Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Here, in the passages just quoted, were assurance,
encouragement, and abetment by the head of the German State
the leading Nazi co-conspirator, in April 1941. But the Nazi
encouragement and promise of support did not end there.
Another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo
regarding conversations with the Japanese Foreign Minister,
dated 130 January 1941, one week before Pearl Harbor, read
as follows:
"The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his
viewpoint that the difference of opinion between Japan
and the US is very great. The Japanese Government since
it sent Ambassador Kurusu has taken a firm stand, as he
told me. He is convinced that this position is in our
favor and makes the United States think that her entry
into the European war would be risky business. The new
American proposal of 25 November showed great
divergences in the viewpoints of the two nations. These
differences of opinion concern, for example, the
further treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest
(one word missing) however resulted from the US attempt
to make the three-power agreement ineffective. US
suggested to Japan to conclude treaties of non-
aggression with the US, the British Empire, the Soviet
Union, and other countries in order to prevent Japan's
entry into the war on the side of the Axis powers.
Japan, however, insisted upon maintaining her treaty
obligations and for this reason American demands are
the greatest obstacles for adjusting Japanese-American
relations. He avoided discussing concessions promised
by the US and merely mentioned that grave decisions
were at stake.
[Page 867]
"The US is seriously preparing for war and is about to
operate a considerable part of its fleet from Southern
Pacific bases. The Japanese Government is busy working
out an answer in order to clarify its viewpoint. But he
has no particulars at that moment. He thinks the
American proposals, as a whole, unacceptable.
"Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations and
she hopes that in that case Germany and Italy,
according to the Three Power Agreement, would stand at
her side. I answered that there could be no doubt about
Germany's future position. The Japanese Foreign
Minister thereupon stated that he understood from my
words that Germany in such a case would consider her
relationship to Japan as that of a community of fate. I
answered, according to my opinion, Germany was
certainly ready to have mutual agreement between the
two countries over this situation.
"Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was
possible that he would come back to this point soon.
The conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs
confirmed the impression that the US note, in fact, is
very unsatisfactory even for the compromise-seeking
politicians here. For these circles America's position,
especially in the China question, is very
disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three-Power Pact
as being the main obstacle between successful Japanese-
US negotiations seems to point to the fact that the
Japanese Government is becoming aware of the necessity
of close cooperation with the Axis powers." (2898-PS)
Extracts from the handwritten diary of Count Galleazzo Ciano
during the period 13 February 1941 to 18 February 1941 fill
in the picture (2987-PS). These are taken from notes which
Ciano jotted down in the course of his daily business as
Foreign Minister of Italy. The entries for 3, 4, and 5
December read:
"December 3.
Wednesday
"Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an
audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement
on the progress of the negotiations with America,
concluding with the assertion that they have reached a
dead end. Then, invoking the appropriate clause in the
Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on
America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities
and proposes the signature of an agreement not to
conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating
this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave
fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with
[Page 868]
Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with
the communication and said: "We are now on the brink of
the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as
September 1939." What does this new event mean? In any
case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his
maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war
immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly
by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore,
this event also means that every prospect of peace is
becoming further and further removed, and that it is
now easy -- much too easy - to predict a long war. Who
will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis
that the problem must be considered. Berlin's answer
will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to
the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies
continue to give way under the pressure of an
unexpected Soviet offensive.
"Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely
cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot
get out of it, but the idea of provoking America's
intervention pleases the Germans less and less.
Mussolini, on the other and, is pleased about it. ***"
"A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness.
After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to
answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent
Mackenson to my house to submit-a plan for a triple
agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the
pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to
awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter
was very glad I hadn't ***"
It appears from the last entry that some sort of agreement
was reached. On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan without
previous warning or declaration of war commenced an attack
against the United States at Pearl Harbor and against the
British Commonwealth of Nations in the Southwest Pacific. On
the morning of 11 December, four days after the Japanese
assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war
on the United States. (2507-PS)
The same day, 11 December 1941, the Congress of the United
States resolved that "the state of war between the United
States and the Government of Germany which has thus been
thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared".
(2945-PS)
[Page 869]
It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive
intentions and declaration of war against the United States,
the Nazi conspirators in their collaboration with Japan
incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to
result in an attack on the United States. While maintaining
their preference that the United States not be involved in
the war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct
possibility, even probability of such involvement as a
result of the actions they were encouraging; they were aware
that the Japanese had prepared plans for attack against the
United States; and they accepted the consequences by
assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the
United States should a US-Japanese conflict result. In
dealing with captured documents of the enemy, the
completeness of the plan is necessarily obscured. But those
documents which have been discovered, and introduced into
evidence before the Tribunal, show that the Japanese attack
was the proximate and foreseeable consequence of their
collaboration policy, and that their exhortations and
encouragement of the Japanese as surely led to Pearl Harbor
as though Pearl Harbor itself had been mentioned.
The entry in the Ciano Diary for 18 February 1941 gives an
interesting sidelight on Ribbentrop's reaction to the
Japanese sneak attack:
"A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is
overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is
so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am
not too sure about the final advantages of what has
happened. One thing is now certain: that America will
enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be so
long that she will be able to realize all her potential
force. This morning I told this to the King who had
been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting
that in the "long run" I may be right. Mussolini was
happy too. For a long time he has favored a definite
clarification of relations between America and the
Axis." (2987-PS)
A conference was held between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador
Oshima on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 hours, in the
presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop. The
subject matter was the Pearl Harbor attack. The top secret
notes-of this conference read in part:
"*** First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with
the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German
Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his
serv-
[Page 870]
ices in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation,
which has now obtained its culmination in a close
brotherhood of arms.
"General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great
honor and emphasizes how glad he is that this
brotherhood of arms has now come about between Germany
and Japan.
"The Fuehrer continues: "You gave the right declaration
of war!" This method is the only proper one. Japan
pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own
system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible. But
if one sees that the other is interested only in
putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is
not willing to come to an agreement, then one should
strike -- as hard as possible, indeed -- and not waste
time declaring war. It was heartwarming to him to hear
of the first operations of the Japanese. He himself
negotiated with infinite patience at times, for
example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then
realized, that the other did not want to come to an
agreement, he struck suddenly and without formalities.
He would continue to go this way in the future." (2932-PS)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Collaboration with Italy & Japan
Aggressive War Against the United States
November 1936 to December
1941
(Part 11 of 12)