Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression The minutes of that meeting show quite clearly the German
intention to attack England ar.d France ultimately, if not
at the me time as Poland. In trying to show the strength of
Germany and its certainty of winning the war as a means of
persuading the Italians to come in, Hitler declared:
"At sea, England had for the moment no immediate
reinforcements in prospect. Some time would elapse
before any of the ships now under construction could be
taken into
[Page 696]
service. As far as the land army was concerned, after
the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been
called to the colors. If England kept the necessary
troops in her own country she could send to France, at
the most, two infantry divisions and one armored
division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber
squadrons but hardly any fighters since, at the
outbreak of war, the German Air Force would at once
attack England and the English fighters would be
urgently needed for the defense of their own country.
"With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer
said that in the event of a general war, after the
destruction of Polandwhich would not take longGermany
would be in a position to assemble hundreds of
divisions along the West Wall and France would then be
compelled to concentrate all her available forces from
the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere
on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death
struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also
thought that the French would find it no easier to
overrun the Italian fortifications than to overrun the
West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme
doubt. The Polish Army was most uneven in quality.
Together with a few parade divisions, there were large
numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak
in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and at the
moment neither France nor England could help her in
this respect.
"If, however, Poland were given assistance by the
Western powers, over a longer period, she could obtain
these weapons and German superiority would thereby be
diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and
Cracow, the population of their areas was different.
Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position
of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one
and one-half million were German, about four million
were Jews, and nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine
Poles were much less in number than the total
population and, as already said, their striking power
was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances
Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the
shortest time.
"Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had
made it clear that in any case in the event of a
conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of
Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present
moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable
conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile
Poland remained on Germany's
[Page 697]
eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East
Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further
contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia.
This would not be necessary in the event of a previous
liquidation."
*******
"Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said
that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had
made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the
Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must
take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression
that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a
precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had
justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general
easterly and northeasterly direction of a German
policy. The east and northeast, that is to say the
Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere
of influence since time immemorial, as the
Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy.
For economic reasons also, Germany needed the
foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions." (TC-77)
Now the truth of this matter appears. It is not the
persecution of German minorities on the Polish frontiers,
but economic reasons -- the need for foodstuffs and timber from
Poland. The minutes of the Italo-German meeting continue:
"In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only
material, although the city had the greatest harbour in
the Baltic. Danzig was a Nurnberg of the North, an
ancient German city awakening sentimental feelings for
every German, and the Fuehrer was bound to take account
of this psychological element in public opinion. To
make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should
suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a
large Italian minority was being treated brutally on
Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that
Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this
kind.
"Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer's statement,
first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side
over the completely unexpected seriousness of the
position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in
those which took place during his Berlin visit had
there been any sign from the German side that the
position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the
contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion the
Danzig question would be settled in the course of time.
On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction
that a conflict with the Western Powers was
unavoidable, had assumed
[Page 698]
that he should make his preparations for this event; he
had made plans for a period of two or three years. If
immediate conflict were unavoidable, the Duce, as he
had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German
side, but for various reasons he would welcome the
postponement of a general conflict until a later time.
"Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position
of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed
that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to
that country but would develop into a general European
war." (TC-77)
Thereafter, Ciano tried to dissuade Hitler from any
immediate action. He argued further
"For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis
Powers should make a gesture which would reassure
people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and
Germany." (TC-77)
The Fuehrer's answer was clear:
"The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish
problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited
until the autumn, the more difficult would military
operations in Eastern Europe become. From the middle of
September, weather conditions made air operations
hardly possible in these areas, while the condition of
the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by
the autumn rains, would be such as to make them
impossible for motorized forces. From September to May,
Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any
kind of military operations. Poland could, however,
occupy Danzig in September and Germany would not be
able to do anything about it since they obviously could
not bombard or destroy the place." (TC-77)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Poland, Danzig, England &
; France
(Part 10 of 21)