Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression He anticipated the possibility that war with England and
France might result. But a two front war was to be avoided
if possible. Yet England was recognized as the most
dangerous enemy. "England is the driving force against
Germany *** the aim will always be to force England to her
knees." More than once repeated that the war with England
and France would be a life and death struggle. All the same,
he concluded, "We shall not be forced into war but we shall
not be able to avoid one."
On the 14 June 1939, General Blaskowitz, then Commander-in-
Chief of the 3d Army Group, issued a detailed battle plan
for the "Fall Weiss" (2327-PS). The following day Von
Brauchitsch issued a memorandum in which it was stated that
the object of the impending operating was to destroy the
Polish Armed Forces. "High Policy demands" -- he said --
"that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in
order to achieve quick results (C-126).
The preparations proceeded apace. On the 22d June Keitel
submitted a preliminary time table for the operation which
Hitler seems to have approved and suggested that the
scheduled manuevre must be camouflaged "in order not to
disquiet the population". On the 3d July Brauchitsch wrote
to Raeder urging that certain preliminary naval moves should
be abandoned in order not to prejudice the surprise of the
attack. On the 12th and 13th August Hitler and Ribbentrop
had a conference with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister.
At the beginning of the conversation Hitler emphasized the
strength of the German position, of its western and eastern
fortifications and of the strategic and other advantages
that they held in comparison with those of England, France,
and Poland.
"Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made
it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict
they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany
and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment
could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict
with the Western democracies. If a hostile Poland
remained on Germany's Eastern frontier, not only would
the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but
also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and
Silesia. This would not be necessary
[Page 626]
in the event of a previous liquidation. Generally
speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the
neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This
process could be carried out more easily if on every
occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other
while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral. Italy
might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this
kind."
Ciano was for postponing the operation. Italy was not ready
she believed that a conflict with Poland would develop into
a general European war. Mussolini was convinced that
conflict with the Western democracies was inevitable but he
was making plans for a period two or three years ahead. But
the Fuehrer said that the Danzig question must be settled
one way or the other by the end of August. "He had,
therefore, decided to use the occasion of the next Polish
provocation in the form of an ultimatum." On the 22d August
Hitler called his Supreme Commanders together at
Obersalzberg and gave the order for the attack: in the
course of what he said he made it clear that the decision to
attack had in fact been made not later than the previous
spring. He would give a spurious cause for starting the war
(1014-PS; L-3). At that time the attack was timed for the
early hours of the 26th August. On the day before the
British Government, in the hope that Hitler might still be
reluctant to plunge the world into war, and in the belief
that a formal treaty would impress him more than the
informal assurances which had been given previously, entered
into an agreement for mutual assistance with Poland,
embodying the previous assurances. It was known to Hitler
that France was bound by the Franco-Polish Treaty of 1921,
and by the Guarantee Pact signed at Locarno in 1925 to
intervene in Poland's aid in case of aggression. For a
moment Hitler hesitated. Goering and Ribbentrop agree that
it was this Anglo-Polish Treaty which led him to call off,
or rather postpone the attack. Perhaps he hoped that there
was still some chance of repeating, after all, what he had
called the Czech affair. If so, his hopes were short-lived.
On the 27th August Hitler accepted Mussolini's decision not
at once to come into the war, but asked for propaganda
support and a display of military activities to create
uncertainty in the minds of the Allies. Ribbentrop on the
same day said that the Armies were marching.
In the meantime, of course, and particularly in the last
month, desperate attempts had been made by the Western
Powers to avert war. You will have details of them in
evidence. Of the intervention of the Pope. Of President
Roosevelt's message. Of the offer by Mr. Chamberlain to do
our utmost to create the conditions in which all matters in
issue could be the subject of free
[Page 627]
negotiations and to guarantee the resultant decisions. This
and the other efforts of honest men to avoid the horror of a
European war were predestined to failure. The Germans were
determined that the day for war had come. On the 31st August
Hitler issued a top secret order for the attack to commence
in the early hours of the 1st September. The necessary
frontier incidents duly occurred -- was it for these that
Keitel had been instructed by Hitler to supply Heydrich with
Polish uniforms -- and thus, without a declaration of war,
without even giving the Polish Government an opportunity of
seeing Germany's final demands the Nazi troops invaded
Poland. On the 3d September, Hitler sent a telegram to
Mussolini thanking him for his intervention but pointing out
that the war was inevitable and that the most promising
moment had to be picked after cold deliberation (1831-PS).
And so Hitler and his Confederates now before this Tribunal
began the first of their wars of aggression for which they
had prepared so long and so thoroughly. They waged it so
fiercely that within a few weeks Poland was overrun.
On 23 November 1939 Hitler reviewed the situation to his
military Commanders and in the course of his speech he said
this
"One year later Austria came; this step was also
considered doubtful. It brought about a tremendous
reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia,
Moravia, and Poland. This step also was not possible to
accomplish in one campaign. First of all the Western
fortifications had to be finished ***. Then followed
the creation of the Protectorate and with that the
basis of action against Poland was laid. But I wasn't
quite clear at that time whether I should start first
against the East and then in the West or vice versa.
The decision came to fight with Poland first. One might
accuse me of wanting to fight again and again. In
struggle, I see the fate of all human beings." (789-PS)
He was not sure when to attack- first. But that sooner or
later he would attack was never in doubt, and he had been
warned not only by the British and French Prime Ministers
but even by his confederate Mussolini that an attack on
Poland would bring England and France into the war. He chose
what he considered the opportune moment -- and he struck.
In these circumstances the intent to wage war against
England and France, and to precipitate it by an attack on
Poland, is not to be denied. Here was defiance of the most
solemn treaty obligations: here was neglect of the most
pacific assurances. Here was aggression, naked and
unashamed, which was indeed to
[Page 628]
arouse the horrified and heroic resistance of all civilized
peoples but which was to tear down many of the pillars of
our civilization.
Once started upon the active achievement of their plan to
secure the domination of Europe, if not of the world, the
Nazi Government proceeded to attack other countries, as
occasion offered. The first actually to be invaded after the
attack on Poland were Denmark and Norway.
On 9 April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded Norway and
Denmark without warning, without any declaration of war. It
was a breach of the Hague Convention of 1907. It was a
breach of the Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation
between Germany and Denmark dated 2 June 1926. It was, of
course, a breach of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. It was
a violation of the Nonaggression Treaty between Germany and
Denmark made on 31 May 1939. And it was a breach of the most
explicit assurances which had been given. After his
annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of
the world, Hitler attempted to reassure the Scandinavian
States. On the 28 April 1939, he affirmed that he had never
made any request to them which was incompatible with their
sovereignty and independence. On the 31 May 1939, he signed
a nonaggression Pact with Denmark.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Opening Address for the United Kingdom
(Part 11 of 17)