Fifth Day:
Monday, 26rd November, 1945
[Page 176]
If occasion arises I will order the concentration of
troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks
before the intended beginning of operations.
Preparations requiring more time to start are - if this
has not yet been done - to begin presently and are to be
completed by 15th May, 1941.
Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of
an attack will not be recognised.
The Preparations of the High Command are to be made on
the following basis:
1. General Purpose:
In quick pursuit a line is to be reached from where the
Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German
Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the
protection from Asiatic Russia of the general line Volga-
Archangelsk. In
[Page 177]
In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea
Fleet will quickly lose its bases and will no longer be
ready to fight.
Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is to be
prevented through powerful blows at the beginning of the
operations."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps that would be a
convenient time to adjourn for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken)
MR. ALDERMAN: If it please the Tribunal, another secret
document captured from the O.K.W. files, establishes, we
think, the motive for the attack on the Soviet Union. It
also establishes the full awareness of the Nazi conspirators
of the crimes against humanity which would result from their
attack. The document is a memorandum Of 2nd May, 1941,
concerning the result of a discussion on that day with the
State Secretaries concerning the "Case Barbarossa." The
document is initialled by a Major von Giessavet, a member of
the staff of General Thomas, set up to handle the economic
exploitations of the territory occupied by the Germans
during the course of the aggression against Russia. The
document is numbered 2718-PS, and our numbered series of
documents are offered in evidence as exhibit USA 32.
I shall simply read the first two paragraphs of this
document, including the introductory matter:
(1) The War can only be continued if all Armed Forces
are fed by Russia in the third year of War.
(2) There is no doubt that as a result many millions of
people will be starved to death if we take out of the
country the things necessary for us."
I turn now to the Nazi collaboration with Italy and Japan
and the resulting, attack on the United States on 7th
December, 1941. With the unleashing of the German aggressive
war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Nazi
conspirators and, in particular, the defendant Ribbentrop,
called upon the Eastern co-architect of the New Order,
Japan, to attack in the rear. Our evidence will show that
they incited and kept in motion a force reasonably
calculated to result in an attack on the United States. For
a time, they maintained their preference that the United
States should not be involved in the conflict, realising the
military implication of an entry of the United States into
the War. However, their incitement did result in the attack
on Pearl Harbour, and long prior to that attack, they had
assured the Japanese that they would declare War on the
United States should
[Page 178]
On the present discussion of this phase of the case, I shall
offer only one document to prove this point. The document
was captured from the files of the German Foreign Office. It
consists of notes dated 4th April, 1941, signed by
"Schmidt," regarding discussions between the Fuehrer and the
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the
defendant Ribbentrop. The document is numbered 1881 PS in
our numbered series and I offer it in evidence as exhibit
USA 33. In the original, it is in very large, typewritten
form in German. I shall read what I deem to be the pertinent
parts of this document, beginning with the four paragraphs,
first reading the heading, the heading being:
Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the
Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in
Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the
wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was
in need of German help particularly concerning the U-
boat warfare, which could be given by making available
to them the latest experiences of the war is well as
the latest technical improvements and inventions."
To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer would
see to it that the proper German authorities would
place at the disposal of the Japanese those
developments and inventions concerning Navy and Army,
which were needed by the Japanese.
The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany
too considered a conflict with the United States
undesirable, but that it had already made allowances
for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the
opinion that America's contributions depended upon the
possibilities of transportation, and that this again is
conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war
against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening
not merely against England, but also against America.
Germany has made her preparations so that no American
could land in Europe. She would conduct a most
energetic fight against America with her boats and her
'Luftwaffe,' and due to her superior experience, which
would still have to be acquired by the United States,
she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from
the fact that the German soldiers naturally rank high
above the Americans.
In the further course of the discussion, the Fuehrer
pointed out that Germany, on her part, would
immediately take the consequences if Japan would get
involved with the United States. It did not matter with
whom the United States would first get involved,
whether Germany or Japan. They would always try to
eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an
understanding with the other country subsequently, but
to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany
would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in
case of a conflict between Japan
[Page 179]
Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the
Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order
that the proper German authorities would place at the
disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and
inventions, which are of interest to them, because the
Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict
with the United States.
As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka
explained further that he has always declared in his
country, that sooner or later a war with the United
States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to
drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict
would happen rather sooner than later. His argument
went on, why should Japan, therefore, not strike
decisively at the right moment and take the risk upon
herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she
perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if
she gained predominance in the South Seas. There were,
to be sure in his opinion, in Japan, many who would
hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka
was considered in those circles a dangerous man with
dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan
continued to walk along her present path, one day she
would have to fight anyway and that this would then be
under less favourable circumstances than at present.
The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the
situation of Matsuoka, because he himself had been in
similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland,
declaration of Sovereignty of Armed Forces, etc.). He
too was of the opinion that he had to exploit
favourable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow
unavoidable fight at a time when be himself was still
young and full of vigour. How right he was in his
attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He
would not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any
widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America.
Providence favoured those who would not let dangers
come to them, but who would bravely face them.
Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather
their ruling politicians, had recently attempted a last
manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America
would not fight Japan on account of China or the South
Seas, provided that Japan gave free passage to the
consignment of rubber and tin to America to their place
of destination. However, America would fight against
Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war
with the intention of assisting in the destruction of
Great Britain. Such an argument naturally did not miss
its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education
oriented on English lines which many of them had
received.
The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of
America did not mean anything but that the United
States had the hope, that, as long as the British World
Empire existed, one day they could advance against
Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of
the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally
isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the
Americans definitely under all circumstances wanted to
maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia,
but that on the other hand it was proved by this
attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of
Japan and Germany.
Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance
to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of
the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also
had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he,
Matsuoka, in his capacity as Japanese Minister for
Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan a single word
of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the
Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans, as this
would cause him serious damage in political and
financial circles. Once before, he had committed the
mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign
Affairs, of telling a close friend something about his
intentions. It seems that the latter had mentioned
these things and thus brought about all sorts
[Page 180]
Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions,
that would be proof that he was lacking in influence,
in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities.
However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had
great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident
that he would succeed.
On his return, being questioned, be would indeed admit
to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the
Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed;
he would, however, state that it was only on a
hypothetical basis.
Besides this Matsuoka made the express decision not to
cable in the matter of Singapore, because he had reason
to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If
necessary, he would send a courier.
The Fuehrer agreed and assured him after all, that he
could entirely rely on German reticence.
Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German
reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same for
Japan.
The discussion was terminated after the exchange of
some personal parting words.
Berlin, the 4th of April, 1941
I turn to a more detailed and more or less chronological
presentation of the various stages of the aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until ten
o'clock tomorrow.
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(Part 7 of 7)
[MR ALDERMAN continues]
Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains
unequivocally against England also during an Eastern
campaign.
Another secret document, captured from the O.K.W. files--
The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be
destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep
wedges within ranks and the retreat of intact battle-
ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be
prevented.
"Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files 1a.
That document has already been commented on and quoted from
in Mr. Justice Jackson's opening statement. The staggering
implications of that document are hard to realise. In the
words of the document, the motive for the attack was that
the War which the Nazi conspirators had launched in
September 1939, could only be continued if all Armed Forces
were fed by Russia in the third year of the War. Perhaps
there never was a more sinister sentence written than the
sentence in this document which reads:-
Second copy to General Schubert, 2nd May, 1941.
Memorandum about the result of today's discussion with
the State Secretaries about Barbarossa.
"There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people
will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
things necessary for us."
The result is known to all of us.
"Notes regarding the discussion between the Fuehrer and
the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in the
presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich
Minister of State, Reissner, in Berlin, on the 4th
April, 1941.
For the record, I am reading on what is page six of the
German original.
"Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the
United States. If Japan should decide to attack
Singapore, the Japanese Navy, of course, had to be
prepared for a fight with the United States, because in
that case America probably would side with Great
Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed that the
United States could be restrained by diplomatic
exertions from entering the war at the side of Great
Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the
worst situation, that is on war against America. They
were of the opinion that such a war would extend for
five years or longer and would take the form of
guerrilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought
out in the South Sea. For this reason the German
experiences in her guerrilla warfare were of the
greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a
war would best be conducted and how all the technical
improvements of submarines, in all details such as
periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by
Japan.
This completes the presentation of what I have called the
"handful of selected documents," offered not as a detailed
treatment of any of these wars of aggression but merely to
prove the deliberate planning, the deliberate premeditation
with which each of these aggressions was carried out.
(Signed) "Schmidt."