The Aggression Against Poland
[Page 22]
By March, 1939, the plan to annex Austria and
Czechoslovakia, which had been discussed by Hitler at the
meeting of the 5th November, 1937, had been accomplished.
The time had now come for the German leaders to consider
further acts of aggression, made more possible of attainment
because of that accomplishment.
On the 23rd May, 1939, a meeting was held in Hitler's study
in the new Reich Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler announced his
decision to attack Poland and gave his reasons, and
discussed the effect the decision might have on other
countries. In point of time, this was the second of the
important meetings to which reference has already been made,
and in order to appreciate the full significance of what was
said and done, it is necessary to state shortly some of the
main events in the history of German-Polish relations.
As long ago as the year 1925 an Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Poland had been made at Locarno, providing for
the settlement of all disputes between the two countries. On
the 26th January, 1934, a German-Polish declaration of non-
aggression was made, signed on behalf of the German
Government by the Defendant von Neurath. On 30th January,
1934, and again on the 30th January, 1937 Hitler made
speeches in the Reichstag in which he expressed his view
that Poland and Germany could work together in harmony and
peace. On the 20th February, 1938 Hitler made a third speech
in the Reichstag in the course of which he said with regard
to Poland:
On the 26th September, 1938, in the middle of the crisis
over the Sudetenland, Hitler made the speech in Berlin which
has already been quoted, and announced that he had informed
the British Prime Minister that when the Czechoslovakian
problem was solved there would be no more territorial
problems for Germany in Europe. Nevertheless, on the 24th
November of the same year, an OKW directive was issued to
the German Armed Forces to make preparations for an attack
upon Danzig; it stated:
(1) ..Preparations are also to be made to enable
the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German
troops by surprise."
In spite of having ordered military preparations for the
occupation of Danzig, Hitler on the 30th January, 1939, said
in a speech in the Reichstag:
Five days previously, on the 25th January, 1939, Ribbentrop
said in the course of a speech in Warsaw:
[Page 23]
Following on the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by
Germany on the 15th March, 1939, which was a flagrant breach
of the Munich Agreement, Great Britain gave an assurance to
Poland on the 31st March, 1939, that in the event of any
action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and
which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital
to resist with their National Forces, Great Britain would
feel itself bound at once to lend Poland all the support in
its power. The French Government took the same stand. It is
interesting to note in this connection, that one of the
arguments frequently presented by the Defense in the present
case is that the Defendants were induced to think that their
conduct was not in breach of international law by the
acquiescence of other Powers. The declarations of Great
Britain and France showed, at least, that this view could be
held no longer.
On the 3rd April, 1939, a revised OKW directive was issued
to the Armed Forces, which after referring to the question
of Danzig made reference to Fall Weiss (the military code
name for the German invasion of Poland) and stated:
(1) Preparations must be made in such a way that
the operation can be carried out at any time from
1st September, 1939 onwards.
(2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been
directed to draw up a precise timetable for Fall
Weiss and to arrange by conferences the
synchronized timings between the three branches of
the Armed Forces."
On 11th April, 1939 a further directive was signed by Hitler
and issued to the Armed Forces, and in one of the annexes to
that document the words
occur:
In spite of the contents of those two directives, Hitler
made a speech in the Reichstag on the 28th April, 1939, in
which, after describing the Polish Government's alleged
rejection of an offer he had made with regard to Danzig and
the Polish Corridor, he stated:
It was four weeks after making this speech that Hitler, on
the 23rd May, 1939, held the important military conference
to which reference has already been made. Among the persons
present were the Defendants Goering, Raeder, and Keitel. The
adjutant on duty that day was Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt,
and he made a record of what happened, certifying it with
his signature as a correct record.
[Page 24]
The purpose of the meeting was to enable Hitler to inform
the heads of the Armed Forces and their staffs of his views
on the political situation and his future aims. After
analyzing the political situation and reviewing the course
of events since 1933, Hitler announced his decision to
attack Poland. He admitted that the quarrel with Poland over
Danzig was not the reason for this attack, but the necessity
for Germany to enlarge her living space and secure her food
supplies. He said:
Later in his address he added:
Lt.- Col. Schmundt's record of the meeting reveals that
Hitler fully realized the possibility of Great Britain and
France coming to Poland's assistance. If, therefore, the
isolation of Poland could not be achieved, Hitler was of the
opinion that Germany should attack Great Britain and France
first, or at any rate should concentrate primarily on the
war in the West, in order to defeat Great Britain and France
quickly, or at least to destroy their effectiveness.
Nevertheless, Hitler stressed that war with England and
France would be a life and death struggle, which might last
a long time and that preparations must be made accordingly.
During the weeks which followed this conference, other
meetings were held and directives were issued in preparation
for the war. The Defendant Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to
negotiate a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.
[
Previous |
Index |
Next ]
Home ·
Site Map ·
What's New? ·
Search
Nizkor
© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012
This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and
to combat hatred.
Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.
As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may
include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and
provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist
and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.
(Part 1
of 2)
"And so the way to a friendly understanding has
been successfully paved, an understanding which,
beginning with Danzig, has today, in spite of the
attempts of certain mischief makers, succeeded in
finally taking the poison out of the relations
between Germany and Poland and transforming them
into a sincere, friendly cooperation .. Relying on
her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone
unturned to save that ideal which provides the
foundation for the task which is ahead of us --
peace."
"The Fuehrer has ordered:
"During the troubled months of the past year, the
friendship between Germany and Poland has been one
of the reassuring factors in the political life of
Europe."
"Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the
future with full confidence in the solid basis of
their mutual relations."
"The Fuehrer has added the following directions to
Fall Weiss.
"Quarrels with Poland should be avoided. Should
Poland however adopt a threatening attitude
towards Germany, 'a final settlement' will be
necessary, notwithstanding the pact with Poland.
The aim is then to destroy Polish military
strength, and to create in the East a situation
which satisfies the requirements of defense. The
Free State of Danzig will be incorporated into
Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the
latest. Policy aims at limiting the war to Poland,
and this is considered possible in view of the
internal crisis in France, and British restraint
as a result of this."
"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible
attitude of the Polish Government, but that alone
is not the decisive fact; the worst is that now
Poland like Czechoslovakia a year ago believes,
under the pressure of a lying international
campaign, that it must call up its troops,
although Germany on her part has not called up a
single man, and had not thought of proceeding in
any way against Poland .. The intention to attack
on the part of Germany which was merely invented
by the international press . . ."
"The solution of the problem demands courage. The
principle by which one evades solving the problem
by adapting oneself to circumstances is
inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted
to needs. This is impossible without invasion of
foreign States or attacks upon foreign property."
"There is therefore no question of sparing Poland,
and we are left with the decision to attack Poland
at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot
expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There
will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The
success of the isolation will be decisive .. The
isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful
politics."
The
original plaintext version of this file is available via
ftp.