Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Basic Order No. 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on
collaboration
with Japan (C-75). It reads:
"TOP SECRET
"Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
"Fuehrer's Headquarters
[Various handwritten notations and stamps]
"Basic Order No. 24
"The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding
collaboration with Japan:
"1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on
the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as
possible to take active measures in the Far East.
Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and
the center of gravity of the interests of the United
States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.
"The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the
prospects of success for Japan in view of the still
undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its
adversaries. The "Barbarossa" operation will create
particularly favorable political and military
prerequisites for this. [Marginal note "slightly
exaggerated"]
"2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is
essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential
with all means available.
"For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of
the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and
generous manner with Japanese desires for information
regarding German war and combat experience and for
assistance in military economics and in technical
matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor
should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority
should naturally be given to those Japanese requests
which would have the most immediate application in
waging war.
[Page 848]
"In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions,
to himself.
"3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two
parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.
"This will be subject to the following guiding
principles:
"a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be
stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and
thereby keeping the United States out of the war.
Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or
economic interests in the Far East which would give
occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese
intentions.
"b. The great successes achieved by Germany in
mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable
to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose.
In this connection every opportunity to support German
mercantile warfare must be exploited.
"c. The raw material situation of the pact powers
demands that Japan should acquire possession of those
territories which it needs for the continuation of the
war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber
shipments must be carried out even after the entry of
Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance
to Germany.
"d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British
position in the Far East would mean a decisive success
for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.
"In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of
British naval power extending to those of American
naval power only if the entry of the United States into
the war cannot be prevented -- will result in weakening
the enemy's system of power in that region and also,
just like the attack on sea communications, in tying
down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia) .
"A date for the beginning of operational discussions
cannot yet be fixed.
"4. In the military commissions to be formed in
accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such
questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the
three participating powers. These will include
primarily the problems of economic warfare.
"The working out of the details is the responsibility
of the "Main Commission" with the cooperation of the
Armed Forces High Command.
[Page 849]
"5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of
the Barbarossa operation.
"The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
"Correctness certified by
It appears from this document that the Nazi conspirators'
cardinal operational principle in their collaboration with
Japan was, as early as March 1941, the inducement of Japan
to aggression against Singapore and other British Far
Eastern bases.
A meeting was held on 18 March 1941, about two weeks after
the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 (C-75) and was attended
by Hitler, Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl. The top secret record
of this meeting discloses that Raeder, then Commander in
Chief of the Navy, made the following calculations:
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as
possible, since the opportunity will never again be as
favourable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of
US A. for war against Japan; inferiority of US Fleet vis-a-
vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for
this action, but according to all declarations made by
Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany
proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore
concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act
immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic
questions regarding the US A. and England are thereby solved
(Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
"Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against US A.
She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as
soon as possible." (C-152)
The fact clearly appears from these minutes that
military staff conferences had already been held with
the Japanese to discuss the activation of Japanese
military support against the British and to urge their
immediate attack on Singapore. Another passage in the
record of this meeting establishes this:
"Japan is indeed making preparations for this action,
but according to all declarations made by Japanese
officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds
to land in England." (C-152)
Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the
Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their
performance under the contract.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Collaboration with Italy & Japan
Aggressive War Against the United States
November 1936 to December
1941
(Part 4 of 12)
"Only by Officer
Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)
No. 44 282/41 Top Secret
5 March 1941
regarding collaboration with Japan
"Signed in draft: Keitel
JUNGE
Lieutenant Commander" (C-75)