Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression On 29 August, at 7:15 p. m. in the evening, Hitler handed to
Sir Neville Henderson the German Government's answer to the
British Government's reply of the 28th. It seems quite clear
that the whole object of this letter was to put forward
something which was quite unacceptable. Hitler agreed to
enter into direct conversatiOns as suggested by the British
Government, but he demanded that those conversations must be
based upon the return to the Reich, of Danzig and also of
the whole of the Corridor.
[Page 712]
It will be recalled that hitherto, even when he had alleged
that Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, Hitler had put
forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone, plus the
arrangement for an extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad
running through the Corridor to East Prussia. That demand
was unacceptable at that time. To make quite certain of
refusal, Hitler now demanded the whole of the Corridor.
There was no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole
territory must become German.
Even so, to make doubly certain that the offer would not be
accepted, Hitler stated: "On those terms I am prepared to
enter into discussion, but to do so, as the matter is
urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary with full powers from the
Polish Government to be here in Berlin by midnight tomorrow
night, the 30th of August."
This offer was made at 7:15 p. m. on the evening of the
29th. That offer had to be transmitted, first, to London;
and from London to Warsaw; and from Warsaw the Polish
Government had to give authority to their Ambassador in
Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible, if
indeed it were possible, to get authority to the Polish
Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night. It
allowed Poland no opportunity for discussing the matters at
all. As Sir Neville Henderson described it, the offer
amounted to an ultimatum.
At midnight on 30 August, at the time by which the Polish
Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Neville
Henderson handed a further message to Ribbentrop in reply to
the message that had been handed to him the previous
evening. Ribbentrop read out in German a two- or three-page
document which purported to be the German proposal to be
discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish
Government. He read it out quickly in German. He refused to
hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no
copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So that there
was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having
before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously
and magnanimously offering to discuss.
On the following day, 31 August, Mr. Lipski, the Polish
Ambassador, saw Ribbentrop, and could get no further than to
be asked whether he came with full powers. When he replied
that he did not, Ribbentrop said that he would put the
position before the Fuehrer. But, in actual fact, it was
much too late to put any position to the Fuehrer by that
time, because on 31 August Hitler had already issued his
Directive No. 1 for the conduct of war, in which he laid
down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the fol-
[Page 713]
lowing morning, 1 September. And on the evening of 31
August, at 9 o'clock, the German radio broadcast the
proposals which Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Neville
Henderson the night before, saying that these were the
proposals which had been made for discussion, but that as no
Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the
German Government assumed that they were turned down. That
broadcast at 9 o'clock on the evening of 31 August was the
first that the Poles had ever heard of the proposal, and it
was the first that the British Government or its
representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than what
had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused
to give a written copy on the evening of the 30th.
After that broadcast, at 9:15 -- perhaps while the broadcast was
still in its course -- a copy of those proposals was handed to
Sir Neville Henderson for the first time.
This summary of events during that last week of August 1939
is based upon the contents of several documents which will now
be alluded to.
In a pre-trial interrogation on 29 August 1945, Goering was
asked the question:
"When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister
in London brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty at the
end of March or the beginning of April, was it not
fairly obvious that a peaceful solution was
impossible?" (TC-90)
This was Goering's answer:
"Yes, it seemed impossible according to my conviction,
but not according to the convictions of the Fuehrer.
When it was mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had
given her guarantee to Poland, he said that England was
also guaranteeing Rumania, but then when the Russians
took Bessarabia -nothing happened, and this made a big
impression on him. I made a mistake here. At this time
Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The
guarantee itself was only given shortly before the
beginning of the war. On the day when England gave her
official guarantee to Poland the Fuehrer called me on
the telephone and told me that he had stopped the
planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether
this was just temporary or for good. He said, 'No, I
will have to see whether we can eliminate British
intervention.' So then I asked him, 'Do you think that
it will be any different within four or five days?' At
this same time -- I don't know whether you know about
that, Colonel -- I was in connection with Lord Halifax
by a special courier outside the regular diplomatic
channels to do everything to stop war
[Page 714]
with England. After the guarantee I held an English
declaration of war inevitable. I already told him in
the Spring of 1939 after occupying Czechoslovakia, I
told him that from now on if he tried to solve the
Polish question he would have to count on the enmity of
England. 1939, that is after the Protectorate." (TC-90)
The interrogation of Goering proceeded as follows:
"Question: 'Is it not a fact that preparations for the
campaign against Poland were originally supposed to
have been completed by the end of August 1939?'
"Answer: 'Yes.'
"Question: 'And that the final issuance of the order
for the campaign against Poland came some time between
15 August 1939 and 20 August 1939 after the signing of
the treaty with Soviet Russia." [The dates obviously
are wrong].
"Answer: 'Yes, that is true.'
"Question: 'Is it not also a fact that the start of the
campaign was ordered for the 25th of August, but on the
24th of August in the afternoon it was postponed until
September the 1st in order to await the results of new
diplomatic maneuvers with the English Ambassador?'
"Answer: 'Yes.' " (TC-90)
In this interrogation Goering purported not to have wanted
war with England. It will be recalled, however, that after
the speech of Hitler on 22 August to his commanders-in-
chief, Goering got up and thanked the Fuehrer for his
exhortation and assured him that the armed forces would play
their part. (798-PS)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Poland, Danzig, England &
; France
(Part 16 of 21)