Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression (b) Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United
States. From the documents just quoted, it appears that the
Nazi conspirators were making at least preliminary military
plans of their own against the United States. The Nazi over-
all plan with regard to the United States, however, was a
complex one, involving in addition collaboration with the
Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to
the Japanese to undertake an assault against British
possessions in the Pacific-Far East, they again considered
war against the United States.
It will be recalled that in Basic Order No. 24 regarding
collaboration with the Japanese (C-75), which was issued on
5 March 1941, the Nazi policy was stated in subparagraph 3a
as aiming at "forcing England to the ground quickly and
thereby keeping the United States out of the war".
Nevertheless the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated
within the framework of that Policy the possibility of the
United States' entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the
Nazis were instigating. This could result from an attack by
Japan on United States' possessions practically
simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire (as
actually happened). Other possibilities of involvement of
the United States were also discussed. Thus, Basic Order No.
24 stated in subparagraph 3 (c):
"c. The raw material situation of the pact powers
demands that Japan should acquire possession of those
territories which it needs for the continuation of the
war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber
shipments must be carried out even after the entry of
Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance
to Germany." (C-75)
The order continues, in the unnumbered paragraph immediately
below subparagraph 3 (d):
"In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of
British naval power extending to those of American
naval power only if the entry of the United States into
the war cannot be prevented -- will result in weakening
the enemy's system of power in that region and also,
just like the attack on sea communications, in tying
down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia)." (C-75)
In these passages there is a clear envisionment of US
involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital
threat to United States' interests if Japan were to capture
Singapore was also clearly envisaged by Raeder in his
meeting of March 1941 with Hitler. Keitel, and Jodl, in
which he stated:
[Page 862]
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as
possible, since the opportunity will never again be as
favourable (whole English Fleet contained:
unpreparedness of USA. for war against Japan:
inferiority of US Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan
is indeed making preparations for this action, but
according to all declarations made by Japanese officers
she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land
in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her
efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan
has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions
regarding the USA. and England are thereby solved
(Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
"Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against USA. She
can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon
as possible." (C-152)
Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of US involvement
as a result of the course of aggression that he was urging
on the Japanese. In his meeting of 23 February 1941 with the
Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the notes of which are contained
in (1834-PS), Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that a surprise
intervention by Japan was bound to keep the United States
out of the war since she was unarmed and could not risk
either her fleet or the possibility of losing the
Philippines as the result of a declaration of war. Two
paragraphs later, Ribbentrop practically dropped the
pretense that the United States would not be involved:
"The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if
America should declare war because of Japan's entry
into the war, this would mean that America had had the
intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even
though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry
into the war would, as explained above, be by no means
decisive and would not endanger the final victory of
the countries of the Three Power Pact. The Foreign
Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary
lift of the British morale caused by America's entry
into the war would be canceled by Japan's entry into
the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the
Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy,
in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East,
this would represent the biggest chance for the
countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war
rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is
convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a
complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this that
unfortunately he does not think the Americans would
[Page 863]
do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in
Japanese waters." (1834-PS)
In the paragraphs that follow, Ribbentrop again stresses the
mutual interdependence of the Tripartite Pact powers and
suggests coordinated action. He indulged in a typical bit of
Nazi cynicism:
"The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the
question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that
the contracting powers might be required, on the basis
of new affronts by the USA., to break off diplomatic
relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally
determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power
Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also
jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the
eyes of the people in the USA. to the situation and
under certain conditions bring about a swing toward
isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had
to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in
the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers
should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The
question, however, was in no way acute at the time."
(1854-PS)
Again on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop -- this time in a
conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka --
discussed the possible involvement of the United States.
(1877-PS)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Collaboration with Italy & Japan
Aggressive War Against the United States
November 1936 to December
1941
(Part 9 of 12)