[Page 19]

The conference of 5th November, 1937 made it quite plain that the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany had been definitely decided upon. The only question remaining was the selection of the suitable moment to do it. On 4th March, 1938 the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote to the Defendant Keitel with regard to a suggestion made to Ribbentrop by the Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, that possible war aims against Czechoslovakia should be discussed between the German and Hungarian Armies. In the course of this letter Ribbentrop said:

"I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed about this."

On 11th March, 1938 Goering made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the developments then taking place in Austria would in no way have any detrimental influence on the relations between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasized the continued earnest endeavor on the part of the Germans to improve those mutual relations. On 12 March Goering asked M. Mastny to call on him, and repeated these assurances.

[Page 20]

This design to keep Czechoslovakia quiet whilst Austria was absorbed was a typical maneuver on the part of the Defendant Goering, which he was to repeat later in the case of Poland, when he made the most strenuous efforts to isolate Poland in the impending struggle. On the same day, 12 March, the Defendant von Neurath spoke with M. Mastny, and assured him on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October, 1925.

The evidence shows that after the occupation of Austria by the German Army on 12 March and the annexation of Austria on 13th March, Conrad Henlein, who was the leader of the Sudeten German Party in Czechoslovakia, saw Hitler in Berlin on 28 March. On the following day, at a conference in Berlin, when Ribbentrop was present with Henlein, the general situation was discussed, and later the Defendant Jodl recorded in his diary:

"After the annexation of Austria the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Gruen (that is, the plan against Czechoslovakia) will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria."

On the 21st April, 1938, a discussion took place between Hitler and the Defendant Keitel with regard to "Case Gruen" showing quite clearly that the preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were being fully considered. On 28th May, 1938 Hitler ordered that preparations should be made for military action against Czechoslovakia by the 2nd October, and from then onwards the plan to invade Czechoslovakia was constantly under review. On the 30th May, 1938, a directive signed by Hitler declared his "unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future"

In June, 1938, as appears from a captured document taken from the files of the SD in Berlin, an elaborate plan for the employment of the SD in Czechoslovakia had been proposed. This plan provided that "the SD follow, if possible, immediately after the leading troops, and take upon themselves the duties similar to their tasks in Germany .."

Gestapo officials were assigned to co-operate with the SD in certain operations. Special agents were to be trained beforehand to prevent sabotage, and these agents were to be notified "before the attack in due time ....in order to give them the possibility to hide themselves, avoid arrest and deportation ....

"At the beginning, guerrilla or partisan warfare is to be expected, therefore weapons are necessary ...."

Files of information were to be compiled with notations as follows: "To arrest." ...."To liquidate." .... "To confiscate." .... "To deprive of passport." etc.

The plan provided for the temporary division of the country into larger and smaller territorial units, and considered various "suggestions" as they were termed, for the incorporation into the German Reich of the inhabitants and districts of Czechoslovakia. The final "suggestion" included the whole country, together with Slovakia and Carpathian Russia, with a population of nearly 15 millions.

The plan was modified in some respects in September after the Munich Conference, but the fact the plan existed in such exact detail and was couched in such war-like language indicated a calculated design to resort to force.

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