Thirteenth Day:
Wednesday, 5th December, 1945
[Page 92]
After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of
the F.S. were transferred essentially to the German
student organisations as compact troop formations in
Prague and Brunn, apart from the isolated German
communities which remained in the Second Republic. This
was also natural because many students from the Sudeten
Gau were already active members of the S.S. The student
organisations then had to endure this test, in common
with other Germans, during the crisis of March, 1939.
In the early morning hours of 15th March, after the
announcement of the planned entry of German troops into
various localities, German men had to act in some
localities in order to assure a quiet course of events,
either by assumption of the police authority, as for
instance in Brunn, or by corresponding instruction of
the police president. In some Czech offices, men had
likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to
burn valuable archives and the material of political
files. It was also necessary to take measures here in
order to prevent foolish destruction. How significant
the many-sided and comprehensive measures were
considered by the competent German agencies, follows
from the fact that many of the men either on 15th March
itself or on the
[Page 93]
Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the
S.S. had marched in with the first columns of the German
Army and had assumed responsibility in the appropriate
sectors, the men here placed themselves at once at their
further disposition, and became valuable auxiliaries and
collaborators."
THE PRESIDENT: Have you cited 572?
MR. ALDERMAN: D-572 was Exhibit USA 113. The first two
documents are British diplomatic dispatches, properly
certified to by the British Government, which give the
background of intrigue in Slovakia - German intrigue in
Slovakia. The third Document, 2943-PS or Exhibit USA 114,
consists of excerpts from the French Yellow Book,
principally excerpts from dispatches signed by M. Coulondre,
the French Ambassador in Berlin, to the French Foreign
Office, between 13th and 18th March, 1939. I expect to draw
on these three dispatches rather freely in the further
course of my presentation, since the Tribunal will take
judicial notice of each of these documents, I think; and,
therefore, it may not be necessary to read them at length
into the transcript. In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis
came on 10th March. On that day the Czechoslovakian
Government dismissed those members of the Slovak cabinet who
refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them
Foreign Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within twenty-four
hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czechoslovak
Government as an excuse for intervention. On the following
day, 11th March, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava,
the Slovak capital. I quote from Document D-571, which is
Exhibit USA 112. That is the report of the British Minister
in Prague to the British Government.
Events went on moving rapidly, but Durcansky, one of the
dismissed ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna,
where the facilities of the
[Page 94]
At this point, in the second week of March, 1939,
preparations for what the Nazi leaders liked to call the
liquidation of Czechoslovakia were progressing with what to
them must have been very satisfying smoothness. The
military, diplomatic and propaganda machinery of the Nazi
conspirators was moving in close co-ordination. As during
the process of the Fall Grun, or Case Green, of the
preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary
to participate in this new attack. Admiral Horthy, the
Hungarian Regent, was again greatly flattered by this
invitation.
I offer in evidence Document 2816-PS, as Exhibit USA 115.
This is a letter which the distinguished Admiral of Hungary
- a country which, incidentally, had no navy - wrote to
Hitler on 13th March, 1939, and which we captured in the
German Foreign Office files.
My sincere thanks,
I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water
Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance
to the life of Hungary" - I suppose he needed some head
waters for the non-existent navy of which he was admiral.
"In spite of the fact that our recruits have been serving
for only five weeks we are going into this affair with eager
enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On
Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will
take place which will be followed by the big blow on
Saturday "- He does not like to use big words. "Big Blow" is
sufficient.
"I shall never forget this proof of friendship, and your
Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all
times.
Your devoted friend,
HORTHY".
THE PRESIDENT: Was that letter addressed to the Hungarian
Ambassador at Berlin ?
MR. ALDERMAN: I thought it was addressed to Hitler, if the
President please.
THE PRESIDENT: There are some words at the top which look
like a Hungarian name.
MR. ALDERMAN: That is the letter heading. As I understand
it, the letter was addressed to Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
MR. ALDERMAN: And I should have said it was - it ended with
the -
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything on the letter which
indicates that?
[Page 95]
From that cynical and callous letter it may be inferred that
the Nazi conspirators had already informed the Hungarian
Government of their plans for further military action
against Czechoslovakia. As it turned out the timetable was
advanced somewhat. I would draw the inference that His
Excellency, Adolf Hitler, informed his devoted friend Horthy
of this change in good time.
On the diplomatic level the defendant Ribbentrop was quite
active. On 13th March, the same day on which Horthy wrote
his letter, Ribbentrop sent a cautionary telegram to the
German minister in Prague outlining the course of conduct he
should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure. I offer
in evidence Document 2815-PS as Exhibit USA 116. This is the
telegram sent by Ribbentrop to the German Legation in Prague
on 13th March.
With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt
today, in case you should get any written communication
from President Hacha, please do not make any written or
verbal comments or take any other action on them, but
pass them on here by cipher telegram. Moreover, I must
ask you and the other members of the Embassy to make a
point of not being available if the Czech Government
wants to communicate with you during the next few days. [Page 96]
The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister (the
defendant Ribbentrop) if he had any remarks to add. The
Reich Foreign Minister also emphasised for his part the
conception that in this case a decision was a question
of hours not of days. He showed the Fuehrer a message he
had just received which reported Hungarian troop
movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Fuehrer read this
report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope
that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself."
While in Berlin the Slovaks also conferred separately with
the defendant Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials.
Ribbentrop very solicitously handed Tiso a copy already
drafted in Slovak language of the law proclaiming the
independence of Slovakia. On the night of the 13th a German
plane was conveniently placed at Tiso's disposal to carry
him home. On 14th March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi
conspirators, the diet of Bratislava proclaimed the
independence of Slovakia. With Slovak extremists acting at
the Nazi bidding in open revolt against the Czechoslovak
Government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move
against Prague. On the evening of the 14th, at the
suggestion of the German Legation in Prague, M. Hacha, the
President of the Czechoslovak Republic and M. Chvalkowsky,
his Foreign Minister, arrived in Berlin. The atmosphere in
which they found themselves might be described as somewhat
hostile. Since the preceding week-end, the Nazi Press had
accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks,
and specially against the members of the German minority and
citizens of the Reich. Both Press and radio proclaimed that
the lives of Germans were in danger. Such a situation was
intolerable. It was necessary to smother as quickly as
possible the focus of trouble, which Prague had become, in
the heart of Europe - these peacemakers.
After midnight on the 15th at 1.15 in the morning, Hacha and
Chvalkowsky were ushered into the Reich Chancellery. They
found there Adolf Hitler, the defendants Ribbentrop,
Goering, and Keitel and other high Nazi officials.
[Page 97]
It must be remembered that this account of the fateful
conference on the night of March 14th-15th comes from German
sources, and of course it must be read as an account biased
by its source, or as counsel for the defendants said last
week "a tendentious account." Nevertheless, even without too
much discounting of the report on account of its source, it
constitutes a complete condemnation of the Nazis, who by
pure and simple international banditry forced the
dissolution of Czechoslovakia. And I interpolate to suggest
that international banditry has been a crime against
International Law for centuries.
I will first read the headings to the minutes. In the
English mimeographed version in the document books the time
given is an incorrect translation of the original. It should
read 0115 to 0215. Conversation between the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor and the President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha,
in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, von
Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister,
Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancellery on 15th March, 1939,
0115 to 0215 hours. Others present were General Field
Marshal Goering, General Keitel, Secretary of the State, von
Weizsaecker, Minister of the State, Meissner, Secretary of
the State, Dietrich, Counsellor of the Legation, Hewel.
Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory - even
humble, though the President of a sovereign State. He
thanked Hitler for receiving him and he said he knew that
the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Fuehrer's hands.
Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to
ask Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the
great age of the President. Hacha was then, I believe, in
his seventies. But this journey, Hitler told the President,
could be of great advantage to his country because, and I
quote "It was only a matter of hours before Germany would
intervene." I quote now from the top of page three of the
English translation. You will bear in mind that what I am
reading are rough notes or minutes of what Adolf Hitler said
- "Czechoslovakia was a matter of indifference to him."
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps so; yes. The last sentence from the
preceding page was:
[Page 98]
At first he had not understood this but when it became
clear to him he drew his conclusions because, had the
development continued in this way, the relations with
Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same
as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not
immediately reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such
an army was a tremendous burden for such a State because
it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political
mission of the State. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has
a foreign political mission such an army is meaningless.
He enumerates several examples which proved to him that
the spirit in the army had not changed. This symptom
convinced him that the army also would be a source of a
severe political burden in the future. Added to this
were the inevitable development of economic necessities,
and, further, the protests of national groups which
could no longer endure life as it was." [
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(Part 1 of 8)
"A modern people and a modern State are today
unthinkable without political troops. To these are
allotted the special task of being the advance guard of
the political will and the guarantor of its unity. This
is especially true of the German folk-groups, which have
their home in some other people's State. Accordingly the
Sudeten German Party had formerly also organised its
political troop, the "Voluntary Vigilantes" or, in
German, "Freiwilliger Selbstschutz " called F.S. for
short. This troop was trained especially in accordance
with the principles of the S.S., so far as these could
be used in this region at that time. The troop was
likewise assigned here the special task of protecting
the homeland actively, if necessary. It stood up well in
its first test in this connection, whenever, in the
autumn crisis of 1938, it had to assist in the
protection of the homeland, arms in hand.
I now ask the Court to take judicial notice, under Article
21 of the Charter, of three official documents. These are
identified by us as Documents D-571, D-572 and 2943-PS. I
offer them in evidence, respectively, D-571 Exhibit USA 112;
D-572 as Exhibit USA 113; and 2943-PS which is the French
Official Yellow Book, at Pages 66 and 67, as Exhibit USA
114.
"Herr Burckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart, and five German
generals came at about 10 p.m. in the evening of
Saturday, the 11th March, into a cabinet meeting in
progress in Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government
that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia.
When M. Sidor, the Prime Minister, showed hesitation,
Herr Burckel took him on one side and explained that
Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of
Czechoslovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to
proclaim her independence, because Herr Hitler would
otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor
thanked Herr Burckel for this information, but said that
he must discuss the situation with the Government at
Prague"
- a very strange situation that he should have to discuss
such a matter with his own Government before obeying
instructions of Herr Hitler delivered by five German
generals and Herr Burckel and Herr Seyss-Inquart.
"Your Excellency,
From this cynical and callous letter from the distinguished
Admiral --
"Berlin, 13th March, 1939. Prague. Telegram in secret
code.
On the afternoon of 13th March, Tiso, accompanied by
Durcansky and Herr Meissner, the local Nazi leader, arrived
in Berlin in response to the summons from Hitler to which I
have heretofore referred. Late that afternoon Tiso was
received by Hitler in his study in the Reich Chancellery and
presented with an ultimatum. Two alternatives were given
him: either declare the independence of Slovakia or be left
without German assistance; or, what were referred to as the
mergers of Poland and Hungary. This decision, Hitler said,
was not a question of days, but of hours. I now offer in
evidence Document 2802-PS as Exhibit USA 117, again a
document captured in the German Foreign Office; German
Foreign Office minutes of the meeting between Hitler and
Tiso on 13th March. I read the bottom paragraph on Page 2
and the top paragraph on Page 3 of the English translation.
The first paragraph I shall read is a summary of Hitler's
remark. You will note that in the inducements he held out to
the Slovaks, Hitler displayed his customary disregard for
the truth. I quote:
Signed Ribbentrop." "Now he had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in
order to make this question clear in a very short time.
Germany had no interest East of the Carpathian
mountains. It was indifferent to him what happened
there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to
conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for
anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his people
or even a single soldier to something which was not in
any way desired by the Slovak people. He would like to
secure final confirmation as to what Slovakia really
wished. He did not wish that reproaches should come from
Hungary that he was preserving something which did not
wish to be preserved at all. He took a liberal view of
unrest and demonstration in general, but in this
connection unrest was
A most extraordinary interview. Germany had no interest in
Slovakia; Slovakia had never belonged to Germany; Tiso was
invited there; and this is what happened: those present at
that meeting included the defendant Ribbentrop, the
defendant Keitel, State Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary
Keppler, the German Minister of State Meissner. I invite the
attention of the Tribunal to the presence of the defendant
Keitel on this occasion as on so many other occasions where
purely political measures in furtherance of Nazi aggression
were under discussion, and where apparently there was no
need for technical military advice.
"If Czechoslovakia had kept closer to Germany it would
have been an obligation to Germany, but he was glad that
he did not have this obligation now. He had no interests
whatsoever in the territory East of the little
Carpathian Mountains. He did not want to draw the final
consequences in the autumn - "
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, do you not think you ought to
read the last sentence on page two ?
"For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but
a means to an end. London and Paris were not in a
position really to stand up for Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia was a matter of indifference to him."
Then I had read down to -
"But even at that time and also later in his
conversations with Chvalkowsky he made it clear that
they would ruthlessly smash this State if Benes's
tendencies were not completely