Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression C. Lulling the Unsuspecting Victim.
They were not yet, however, ready to deal with Yugoslavia,
towards which their policy accordingly remained one of
lulling the unsuspecting victim. On 25 March, in accordance
with this policy, the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-
Power Pact
[Page 783]
was secured. This adherence followed a visit on 15 February
1941 by the Yugoslav Premier Cvetkovic and the Foreign
Minister Cinkar-Markvic to Ribbentrop at Salzburg and
subsequently to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, after which these
ministers were induced to sign the Pact at Vienna on 25
March. On this occasion Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of
assurance. The first made this guarantee:
"Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.
"At the same time, when the protocol on the entry of
Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the
governments of the Axis Powers sent to the Yugoslavian
Government the following identical notes:
" Mr. Prime Minister:
" 'In the name of the German Government and at its
behest, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of
the following: " 'On the occasion of the Yugoslavian
entry today into the Tri-Partite Pact, the German
Government confirms its determination to respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at
all times.' " (2450-PS)
That letter was signed by Ribbentrop, who was present at the
meeting in August 1939 when he and Hitler tried to persuade
the Italians to invade Yugoslavia. It was in fact 11 days
after this letter was written that the Germans did invade
Yugoslavia, and two days after the letter was written that
they issued the necessary order.
The second letter reads:
"Mr. Prime Minister: "With reference to the
conversations that occurred in connection with the
Yugoslavian entry into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the
honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the
name of the Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung], that in
the agreement between the Axis powers and the Royal
Yugoslavian Government, the governments of the Axis
powers during this war will not direct a demand to
Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of
troops through Yugoslavian national territory." (2450-PS)
The position at this stage, 25 March 1941, was therefore
that German troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards
the Greek frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler's
own term in his letter to Mussolini, "become disinterested"
in the cleaning up of the Greek question.
The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-
Power Pact appears very clearly from an extract from the
[Page 784]
minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Ciano. The first
paragraph states:
"The Fuehrer first expressed his satisfaction with
Yugoslavia's joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the
resulting definition of her position. This is of
special importance in view of the proposed military
action against Greece, for, if one considers that for
350 to 400 kilometers the important line of
communication through Bulgaria runs within 20
kilometers of the Yugoslav border, one can judge that
with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia an undertaking
against Greece would have been militarily an extremely
foolhardy venture." (2765-PS)
Again, it is a matter of history that on the night of 26
March 1941, when the two Yugoslav ministers returned to
Belgrade, General Simovic and his colleagues effected their
removal by a coup 'etat, and Yugoslavia emerged on the
morning of 27 March ready to defend, if need be, its
independence.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Greece & Yugoslavia
(Part 4 of 8)