Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression [Page 794]
A. Inception of the Plan.
The point of departure for the story of the aggression
against the Soviet Union is the date, 23 August 1939. On
that day - just a week before the invasion of Poland -- the
Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter into the Treaty of
Non-Aggression with the USSR This Treaty (TC-25) contained
two significant articles:
"Article 1: The two contracting parties undertake to
refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive
action, or any attack against one another, whether
individually or jointly with other powers."
"Article 5: Should disputes or conflicts arise between
the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind
whatsoever, the two partners would clear away these
disputes or conflicts solely by friendly exchanges of
views or if necessary by arbitration commission." (TC-25)
The Treaty was signed for the USSR by the Soviet Foreign
Minister Molotov, and for the German Government by
Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as somewhat of a surprise
to the world, since it appeared to constitute a reversal of
the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The explanation
for this about face was provided, however, by Ribbentrop
himself, in a discussion which he had with the Japanese
Ambassador, Oshima, at Fuchel on 23 February 1941. A report
of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain
German diplomats in the field for their strictly
confidential and purely personal information (1834-PS).
Ribbentrop told Oshima the reason for the Pact with the USSR
in the following words:
"Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a
treaty with Russia -- a necessity for avoiding a two-
front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan.
The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for
the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German
victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty
with Russia." (1834-PS)
In view of this spirit of opportunism which motivated the
Nazi Conspirators in entering into this solemn pledge of
arbitration and nonaggression, it is not surprising to find
that they regarded it, as they did all Treaties and Pledges,
as binding on them only so long as it was expedient for them
to do so. That they did so regard it is evident from the
fact that, even while the campaign in the West was still in
progress, they began to consider the pos-
[Page 795]
sibility of launching a war of aggression against the USSR
In a speech to the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters at Munich in
November 1943, Jodl admitted that:
"Parallel with all these developments realization was
steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly
nearer from the Bolshevik East -- that danger which has
been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly,
for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored.
However, the Fuehrer himself has always kept this
danger steadily in view and even as far back as during
the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental
decision to take steps against this danger the moment
our military position made it at all possible." (L-172)
At the time this statement was made, however, the Western
Campaign was still in progress and so any action in the East
necessarily had to be postponed for the time being. On 22
June 1940, however, the Franco-German armistice was signed
at Compiegne and the campaign in the West, with the
exception of the war against Britain, came to an end. The
view that Germany's key to political and economic dominance
lay in the elimination of the USSR as a political factor,
and in the acquisition of lebesraum at her expense, had long
been basic in Nazi ideology. This idea had never been
completely forgotten, even while the war in the West was in
progress. Now, flushed with the recent success of their arms
and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat
Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw
materials, the Nazi conspirators began serious consideration
of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by
conquering the Soviet Union. The situation in which Germany
now found herself made such action appear both desirable and
practicable.
As early as August of 1940, General Thomas received a hint
from Goering that planning for a campaign against the Soviet
Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was the
Chief of the Wirtschaft Rustug Amt, or Office for Economy
and Armaments, of the OKW (Wi Rue Amt). General Thomas tells
about receiving this information from Goering in his draft
of a work entitled "Basic Facts For a History of German War
and Armaments Economy," which he prepared during the Summer
of 1944 (235-PS). On pages 313 to 315 of this work, Thomas
discusses the Russo-German trade agreement of 1939 and
relates that, since the Soviets were delivering quickly and
well under this agreement and were requesting war materials
in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early
1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans.
However, at page 315 he has the
[Page 796]
following to say about the change of heart expressed by the
German leaders in August of 1940:
"On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference
with Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the
Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only
till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further
interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands.
This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to give
priority to matters concerning Russian War-Economy."
(235-PS)
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against the U.S.S.R.
(Part 1 of 16)