The Seizure Of Czechoslovakia
[Page 19]
The conference of 5th November, 1937 made it quite plain
that the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany had been
definitely decided upon. The only question remaining was the
selection of the suitable moment to do it. On 4th March,
1938 the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote to the Defendant Keitel
with regard to a suggestion made to Ribbentrop by the
Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, that possible war aims
against Czechoslovakia should be discussed between the
German and Hungarian Armies. In the course of this letter
Ribbentrop said:
On 11th March, 1938 Goering made two separate statements to
M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him
that the developments then taking place in Austria would in
no way have any detrimental influence on the relations
between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasized
the continued earnest endeavor on the part of the Germans to
improve those mutual relations. On 12 March Goering asked M.
Mastny to call on him, and repeated these assurances.
[Page 20]
This design to keep Czechoslovakia quiet whilst Austria was
absorbed was a typical maneuver on the part of the Defendant
Goering, which he was to repeat later in the case of Poland,
when he made the most strenuous efforts to isolate Poland in
the impending struggle. On the same day, 12 March, the
Defendant von Neurath spoke with M. Mastny, and assured him
on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considered herself
bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention
concluded at Locarno in October, 1925.
The evidence shows that after the occupation of Austria by
the German Army on 12 March and the annexation of Austria on
13th March, Conrad Henlein, who was the leader of the
Sudeten German Party in Czechoslovakia, saw Hitler in Berlin
on 28 March. On the following day, at a conference in
Berlin, when Ribbentrop was present with Henlein, the
general situation was discussed, and later the Defendant
Jodl recorded in his diary:
On the 21st April, 1938, a discussion took place between
Hitler and the Defendant Keitel with regard to "Case Gruen"
showing quite clearly that the preparations for the attack
on Czechoslovakia were being fully considered. On 28th May,
1938 Hitler ordered that preparations should be made for
military action against Czechoslovakia by the 2nd October,
and from then onwards the plan to invade Czechoslovakia was
constantly under review. On the 30th May, 1938, a directive
signed by Hitler declared his "unalterable decision to smash
Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future"
In June, 1938, as appears from a captured document taken
from the files of the SD in Berlin, an elaborate plan for
the employment of the SD in Czechoslovakia had been
proposed. This plan provided that "the SD follow, if
possible, immediately after the leading troops, and take
upon themselves the duties similar to their tasks in Germany
.."
Gestapo officials were assigned to co-operate with the SD in
certain operations. Special agents were to be trained
beforehand to prevent sabotage, and these agents were to be
notified "before the attack in due time ....in order to give
them the possibility to hide themselves, avoid arrest and
deportation ....
Files of information were to be compiled with notations as
follows: "To arrest." ...."To liquidate." .... "To
confiscate." .... "To deprive of passport." etc.
The plan provided for the temporary division of the country
into larger and smaller territorial units, and considered
various "suggestions" as they were termed, for the
incorporation into the German Reich of the inhabitants and
districts of Czechoslovakia. The final "suggestion" included
the whole country, together with Slovakia and Carpathian
Russia, with a population of nearly 15 millions.
The plan was modified in some respects in September after
the Munich Conference, but the fact the plan existed in such
exact detail and was couched in such war-like language
indicated a calculated design to resort to force.
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(Part 1
of 2)
"I have many doubts about such negotiations. In
case we should discuss with Hungary possible war
aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists
that other parties as well would be informed about
this."
"After the annexation of Austria the Fuehrer
mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech
question, because Austria has to be digested
first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Gruen
(that is, the plan against Czechoslovakia) will
have to be carried out energetically; they will
have to be newly prepared on the basis of the
changed strategic position because of the
annexation of Austria."
"At the beginning, guerrilla or partisan warfare
is to be expected, therefore weapons are necessary
...."
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