Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Meanwhile, Ribbentrop continued to make further efforts to
[Page 850]
induce the Japanese to aggression against the British
Commonwealth. On 29 March 1941, he met with the Japanese
Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. The
following is a report of their conversations, found in the
German Foreign Office Archives:
"REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER
MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 March 1941.
"The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka
about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in
Moscow, where they had left of. He expressed the opinion,
that it would probably be best, in view of the whole
situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians
too far. He did not know how the situation would develop.
One thing, however, was certain, namely, that Germany would
strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was
ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that
Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, without
fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part
of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of
the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any
time. He (the RAM), however, believed that Russia would try
to avoid development leading to war. Should Germany however
enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be
finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of
course even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants
to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain
from such an undertaking because of possible fears of
Russia.
"He could not know of course, just how things with Russia
would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would
intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He
(the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka, in any case, that
a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of
possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the
Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between
Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the
situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were
not probable, would have to be considered possible."
*******
"Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In
view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible
attacks by submarines, based on the Philippines, and of the
[Page 851]
intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets,
he had again discussed the situation with General-Admiral
Raeder. The latter had stated that the British Navy during
this year would have its hands so full in the English home
waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able
to send even a single ship to the Far East. General Admiral
Raeder had described the US submarines as so bad that Japan
need not bother about them at all.
"Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a
very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it
also held the view that, in case of a clash with the
American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without
trouble. However it was afraid that the Americans would not
take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with
the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five
years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.
"The RAM replied that America could not do anything against
Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for
this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before
deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on one
hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the
other hand there was the probability of losing the
Philippines to Japan; for the American president, of course,
this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because
of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to
offset such a loss.
"In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing
everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted
as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key
'position of England in the East. Therefore it might be
possible that his attitude toward the British would appear
to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should
not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only
in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool
the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one
day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.
"In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were
based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack
against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation
with one blow. ("Nothing succeeds like success," the RAM
remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a
famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: "You open fire, then
the nation will be united." The Japanese need to be
[Page 852]
shaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed
in fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not."
*******
"Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance
in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been
broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a
German written promise of assistance.
"The RAM replied that he had already discussed these
questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to
procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer -- who
probably must be considered the greatest expert on military
questions at the present time -- could advise Japan on the
best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on
aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could
draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for
the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in
the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus
the British fleet would be forced to disappear from
Singapore immediately.
"Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.
"The RAM replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed
new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified
positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael,
which he could make available to the Japanese.
"Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the
younger, expert Japanese naval officers, who were close
friends of his, were of the opinion that the Japanese naval
forces would need three months until they could capture
Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled
this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger
which threatened from America, for six months. If, however,
the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the
operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, the
situation with America would become extremely critical and
he did not know as yet how to meet it.
"If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East
Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese
attack on this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They
could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2
years.
"The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over
the Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture
of Singapore." (1877-PS)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Collaboration with Italy & Japan
Aggressive War Against the United States
November 1936 to December
1941
(Part 5 of 12)