The Aggression Against Poland
[Page 24]
On the 22nd August, 1939 there took place the important
meeting of that day, to which reference has already been
made. The Prosecution have put in evidence two unsigned
captured documents which appear to be records made of this
meeting by persons who were present. The first document is
headed: "The Fuehrer's Speech to the Commanders-in-Chief on
22nd August, 1939." The purpose of the speech was to
announce the decision to make war on Poland at once, and
Hitler began by saying:
Hitler then went on to explain why he had decided that the
most favorable moment had arrived for starting the war:
"Now" said Hitler, "Poland is in the position in which I
wanted her .. I am only afraid that at the last moment some
Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation .. A
beginning has been made for the destruction of England's
hegemony."
[Page 25]
This document closely resembles one of the documents put in
evidence on behalf of the Defendant Raeder. This latter
document consists of a summary of the same speech, compiled
on the day it was made, by one Admiral Boehm, from notes he
had taken during the meeting. In substance it says that the
moment had arrived to settle the dispute with Poland by
military invasion, that although a conflict between Germany
and the West was unavoidable in the long run, the likelihood
of Great Britain and France coming to Poland's assistance
was not great, and that even if a war in the West should
come about, the first aim should be the crushing of the
Polish military strength. It also contains a statement by
Hitler that an appropriate propaganda reason for invading
Poland would be given, the truth or falsehood of which was
unimportant, since "the Right lies in Victory"
The second unsigned document put in evidence by the
Prosecution is headed: "Second Speech by the Fuehrer on the
22nd August, 1939," and is in the form of notes of the main
points made by Hitler. Some of these are as follows:
In spite of it being described as a second speech, there are
sufficient points of similarity with the two previously
mentioned documents to make it appear very probable that
this is an account of the same speech, not as detailed as
the other two, but in substance the same.
These three documents establish that the final decision as
to the date of Poland's destruction, which had been agreed
upon and planned earlier in the year, was reached by Hitler
shortly before the 22nd August, 1939. They also show that
although he hoped to be able to avoid having to fight Great
Britain and France as well, he fully realized there was a
risk of this happening, but it was a risk which he was
determined to take.
The events of the last days of August confirm this
determination. On the 22nd August, 1939, the same day as the
speech just referred to, the British Prime Minister wrote a
letter to Hitler, in which he said:
On 23 August Hitler replied:
There followed a number of appeals to Hitler to refrain from
forcing the Polish issue to the point of war. These were
from President Roosevelt
[Page 26]
on 24 and 25 August; from his Holiness the Pope on the 24th
and 25th August; and from M. Daladier, the Prime Minister of
France, on the 26 August. All these appeals fell on deaf
ears.
On the 25 August, Great Britain signed a pact of mutual
assistance with Poland, which reinforced the undertaking she
had given to Poland earlier in the year. This, coupled with
the news of Mussolini's unwillingness to enter the war on
Germany's side, made Hitler hesitate for a moment. The
invasion of Poland, which was timed to start on the 26
August, was postponed until a further attempt had been made
to persuade Great Britain not to intervene. Hitler offered
to enter into a comprehensive agreement with Great Britain,
once the Polish question had been settled. In reply to this,
Great Britain made a counter-suggestion for the settlement
of the Polish dispute by negotiation. On the 29th August
Hitler informed the British Ambassador that the German
Government, though skeptical as to the result, would be
prepared to enter into direct negotiations with a Polish
emissary, provided he arrived in Berlin with plenipotentiary
powers by midnight for the following day, August 30th. The
Polish Government were informed of this, but with the
example of Schuschnigg and Hacha before them, they decided
not to send such an emissary. At midnight on the 30th August
the Defendant Ribbentrop read to the British Ambassador at
top speed a document containing the first precise
formulation of the German demands against Poland. He
refused, however, to give the Ambassador a copy of this, and
stated that in any case it was too late now, since no Polish
plenipotentiary had arrived.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the manner in which these
negotiations were conducted by Hitler and Ribbentrop showed
that they were not entered into in good faith or with any
desire to maintain peace, but solely in the attempt to
prevent Great Britain and France from honoring their
obligations to Poland.
Parallel with these negotiations were the unsuccessful
attempts made by Goering to effect the isolation of Poland
by persuading Great Britain not to stand by her pledged
word, through the services of one Birger Dahlerus, a Swede.
Dahlerus, who was called as a witness by Goering, had a
considerable knowledge of England and things English, and in
July, 1939 was anxious to bring about a better understanding
between England and Germany, in the hope of preventing a war
between the two countries. He got into contact with Goering
as well as with official circles in London, and during the
latter part of August, Goering used him as an unofficial
intermediary to try and deter the British Government from
their opposition to Germany's intentions towards Poland.
Dahlerus, of course, had no knowledge at the time of the
decision which Hitler had secretly announced on the 22nd
August, nor of the German military directives for the attack
on Poland which were already in existence. As he admitted in
his evidence, it was not until the 26th September, after the
conquest of Poland was virtually complete, that he first
realized that Goering's aim all along had been to get Great
Britain's consent to Germany's seizure of Poland.
After all attempts to persuade Germany to agree to a
settlement of her dispute with Poland on a reasonable basis
had failed, Hitler, on the 31st August, issued his final
directive, in which he announced that the attack on Poland
would start in the early morning of the 1st September, and
gave instructions as to what action would be taken if Great
Britain and France should enter the war in defense of
Poland.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the events of the days
immediately preceding 1st September, 1939 demonstrate the
determination of Hitler and his associates to carry out the
declared intention of invading Poland at all costs, despite
appeals from every quarter. With the ever increasing
evidence
[Page 27]
before him that this intention would lead to war with Great
Britain and France as well, Hitler was resolved not to
depart from the course he had set for himself. The Tribunal
is fully satisfied by the evidence that the war initiated by
Germany against Poland on 1st September, 1939 was most
plainly an aggressive war, which was to develop in due
course into a war which embraced almost the whole world, and
resulted in the commission of countless crimes, both against
the laws and customs of war, and against humanity.
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(Part 2
of 2)
"It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland
had to come sooner or later. I had already made
this decision in the spring, but I thought that I
would first turn against the West in a few years,
and only afterwards against the East ..I wanted to
establish an acceptable relationship with Poland
in order to fight first against the West. But this
plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be
executed since essential points have changed. It
became clear to me that Poland would attack us in
case of a conflict with the West."
"Everybody shall have to make a point of it that
we were determined from the beginning to fight the
Western Powers. Struggle for life or death
..destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim
is elimination of living forces, not the arrival
at a certain line. Even if war should break out in
the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the
primary objective. I shall give a propagandist
cause for starting the war never mind whether it
be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked
later on whether we told the truth or not. In
starting and making a war, not the Right is what
matters, but Victory .. The start will be ordered
probably by Saturday morning." (That is to say,
the 26th August.)
"Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I
wish to repeat to you my conviction that war
between our two peoples would be the greatest
calamity that could occur."
"The question of the treatment of European
problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision
which rests with Germany, but primarily on those
who since the crime committed by the Versailles
Diktat have stubbornly and consistently opposed
any peaceful revision. Only after a change of
spirit on the part of the responsible Powers can
there be any real change in the relationship
between England and Germany."
The
original plaintext version of this file is available via
ftp.