Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Here is something which is both significant and new. Until
this date the documents in our possession disclose
preparations for war against Poland, England, and France
purporting at least to be defensive measures to ward off
attacks which might result from the intervention of those
powers in the preparatory aggression of Germany in Central
Europe. Hitherto aggressive war
[Page 622]
against Poland, England, and France has been contemplated
only as a distant objective. Now, for the first time, we
find a war of conquest by Germany against France and England
openly recognized as the future aim, at least of the German
Navy.
On 24 November 1938 an Appendix was issued by Keitel to a
previous order of the Fuehrer. In this Appendix there are
set out the future tasks for the armed forces and the
preparation for the conduct of the war which would result
from those tasks.
"The Fuehrer has ordered that besides the three
eventualities mentioned in the previous Directive
preparations are also to be made for the surprise
occupation by German troops of the Free State of
Danzig.
"For the preparation the following principles are to be
borne in mind -- the primary assumption is the lightning seizure
of Danzig by exploiting a favorable political situation
and not war with Poland ***. Troops which are going to
be used for this purpose must not be held at the same
time for the seizure of Memel-land, so that both
operations can take place simultaneously should such
necessity arise." (C-17)
Thereafter, as the evidence which has already been
produced has shown, final preparations for the invasion
of Poland were taking place. On 3 April 1939, three
days before the issue of the Anglo-Polish communique,
Keitel issued to the High Command of the Armed Forces a
Directive in which it was stated that the Directive for
the uniform preparation of war by the armed forces in
1939-40 was being re-issued, and that the part
concerning Danzig would be issued in the middle of
April. The basic principles were to remain the same as
in the previous Directive. Attached to this document
were the orders "Fall Weiss", the code name for the
proposed invasion of Poland. Preparations for that
invasion were to be made in such a way that the
operation could be carried out at any time from 1
September 1939 onwards. (C-120)
On the 11th April Hitler issued his Directive for the
uniform preparations of war by the armed forces 1939-40. In
it he says: "I shall lay down in a later Directive future
tasks of the armed forces and the preparations to be made in
accordance with these for the conduct of war. Until that
Directive comes into force the armed forces must be prepared
for the following eventualities:
"1. Safeguarding of the frontiers.
[Page 623]
In an Annex to that document headed "Political Hypotheses
and Aims" it is stated that quarrels with Poland should be
avoided. Should Poland, however, change her present policy
and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final
settlement would be necessary, notwithstanding the pact with
Poland. The Free City of Danzig was to be incorporated into
Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. The
policy aims to limit the war to Poland and this is
considered possible with the internal crisis in France and
resulting British restraint.
The wording of this document does not directly involve the
intention of immediate aggression. It is a plan of attack
"if Poland changes her policy and adopts a threatening
attitude". But the picture of Poland, with her inadequate
armaments, threatening Germany is ludicrous enough and the
real aim emerges in the sentence "The aim is then to destroy
Polish military strength and to create, in the East, a
situation which satisfies the requirements of defense" -- a
sufficiently vague phrase to cover designs of any magnitude.
Even now the evidence does not suffice to prove that the
actual decision to attack Poland has been taken. But all
preparations are being set in train in case that decision is
reached.
It was within three weeks of the date of this last document
that Hitler addressed the Reichstag (28 April 1939). In his
speech he repeated the German demands already made to Poland
and proceeded to denounce the German-Polish Agreement of
1934. Leaving aside for the moment the warlike preparations
for aggression, which Hitler had set in train behind the
scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to consider the nature of
the denunciation of an agreement to which, in the past,
Hitler had professed to attach so high an importance.
In the first place Hitler's denunciation was per se
ineffectual, since the text of the Agreement made no
provision for its denunciation by either Party until six
months before the expiration of the ten years for which it
was concluded. No denunciation could be legally affective,
therefore, until June or July 1943, and Hitler was speaking
on 28 April 1939 -- more than five years too soon!
In the second place Hitler's actual attack on Poland when it
came on 1 September 1939, was made before the expiration of
the six months period after denunciation required by the
Agreement before such a denunciation became operative. In
the third place the grounds for his denunciation of the
Agreement stated by Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag
are entirely specious. How ever one reads its terms it is
impossible to accept the view that the Anglo-Polish
guarantee of mutual assistance against aggression could
render the Pact null and void. If that were so then
[Page 624]
certainly the Pacts already entered into by Hitler with
Italy and Japan had already invalidated it, and Hitler might
have spared his breath. But the truth is that the text of
the German-Polish Agreement contains nothing whatever to
support Hitler's contention.
Why then did Hitler make this trebly invalid attempt to
denounce his own pet diplomatic child? Is there any other
possible answer but that, the Agreement having served its
purpose, the grounds which he put forward were chosen merely
in an effort to provide Germany with some justification for
the aggression on which she was intent.
For Hitler sorely needed some kind of justification, some
apparently decent excuse, since nothing had happened, or was
likely to happen, from the Polish side to provide him with
it. So far he had made demands upon his Treaty partner which
Poland, as a sovereign State had every right to refuse. If
dissatisfied with that refusal Hitler was bound, under the
terms of the Agreement itself, to "seek a settlement through
other peaceful means, without prejudice to the possibility
of applying those methods of procedure, in case of
necessity, which are provided for such a case in the other
agreements between them that are in force" -- a reference,
it can only be supposed, to the German-Polish Arbitration
Treaty signed at Locarno in 1925.
The very fact, therefore, that as soon as the Nazi leader
cannot get what he wants, but is not entitled to, from
Poland by merely asking for it, and that, on his side, he
made no further effort to settle the dispute "by peaceful
means" in accordance with the terms of the Agreement and of
the Kellogg Pact, to which the Agreement pledged both
Parties, in itself creates a strong presumption of
aggressive intentions against Hitler and his associates.
That presumption becomes a certainty when the documents to
which I shall now refer are studied.
On 10th May Hitler issued an order for the capture of
economic installations in Poland and on 16th May the
Defendant Raeder, as Commander in Chief of the Navy, issued
a memorandum setting out the Fuehrer's instructions to
prepare for the operation "Fall Weiss" at any time from 1
September 1939. (C-120)
But the decisive document is the record of the Conference
held by Hitler on 23 May 1939 with various high-ranking
officers, including the defendants Goering, Raeder, and
Keitel. Hitler then stated that the solution of the economic
problems could not be found without invasion of foreign
States and attacks on foreign property.
"Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all: it is
a ques-
[Page 625]
tion of expanding our living space in the East ***.
There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and
we are left with the decision: to attack Poland at the
earliest opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of
the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to
isolate Poland. The success of this isolation will be
decisive. The isolation of Poland is a matter of
skillful politics." (L-79)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Opening Address for the United Kingdom
(Part 10 of 17)
"2. "Fall Weiss".
"3. The annexation of Danzig."