Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression [Page 829]
F. The Motives for the Attack.
It should first be pointed out that not only was Germany
bound by solemn covenant not to attack the USSR, but
throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the
invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union was faithful to its
agreements with Germany and displayed no aggressive
intentions toward the territories of the German Reich.
General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of
"Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments
Economy" (2353-PS), that insofar as the German-Soviet trade
agreement of 11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets
carried out their deliveries thereunder up to the very end.
Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were
usually made quickly and well, and since the food and raw
material being thus delivered was considered essential to
the German economy, efforts were made to keep up their side
too. However, as preparations for the campaign proceeded,
the Nazis cared less about maintaining their obligations. At
page 315 of his book Thomas says:
"Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries
diminished, as preparations for the campaign in the
East were already under way.
"The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned,
right up to the start of the attack; even during the
last few days, transports of India-rubber from the Far
East were completed by Express transit trains." (2353-PS)
Again at page 404, Thomas brings this point out even more
forcefully:
"In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June,
1941, the negotiations with Russia were accorded a
great deal of attention. The Fuehrer issued the
directive that, in order to camouflage German troop
movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must
be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians
only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered
orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of
individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it
impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed
forces, it was necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter
into numerous individual negotiations with German firms
in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the
German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance
with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry
was instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it
were impossible to fill them within the limits of the
time set for manufacture and delivery. Since in May
especially, large deliveries had to be made to the
Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the
[Page 830]
equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance
Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during
its transportation as to make it impossible for it to
be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning
of the German attack." (2353-PS)
Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to its treaty
obligations with Germany, but she had no aggressive
intentions toward German territory. A file on Russo-German
relations found in the files of the Naval High Command,
covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack (C-
170), demonstrates this point conclusively. It will be
sufficient to quote a few entries, which include reports
from the German ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941.
Entry 165 reads:
"165 A 22,29 4 June
"Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-
Russia. Russian deliveries continue to full
satisfaction. Russian government is endeavoring to do
everything to prevent a conflict with Germany." (C-170)
Entry 167 reads:
"167 A 22.53 6 June
"Ambassador in Moscow reports *** Russia will only
fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered
in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All
military preparations have been made quietly -- as far
as can be recognized only defensive. Russian policy
still strives as before to produce the best possible
relationship to Germany as good." ( C-170)
Entry 169 also reiterates this point:
"169 A 22.65 7 June
"From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow ***. All
observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone
are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing
everything to avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire
behavior of the Government, as well as the attitude of
the press, which reports all events concerning Germany
in a factual, indisputable manner, support this view.
The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with
Germany proves the same thing." (C-170)
The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the
Soviet Union could not have been self-defense or treaty
breaches. No doubt, as has been necessarily implied from the
materials presented on planning and preparation, more than
one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi
conspirators to launch their aggression against the USSR All
of them, however, appear to
[Page 831]
blend into one grand motif of Nazi policy. The pattern into
which these varied reasons fall is the traditional Nazi
ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the
USSR This Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative,
"Drang Nach Osten," had been a cardinal principle of the
Party almost since its birth, and rested on the twin bases
of political strategy and economic aggrandizement.
Politically, such action meant elimination of the powerful
force to the East, which might constitute a threat to German
ambition, and acquisition of Lebensraum. Economically, it
offered opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of
food, raw materials, and other supplies. Undoubtedly the
demands of the German War economy for food and raw material
served to revive the attractiveness of the economic side of
this theory while the difficulties Germany was experiencing
in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators
the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of
eliminating, as a political factor, their one formidable
opponent on the continent.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
[
Previous |
Index |
Next ]
Home ·
Site Map ·
What's New? ·
Search
Nizkor
© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012
This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and
to combat hatred.
Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.
As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may
include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and
provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist
and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.
Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against the U.S.S.R.
(Part 14 of 16)