Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression B. Planning for Invasion: Collaboration with Italy and
Bulgaria.
Despite the obligation of Germany under the Convention of
1899, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and under the foregoing
Assurance which I have read, the fate of both Greece and
Yugoslavia had, as is now known, been sealed ever since the
meeting between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano at
Obersalzberg, 12 August 1939 and 13 August 1939 (TC-77). The
effect of the meeting was that Hitler and Ribbentrop, only
two months after the dinner to the Prince Regent, were
seeking to persuade Italy to make war on Yugoslavia at the
same time that Germany was to commence hostilities against
Poland, which Hitler had decided to do in the very near
future. Ciano while evidently in entire agreement with
Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the desirability of liquidating
Yugoslavia, and while himself anxious to secure Salonika,
stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general European
war. Thus, despite all the persuasion which Hitler and
Ribbentrop exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for
the Nazi conspirators to reassure their intended victim,
Yugoslavia, since in fact Italy -maintained its position and
did not enter the war when Germany invaded Poland, and since
the Germans themselves were not yet ready to strike in the
Balkans. It was apparently for this reason that on 6
October, through Hitler's speech, the Nazis repeated the
assurance they had made in April 1938. It is a matter of
history that after the defeat of the Allied Armies in May
and June 1940, the Italian Government declared war on France
and that subsequently, at three o'clock in the morning on 28
October
[Page 778]
1940, the Italian Minister at Athens presented the Greek
Government with a 3 hour ultimatum, upon the expiration of
which Italian troops were already invading the soil of
Greece.
This event was reported by the British Minister at Athens in
these words:
"The president of the council has assured himself an
outstanding place in Greek history and, whatever the
future may bring, his foresight in quietly preparing
his country for war and his courage in rejecting
without demur the Italian ultimatum when delivered in
the small hours of that October morning, will surely
obtain an honorable mention in the story of European
statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is completely
defeated and this reflects the purpose of the whole
Greek nation."
A letter from Hitler to Mussolini, which is undated but
which -- this is clear from the contents -- must have been
written shortly after the Italian invasion of Greece on 28
November 1940, contained these sentiments:
"Jugoslavia must become disinterested, if possible
however from our point of view interested in
cooperating in the liquidation of the Greek question.
Without assurances from Yugoslavia, it is useless to
risk any successful operation in the Balkans.
"Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a
war in the Balkans before March is impossible.
Therefore, any threatening move towards Jugoslavia
would be useless, since the impossibility of a
materialization of such threats before March is well
known to the Serbian general staff. Therefore,
Jugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by
other means and other ways." (2762-PS)
It was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the
offensive in the Spring of 1941, which included the invasion
of Greece from the north. It was an integral part of those
plans that Yugoslavia should be induced to cooperate in them
or at least to maintain a disinterested attitude towards the
liquidation of the other Balkan States. These facts are
disclosed in a "Top Secret Directive" issued from the
Fuehrer's Headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by Jodl,
and dated 12 November 1940. This order reads, in part:
"Directive No. 18.
"The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the
prosecution of the war in the near future are to be
made along the following lines.***" (444-PS)
[Page 779]
After sections dealing with operations against Gibraltar and
an offensive against Egypt, the order continues:
"The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make
preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of
the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through
Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air
force units against targets in the Eastern
Mediterranean, in particular against those English air
bases which are threatening the Rumanian oil area.
"In order to be able to face all eventualities and to
keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an
approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the
basis for the planning and the calculations of
deployment. It will not be possible to count on the
railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these
forces into position.
"So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment,
preparations will be made for an early increase in the
German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which
must be submitted to me.
"The commander-in-chief of the Air Force will make
preparations for the use of German Air Force units in
the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on
the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the
intended ground operations." (444-PS)
The positions of the Italian invading forces in Greece in
December 1940 may be summarized in the words in which the
British Minister reported to Foreign Secretary Eden:
"The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of
the highest, and our own naval and land successes at
Tarento and in the Western Desert have done much to
maintain it. With relatively poor armaments and the
minimum of equipment and modern facilities they have
driven back or captured superior Italian forces more
frequently than not at the point of the bayonet. The
modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not
unworthy of the ancient tradition of their country and
that they, like their distant forbears, are prepared to
fight against odds to maintain their freedom."
In fact, the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it
was time that Hitler came to the rescue with the order for
the German attack on Greece.
This Directive of 13 December 1940, which is Top Secret
Directive number 20, dealing with Operation Marta, bears a
[Page 780]
distribution list which shows that copies vent to the
Commander of the Navy (Raeder), to the Commander of the Air
Force (Goering), to the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces (Keitel), and to the Command Staff (Jodl). The first
two paragraphs state:
"The result of the battles in Albania is not yet
decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania
it is doubly necessary that the British endeavour be
foiled to create air bases under the protection of a
Balkan- front, which would be dangerous above all to
Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Greece & Yugoslavia
(Part 2 of 8)