Fifth Day:
Monday, 26rd November, 1945
[Page 160]
In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been
carried out at that time by other nations, we shall
decrease in relative power. Should we not act until
1943-45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves,
any year could bring about the food crisis, for the
countering of which we do not possess the necessary
foreign currency. This must be considered as a 'point
of weakness in the regime.'
Over and above that, the world will anticipate our
action and will increase counter-measures yearly.
Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be
forced on the offensive.
What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45,
no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can
wait no longer.
On the one side the large armed forces, with the
necessity for securing their upkeep, the ageing of the
Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side
the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living
and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice
but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it
will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German
space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for
action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in
Cases 2 and 3.
Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an
internal political crisis of such dimensions that it
absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable
for employment in war against Germany, then the time
for action against Czechoslovakia has come. [Page 161]
For the improvement of our military political position
it must be our first arm, in every case of entanglement
by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria
simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the
flanks in case of a possible advance westwards. In the
case of a conflict with France it would hardly be
necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare
war on the same day as France. However,
Czechoslovakia's desire to participate in the war will
increase proportionally to the degree to which we are
being weakened. Its actual participation
could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either
towards the North or the West.
Once Czechoslovakia is conquered - and a mutual
frontier, Germany-Hungary, is obtained-then a neutral
attitude by Poland in a German-French conflict could
more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with Poland
remain valid only as long as Germany's strength remains
unshakeable; should Germany have any setbacks then an
attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps also
against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into
account.
Assuming a development of the situation, which would
lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943
to '45, then the behaviour of France, England, Poland
and Russia would probably have to be judged in the
following manner:
The Fuehrer believes personally, that in all
probability England and perhaps also France, have
already silently written off Czechoslovakia, and that
they have got used to the idea that this question would
one day be cleaned up by Germany. The difficulties in
the British Empire and the prospects of being entangled
in another long-drawn-out European war, would be
decisive factors in the non-participation of England in
a war against Germany. The British attitude would
certainly not remain without influence on France's
attitude. An attack by France, without British support,
is hardly probable, assuming that its offensive would
stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without
England's support it would also not be necessary to
take into consideration a march by France through
Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be
reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France,
as in every case it would have, as a consequence, the
enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every
case have to bar our frontier during the operation of
our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must
be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's
defence measures will increase in strength from year to
year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of
the Austrian Army will also be effected in the course
of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in
the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of
Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless
constitute the conquest of food for five to six million
people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of
two million from Czechoslovakia, and of one million
from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of
the two States to Germany, militarily and politically,
would constitute a considerable relief, owing to
shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting
personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of
reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about
twelve Divisions, representing a new Division per one
million population.
No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia or
Austria is expected on the part of Italy; however, it
cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in
the Austrian question, since it would depend largely on
whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.
The measure and speed of our action would decide
Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination
to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with
Russia in the rear.
Military participation by Russia must be countered by
the speed of our operations; it is a question whether
this needs to be taken into consideration at all in
view of Japan's attitude. [Page 162]
The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could
develop from the existing tensions in the
Mediterranean, and should it occur, he has firmly
decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as
early as 1938.
Following recent experiences in the course of the
events of the war in Spain, the Fuehrer does not see an
early end to hostilities there.
Taking into consideration the time required for past
offensives by Franco
- the English Text says France: it means Franco - a
further three years' duration of war is within the
bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the
German point of view, a one hundred per cent victory by
Franco is not desirable; we are more interested in a
continuation of the war and preservation of the
tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole
possession of the Spanish Peninsula, it would mean the
end of Italian intervention and of the presence of
Italy in the Balearic Isles. As our interests are
directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must
be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in
her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a
solidification of Italian positions in the Balearic
Isles cannot be tolerated either by France or by
England and could lead to a war by France and England
against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in his
(that is Franco's) hands, could participate on the side
of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a
war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials
could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuehrer
believes that Italy's military strategy would be to
remain on the defensive against France on the Western
frontier and carry out operations against France from
Libya, against the North African French colonial
possessions.
As a landing of French and British troops on the
Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French
offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be
extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate before
the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of
communication threatened by the Italian fleet will to a
great extent be paralysed for the transport of fighting
personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its
frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have, at
its disposal, solely the metropolitan fighting forces."
The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria
must be made independent of the course of the Italian-
French-English war and would not be simultaneous with
the commencement of military operations by these three
States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military
agreements with Italy, but in complete independence and
by exploiting this unique favourable opportunity, he
wishes to begin to carry out operations against
Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have
to take place with the 'speed of lightning'"
Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von
Fritsch, in giving their estimate on the situation,
repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not
appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war
with Italy would not bind the French Army to such an
extent that it would not be in a position to commence
operations on our Western frontier with superior
forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French
forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine
frontier against Italy to be in the region of twenty
divisions, so that a strong
[Page 163]
Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the
purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter
to investigate the possibilities of carrying out
operations against Czechoslovakia, with special
consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian
system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated
that owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have
to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on
the 10th of November. This intention was countermanded
by the Fuehrer, who gave as a reason that the
possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as
being so imminent. In reply to statements by General
Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch
regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuehrer
repeated his previous statements and said that he was
convinced of Britain's non-participation and that
consequently he did not believe in military action by
France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean
conflict, already mentioned, lead to a general
mobilisation in Europe, then we should have to commence
operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If,
however, the powers who are not participating in the
war should declare their disinterestedness, then
Germany would, for the time being, have to side with
this attitude.
In view of the information given by the Fuehrer,
Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think
of a reduction or abandonment of our military
undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer agreed to this,
insofar as he believed this decision should be
postponed for a suitable date.
The second part of the discussion concerned material
armament questions."
(Signed) "Hoszbach," and there are other notations.
In this connection I invite the Court's attention to the
allegation in paragraph 3(a) of Section IV (F) of the
Indictment, on page 7 of the printed English text, relating
to a meeting of an influential group of Nazi conspirators on
5th November, 1937. The document just introduced and read in
evidence gives the specific evidentiary support for trial
allegation.
The record of what happened thereafter is well known to
history. The Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure
from the Nazis, occurred in March, 1938. We shall give you
detailed evidence concerning that in due course. We shall
also give evidence as to details of the aggression against
Czechoslovakia including the pressure on Czechoslovakia that
resulted in the Munich Pact of September, 1938, and the
violation of that Pact itself by Germany, on 15th March,
1939. There is much of interest in the secret documents
relating to those aggressions.
At this point, however, I desire to bring to the attention
of the Tribunal one more captured document, which reveals in
all its nakedness the truth concerning the deliberateness of
the aggressions against Czechoslovakia. This document
consists of a file, a file kept by Colonel Schmundt,
Hitler's adjutant. The file was found by one of the units of
the 327th Glider Infantry, in a cellar of the Platterhof,
Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. The file represents a work-
file of originals and duplicates, incidental to the
preparations for the annexation of Czechoslovakia. I should
like to ask the Tribunal to examine particularly the
photostat of the original German of this file. We have
copies of those photostats. Something in physical form is
lost in transcribing a translation. The picture of the
original
[Page 164]
I thought perhaps I might read the German title. It is
"Grundlagen zur Studie Gruen," that is the main plan for
"Case Green," Green being a code word for the aggression
against Czechoslovakia.
I offer the entire file in evidence as exhibit USA 26 and
will ask that photostats be passed up to the Court. I offer
the file, if the Tribunal please, with, of course, the
understanding arid realisation that only such parts of it as
I read will immediately go into evidence; but we shall refer
to other parts from time to time later, in the presentation
of the case. The material in this file will be dealt with in
greater detail at a later point in my prosecution. However,
at this point, I desire to call attention to Item No. 2 in
the file.
Item No. 2 is dated 22nd April, 1938. It is the second sheet
of the English translation. It is a summary, prepared by
Schmundt, the adjutant, of a discussion on 21st April, 1938,
between Hitler and the defendant Wilhelm Keitel.
This item, like the other items in the file, relates to
"Case Green." As I said, "Case Green" was a secret code word
for the planned operation against Czechoslovakia. This
meeting occurred within approximately one month following
the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of
the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the "Case
Green," to take into account the changed attitude, as a
result of the bloodless success against Austria. I shall now
read Item 2 of this file.
Bases of the Dissertation on 'Gruen.'
Summary of discussion between the Fuehrer and General
Keitel of 21st April: -
A. Political Aspect.
(2) Action after a time of diplomatic clashes,
which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.
(3) Lightning-swift action as the result of an
incident (for example, assassination of German
ambassador in connection with an anti-German
demonstration). [
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(Part 3 of 7)
[MR ALDERMAN continues]
"Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect
a change for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the
Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the
Officers' Corps, are practically concluded."
I remind the Tribunal that this meeting was on 5th November,
1937, but he is contemplating the period 1943-45.
"Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with
further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date
will increase. In particular the secrecy of 'special
weapons' cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of
reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age
groups and an addition from older untrained groups
would be no longer available.
Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against
Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war
against another State that it cannot "proceed" against
Germany.
Should Case 2 occur - paralysation of France by a Civil
War - then the situation should be utilised at any time
for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany's
most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.
There again I think that must be a defective English
translation. "French lines of communication by the Italian
fleet." must mean "Fresh lines." or something in that
connection.
"If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the
Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the
probability must be assumed that England-being at war
with Italy-would not decide to commence operations
against Germany. Without British support, a warlike
action by France against Germany is not to be
anticipated.
- the German words being "blitzartig schnell."
"Berlin, 22nd April, 1938.
(1) Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky
without any cause or possibility of justification
has been turned down. The result would be: hostile
world opinion which can lead to a critical
situation. Such a measure is justified only for
the elimination of the last opponent on the
mainland.