Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression It will be recalled that in the previous document discussed
(C-137) orders had already been issued for preparations to
be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise. Yet some
six weeks later Hitler assured the Polish Foreign Minister
that there would be no fait accompli and that he should be
quite at his ease. -On the day after the conversation
between Beck and Hitler, Beck and Ribbentrop conferred, as
follows:
"Mr. Beck asked M. Von Ribbentrop to inform the
Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his
conversations and contacts with German statesmen, he
had been feeling optimistic, today for the first time
he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to
the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the
Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of
agreement."
*******
"In answer M. Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that
Germany was not seeking any violent solution. The basis
of their policy towards Poland was still a desire for
the further building up of friendly relations. It was
necessary to seek such a method of clearing away the
difficulties as would respect the rights and interests
of the two parties concerned." (TC-73 No. 49)
Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one
expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month,
January 1939, he was in Warsaw and made another speech, of
which the following is a pertinent extract:
[Page 686]
"In accordance with the resolute will of the German
National Leader, the continual progress and
consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and
Poland, based upon the existing agreement between us,
constitute an essential element in German foreign
policy. The political foresight, and the principles
worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides
to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a
guarantee that all other problems arising in the course
of the future evolution of events will also be solved
in the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and
understanding of the rightful interests of both sides.
Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future
with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual
relations." (2530-PS)
Hitler spoke in the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, and gave
further assurances of the good faith of the German
Government. (TC-73 No. 57)
In March 1939 the remainder of Czechoslovakia was seized and
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up. That
seizure, as was recognized by Hitler and Jodl, had immensely
strengthened the German position against Poland. Within a
week of the completion of the occupation of Czechoslovakia
heat was beginning to be applied on Poland.
On 21 March M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador, saw
Ribbentrop. The nature of the conversation was generally
very much sharper than that of the discussion between
Ribbentrop and Beck a little time back at the Grand Hotel,
Berchtesgaden:
"I saw M. Von Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he
had asked me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-
German relations in their entirety. "He complained
about our Press, and the Warsaw students'
demonstrations during Count Ciano's visit."
*******
"Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the
conversation at Berchtesgaden between you and the
Chancellor, in which Hitler put forward the idea of
guaranteeing Poland's frontiers in exchange for a motor
road and the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich. He
said that there had been further conversations between
you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had
pointed out the great difficulties in the way of
accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand
that all this had made an unfavorable impression on the
Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive
reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. M.
von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the Chancellor only
yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in
favor of good relations with Poland and had expressed a
desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the
subject of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop
indicated that he was under the impression that
difficulties arising between us were also due to some
misunderstanding of the Reich's real aims. The problem
needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his
opinion our two States were dependent on each other."
*******
"I [Lipski] stated that now, during the settlement of
the Czechoslovakian question, there was no
understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was
already hard enough for the Polish public to swallow,
for, despite our disputes with the Czechs they were
after all a Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia the
position was far worse. I emphasized our community of
race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we
had given in their achievement of independence. I
pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I
indicated that the Polish man in the street could not
understand why the Reich had assumed the protection of
Slovakia, that protection being directed against
Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a
serious blow to our relations.
"Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that
this could be discussed.
"I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a
conversation between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop
remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few
days to talk over this matter. He advised that the talk
should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come
to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his
offers.
"Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything
about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of
Lithuania.
"Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr.
Urbsys on the latter's return from Rome, and they had
discussed the Memel question, which called for a
solution." (TC-73 No. 61 )
That conversation took place on 21 March. The world soon
learned what the solution to Memel was. On the next day
German armed forces marched in.
As a result of these events, considerable anxiety was
growing both in the government of Great Britain and the
Polish govern-
[Page 688]
ment, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking
conversations between each other. On 31 March, the Prime
Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons. He
explained the results of the conversations that had been
taking place between the British and Polish Governments:
"As the House is aware, certain consultations are now
proceeding with other governments. In order to make
perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's
government in the meantime before those consultations
are concluded, I now have to inform the House that
during that period, in the event of any action which
clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the
Polish government accordingly considered it vital to
resist with their national forces, His Majesty's
government would feel themselves bound at once to lend
the Polish government all support in their power. They
have given the Polish government an assurance to this
effect.
"I may add that the French government have authorized me to
make it plain that they stand in the same position in this
matter as do His Majesty's Government." (TC-72 No. 17)
The
original plaintext version
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Poland, Danzig, England &
; France
(Part 6 of 21)