Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression [Page 766]
friendship with Holland. It has not taken over any
existing differences between the two countries and has
not create any new ones." (TC-32)
The value of these pledges of Germany's good faith is shown
by an order issued on the very next day, 7 October. This
order was from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von
Brauchitsch, and was addressed to various Army Groups. The
third paragraph provided:
"The Dutch Border between Ems and Rhine is to be
observed only.
"At the same time, Army Group B has to make all
preparations according to special orders, for immediate
invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the
political- situation so demands." (2329-PS)
Two days later, on 9 October, Hitler directed that:
"Preparations should be made for offensive action on
the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the
area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack
must be carried out as soon and as forcefully as
possible. ***"
*******
"The object of this attack is to acquire as great an
area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as
possible." (C-62) That document is signed by Hitler
himself. It is addressed to the Supreme Commander of
the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and Air Minister and
Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Goering. On 15
October 1939, a supplementary order was issued from the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It was signed by
Keitel in his familiar red pencil signature, and was
addressed to Raeder, Goering, and the General Staff of
the Army. It declared, in part: "It must be the object
of the Army's preparations, therefore, to occupy -- on
receipt of a special order -- the territory of Holland,
in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas line."
(C-62)
The second paragraph deals with the taking possession of the
West Frisian islands.
It is clear that from that moment the decision to violate
the neutrality of these three countries had been made. All
that remained was to work out the details, to wait until the
weather became favorable, and in the meantime, to give no
hint that Germany's word was about to be broken again.
Otherwise, these small countries might have had some chance
of combining with themselves and their neighbors.
Another Keitel directive, again sent to the Supreme Command-
[Page 767]
ers of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, gives details of how
the attack is to be carried out. The following are pertinent
passages: "Contrary to previously issued instructions, all
action intended against Holland may be carried out without a
special order which the general attack will
start.
"The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be
anticipated ahead of time."
*******
"Wherever-there is no resistance, the entry should
carry the character of a peaceful occupation."
*******
"At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian
islands -situated just off the coast, for the present
without Texel, is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas
line."
"The 7th Airborne Division will be committed for the
airborne operation only after the possession of bridges
across the Albert Canal" (in Belgium) "has been
assured." (440-PS)
In addition to Belgium and Holland, the document, in
paragraph 5) and (6)(b) mentions Luxembourg. The signature
of Keitel is typed. It is authenticated by a staff officer.
A later order of 28 November 1939, over the signature of
Keitel, in the usual red pencil, is addressed to the Army,
Navy, and Air force. It states that if a quick break-through
should fail north of Liege, other machinery for carrying out
the attack will be used. Paragraph 2 shows clearly that the
Netherlands is to be violated. It speaks of "The occupation
of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing harbor, or of some
other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea
and air warfare," and "b Taking of one or more Maas
crossings between Namur and Dinant ***." (C-10)
From November until March of 1940 the High Command and .the
Fuehrer were waiting for favorable weather before A-Day, as
they called it. That referred to the attack on Luxembourg,
Belgium and the Netherlands. The successive postponements
are shown in a series of orders which range in date from 7
November 1939 until 9 May 1940, and which are all signed
either by Keitel or by Jodl. (C-72)
On 10 January 1940, a German airplane made a forced landing
in Belgium. The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of
which they were in possession, but they were only partially
successful. Among the papers which were captured is an order
to the Commander of the Second Army Group, Air Force Group
Luftflotte -- the Second Air Force Fleet, clearly for
offensive action against France, Holland, and Belgium. It
deals with the dis-
[Page 768]
position of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army covers the
Liege-Antwerp Line. Then it deals with the disposition of
the Dutch Army. The German Western Army is accordingly
directing its attack between the North Sea and the Moselle,
with the strongest possible air-force support, through the
Belgo-Luxembourg region. The rest consists of operational
details as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium
and in Holland. (TC-58)
The nature of the Army's planning is shown in the 1 February
1940 entry in Jodl's diary, which reads in part as follows:
"1. Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague
they have to be strong enough to break in if necessary
by sheer brute force. The 7th Division intends to drop
units near the town.
"2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with
violent action against the Dutch air force." (1809-PS)
The entry for 2 February 1940 states that "landings can be
made in the centre of The Hague." On 26 February Jodl wrote:
"Fuehrer raises the question whether it is better to
undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case
'Yellow.' "
On 3 March, he recorded the answer:
"Fuehrer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before
case 'Yellow', with a few days' interval."
And on May 8, two days before the invasion, Jodl made this
entry:
"Alarming news from Holland, canceling of furloughs,
evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures;
according to reports of the intelligence service the
British have asked for permission to march in, but the
Dutch have refused." (1809-PS)
In other words, the Germans objected because the Dutch were
actually making some preparation to resist their endeavor.
Furthermore, the Dutch armies, according to the Germans' own
intelligence reports, were still adhering properly to their
neutrality.
At 4:30 a.m. on 10 May, the months of planning bore fruit,
and Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg were violently invaded
with all the fury of modern warfare. No warning was given by
Germany and no complaint was made by Germany of any breaches
of neutrality before this action was taken.
After the invasion of each of the three countries was a fait
accompli, the German Ambassador called upon representatives
of the three Governments some hours later and handed them
documents which were similar in each case, and which are
described as memoranda or ultimatums. An account of what
happened in Belgium is contained in an official Belgian
report:
"From 4:30 information was received which left no
shadow
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg
(Part 3 of 6)