with
preparation of 'Weser Exercise'. Falkenhorst accepts gladly.
Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed
Forces."
Then the next entry, on the next page -
THE PRESIDENT: "Weser Exercise" - is that Norway too?
MAJOR ELWYN JONES: That is Norway too, my Lord, yes. That is
a translation of "Weserubung".
The entry on the next page, under the date of 28th February:
The next entry is of 29th February - I am not troubling the
Court with further entries of 28th February, which relate to
the forces to be employed in the invasion of Norway and
Denmark.
[Page 189]
Then, "Directive for Fall Weserubung."
It is most important that the Scandinavian States as
well as the Western opponents should be taken by
surprise by our measures. All preparations, particularly
those of transport and of readiness, drafting and
embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor
in mind.
In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer
be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be
deceived with fictitious objectives." [Page 190]
Added to this, having secured the most important places,
the Group will break through as quickly as possible from
Fyen to Skagen and to the East coast." [
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(Part 1 of 9)
"C.-in-C. Navy" - who of course was the defendant Raeder
- "has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates
the impression of being reliable."
And then there follows, in the next two paragraphs, a
statement of Quisling's views, views with which the Court is
by now familiar because of my reading of extracts from the
Document 007-PS; but I draw the Court's attention to the
fourth paragraph in Document C-64, beginning:
"The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally
so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to
see Rosenberg once more first, as the latter had known
Quisling for a long while. C.-in-C. Navy" - that is, of
course, Raeder - "suggests that if the Fuehrer formed a
favourable impression, the O.K.W. should obtain
permission to make plans with Quisling for the
preparation and carrying out of the occupation.
That was 12th December, the meeting at which Raeder made
this report to Hitler.
(a) By peaceful means: that is to say, German Forces
summoned by Norway;
"(b) Weserubung", these words:
THE PRESIDENT: I have not got it.
"Thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who
came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were
taken to the Fuehrer by me, with the approval of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg."
And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the
page:-
"At the crucial moment, R" - presumably Rosenberg -
"hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on
the morning of 14th December."
That is, of course, Raeder's note, and it indicates the
extent of his complicity in this conspiracy.
"On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with
Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon Of 14th December,
the Fuehrer gave the order that preparations for the
Norwegian operation were to be made by the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces.
The Court may well think that the note of the defendant
Raeder referring to "the crucial moment" was an appropriate
one, because the Court will see that on that day, 14th
December, Hitler gave the order that preparations for the
Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.
"Quisling was granted a personal audience with the
Fuehrer on 16th December, and once more on the 18th
December. In the course of this audience the Fuehrer
emphasised repeatedly that he personally would prefer a
completely neutral attitude of Norway, as well as of the
whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the
theatre of war and to draw still other nations into the
conflict."
As I have said in opening the presentation of this part of
the case, here was an instance where pressure had to be
brought to bear on Hitler to induce him to take part in
these operations.
"Should the enemy attempt" - there is a mis-translation
here - "to extend the war, however, with the aim of
achieving further throttling
Here again the Court will note the close link between the
Nazi politicians and the Nazi service chiefs.
"The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
wishes that Study 'N' should be further worked on under
my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest
conjunction with the general war policy. For these
reasons the Fuehrer has commissioned me to take over the
direction of further preparations.
Then, at the end of the memorandum:
"All further plans will be made under the cover name
'Weserubung'."
I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal's attention
to the importance of that document, to the signature of
Keitel upon it, and to the date of this important decision.
"New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only, and
guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the
war."
The next entry to which I invite the Court's attention is
the entry of the 21st February.
"I propose, first to the Chief of O.K.W. and then to the
Fuehrer, that Case Yellow" - which, as the Court knows,
is the code name for the invasion of the Netherlands -
"and Weser Exercise" - the invasion of Norway and
Denmark - "must be prepared in such a way that they will
be independent of one another as regards both time and
forces employed. The Fuehrer completely agrees, if this
is in any way possible."
So the Court will observe that the new idea of 6th February,
that the neutrality of Belgium might be observed, had been
abandoned by 28th February.
"Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in
Copenhagen and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how
individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock
troops. Warlimont, Chief of Landesverteidigung,
instructed to make out immediately the order of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director of Armed Forces
to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening
of the staff."
And there, for the moment, I will leave the entries in
Jodl's diary and refer the Court to the vital Document C-
174, which, for the purposes of the record, will be Exhibit
GB 89. The Court will see, from that document, that it is
Hitler's operation order to complete the preparations for
the invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears the date of 1st
March, 1940, and it is headed: "The Fuehrer and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, most Secret."
"The development of the situation in Scandinavia
requires the making of all preparations for the
occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German
Armed Forces-Fall Weserubung. This operation should
prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the
Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in
Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start
line against Britain."
The second part of Paragraph 1 reads:
"In view of our military and political power in
comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the
force to be employed in the Fall Weserubung will be kept
as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be
balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On
principle we will do our utmost to make the operation
appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is
the military protection of the neutrality of the
Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be
transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the
occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and
the Air Force will provide the necessary emphasis. If,
in spite of this, resistance should be met with, all
military means will be used to crush it."
There follows, in Paragraph 2 on the next page:
"I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of
the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding
General of the 21st Army Corps, General von
Falkenhorst."
Paragraph 3:
"The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in
Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasise that
the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible.
In case the enemy seizes the initiative against Norway,
we must be able to apply immediately our own counter-
measures.
Then Paragraph 4 on the next page. "The Occupation of
Denmark which is given the code name of "Weserubung Sud".
"The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of
Jutland and of Fyen immediately after occupation of
Seeland.