Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression [Page 800]
C. Military Planning and Preparation for the Implementation
of Barbarossa.
The Naval War Diary for 30 January 1941 indicates the early
compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21
(446-PS) which ordered progress in preparation to be
reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed
Forces. This entry in the War Diary contains a substantial
amount of technical information concerning the Navy's part
in the coming campaign- and the manner in which it was
preparing itself to play that part (C-35). The following
passage shows that the Navy was actively preparing for the
attack at this early date:
7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the
"Barbarossa" case to be submitted to the High Command of the
Armed Forces". (C-35) ("Ia" is, in this case, the
abbreviation for a deputy head of the Operations Division of
the Naval War Staff.) Then follows a list of the Navy's
objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many
tasks for the Navy are listed, one of which is sufficiently
typical to give an idea of all: "II. Objectives of War
Against Russia. d. To harass the Russian fleet by surprise
blows as:
"1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the
war of air force units against strong points and combat
vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea." (C-35)
This document indicates the detailed thinking and planning
which was being carried out to implement Barbarossa almost
six months before the operation actually got underway. It is
but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which
demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of
the Soviet Union was undeniably a premeditated attack.
Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February
contains at least several references to the planning and
preparation for the coming campaign (C-33). The entry for 19
February 1941 is typical:
"In regard to the impending operation 'Barbarossa' for
which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a
transfer of some can only be considered after
conclusion of the Barbarossa operations." (C-33)
On 3 February 1941 the Fuehrer held a conference to assess
the progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa.
The conference also discussed the plans for Sonnenblume,
which was
[Page 801]
the code name for the North African Operation. Attending
this conference were, in addition to Hitler, the Chief of
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; the Chief
of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Jodl; the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army
General Staff, Halder; as well as several others including,
Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's Adjutant (872-PS). During the
course of this conference, the Chief of the Army General
Staff gave a long report out enemy strength as compared with
German strength, and about the general overall operational
plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at
various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. An extract
from this report, although written in a semishorthand form,
is at least sufficiently clear to disclose that elaborate
timetables had already been set up for the deployment of
troops, as well as for industrial operations:
"The intended time period was discussed with a plan.
1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel)
2nd " " "
transfer now, Front -- Germany -- East from the middle
of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in
the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being
withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable
reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now
on, Attila [the code word for the operation for the
occupation of unoccupied France] can be carried out
only under difficulties.. Industrial traffic is
hampered by transport movements. From the middle of
April, Hungary will be approached about the march
through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of
April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part
of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code
word for the occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa
and Gibraltar.]
"In industry the full capacity time-table is in force.
No more camouflage.
"From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable
forces from the West. (Seeloewe [Seeloewe was the code
word for the planned operation against England] can no
longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in
the East is quite recognizable.
"The full capacity time-table remains. 8 Marita [Marita
was the code word for the action against Greece]
divisions complete the picture of the disposition of
forces on the plan. "C-in-C Army requested that he no
longer have to employ
[Page 802]
5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready
as reserves for commanders in the West.
"Fuehrer When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold
its breath and make no comment." (872-PS)
This much, when read with the conference conclusions, is
sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy
regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far
along with their preparations even as early as February 1941
-- almost five months prior to 22 June, the date when the
attack was actually launched. The conference report
summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as
they affected Barbarossa, as follows:
"Conclusions: "1. Barbarossa
"a. The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the
operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must
be remembered that the main aim is to gain possession
of the Baltic States and Leningrad.
"b. The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the
plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as
soon as possible.
"c. Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking
part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any
necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania
with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw.
"d. It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out
Attila (auxiliary measure).
"e. The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be
camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary
measure Marita." (872-PS)
As the plans for the invasion became more detailed,
involved, and complete, more and more agencies outside the
Armed Forces had to be brought into the picture, let in on
the secret, and assigned their respective parts. For
example, early in March, 1941, Keitel drafted a letter to be
sent to Reich Minister Todt, then Reich Minister of
Armaments and Munitions and head of the organization Todt.
In this letter Keitel explained the principles on which the
camouflage for the operation was based and requested that
the organization Todt follow the same line (874-PS). This
letter illustrates the elaborate deceit with which the Nazi
conspirators sought to hide the preparations for their
treacherous attack:
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
[
Previous |
Index |
Next ]
Home ·
Site Map ·
What's New? ·
Search
Nizkor
© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012
This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and
to combat hatred.
Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.
As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may
include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and
provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist
and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.
Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against the U.S.S.R.
(Part 4 of 16)