The Invasion Of Denmark And Norway
[Page 29]
The War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff for 13th
January, 1940, stated that the Chief of the Naval Operations
Staff thought that the most favorable solution would be the
maintenance of the neutrality of Norway, but he harbored the
firm conviction that England intended to occupy Norway in
the near future relying on the tacit agreement of the
Norwegian Government.
The directive of Hitler issued on 1st March, 1940, for the
attack on Denmark and Norway stated that the operation
"should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the
Baltic."
It is, however, to be remembered that the Defendant Raeder's
memorandum of the 3rd October, 1939, makes no reference to
forestalling the Allies, but is based upon "the aim of
improving our strategical and operational position."
The memorandum itself is headed "Gaining of Bases in
Norway" The same observation applies mutatis mutandis to
the memorandum of the Defendant Doenitz of 9th October,
1939.
Furthermore, on the 13th March, the Defendant Jodl recorded
in his diary:
On 14th March, 1940 he again wrote:
On the 21st March, 1940, he recorded the misgivings of Task
Force XXI about the long interval between taking up
readiness positions and the close of the diplomatic
negotiations, and added:
On 2nd April he records that all the preparations are
completed; on 4th April, the Naval Operational Order was
issued; and on the 9th April, the invasion was begun.
From all this it is clear that when the plans for an attack
on Norway were being made, they were not made for the
purpose of forestalling an imminent Allied landing, but, at
the most, that they might prevent an Allied occupation at
some future date.
When the final orders for the German invasion of Norway were
given, the diary of the Naval Operations Staff for 23rd
March, 1940, records:
And Admiral Assmann's entry for 26 March says:
Documents which were subsequently captured by the Germans
are relied on to show that the Allied plan to occupy harbors
and airports in Western Norway was a definite plan, although
in all points considerably behind the German
[Page 30]
plans under which the invasion was actually carried out.
These documents indicate that an altered plan had been
finally agreed upon on 20th March, 1940, that a convoy
should leave England on 5th April, and that mining in
Norwegian waters would begin the same day; and that on 5th
April the sailing time had been postponed until 8th April.
But these plans were not the cause of the German invasion of
Norway. Norway was occupied by Germany to afford her bases
from which a more effective attack on England and France
might be made, pursuant to plans prepared long in advance of
the Allied plans which are now relied on to support the
argument of self-defense.
It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in
accordance with the reservations made by many of the
Signatory Powers at the time of the conclusion of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, whether preventive action was a
necessity, and that in making her decision her judgment was
conclusive. But whether action taken under the claim of self-
defense was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately
be subject to investigation and adjudication if
international law is ever to be enforced.
No suggestion is made by the defendants that there was any
plan by any belligerent, other than Germany, to occupy
Denmark. No excuse for that aggression has ever been
offered.
As the German Armies entered Norway and Denmark, German
memoranda were handed to the Norwegian and Danish
Governments which gave the assurance that the German troops
did not come as enemies, that they did not intend to make
use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for
operations against England, as long as they were not forced
to do so by measures taken by England and France, and that
they had come to protect the North against the proposed
occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French
forces.
The memoranda added that Germany had no intention of
infringing upon the territorial integrity and political
independence of the Kingdom of Norway then or in the future.
Nevertheless, on 6/3/1940, a German naval memorandum
discussed the use to be made of Norway and Denmark, and put
forward one solution for consideration, that the territories
of Denmark and Norway acquired during the course of the war
should continue to be occupied and organized so that they
could in the future be considered as German possessions.
In the light of all the available evidence it is impossible
to accept the contention that the invasions of Denmark and
Norway were defensive, and in the opinion of the Tribunal
they were acts of aggressive war.
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(Part
2 of 2)
"Fuehrer does not give order yet for 'W' (Weser
Exercise). He is still looking for an excuse."
(Justification?)
"Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give
for 'Weser Exercise'"
"Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as
otherwise calls for help go out to England and
America. If resistance is put up it must be
ruthlessly broken."
"A mass encroachment by the English into Norwegian
territorial waters ... is not to be expected at
the present time."
"British landing in Norway not considered serious."
The
original plaintext version of this file is available via
ftp.