Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Some time afterwards, when there was no longer need for
pretense and deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and
frank statement of the mission assigned to him by the Nazi
conspirators. This statement was made in a lecture by Konrad
Hen-
[Page 545]
lein quoted on page 29 of "Four Fighting Years", a
publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In this lecture, delivered by Henlein on 4 March 1941 in the
Auditorium of the University of Vienna under the auspices of
the Wiener Verq tungsakalame, he discussed the "fight for
the liberation of the Sudetens" in the following terms:
"National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten Germans.
Our struggle was of a different character from that in
Germany. Although we had to behave differently in
public we were, of course, secretly in touch with the
National Socialist revolution in Germany so that we
might be a part of it. The struggle for Greater Germany
was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle could be
waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National
Socialism, persons who were true followers of our
Fuehrer, whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought
me out to be the leader of the national group in its
final struggle. When *** in autumn, 1933, the leaders
of the NSDAP asked me to take over the political
leadership of the Sudeten Germans, I had a difficult
problem to solve.
"Should the National Socialist Party
continue to be carried on illegally or should the
movement, in the interest of the self-preservation of
the Sudeten Germans and in order to prepare their
return to the Reich, wage its struggle under camouflage
and by methods which appeared quite legal to the
outside world? For us Sudeten Germans only the second
alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of
our national group was at stake. It would certainly
have been easier to exchange this hard and mentally
exhausting struggle for the heroic gesture of
confessing allegiance to National Socialism and
entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than
doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled
the political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a
bastion in the alliance against the German Reich."
(2863-PS.)
1. Evidence Implicating Nazi Conspirators in Czechoslovak
Agitation.
The foregoing account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia is
the outline of this conspiracy as it had been pieced
together by the Czechoslovak government early in the summer
of 1945. Since then captured documents and other information
made available since the defeat of Germany have clearly and
conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto
could only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the
Sudetenland agitation.
[Page 546]
A telegram sent from the German Legation in Prague on 16
March 1938 to the Foreign Office in Berlin, presumably
written by the German Minister, Eisenlohr, proves
conclusively that the Henlein movement was an instrument of
the Nazi conspirators (3060-PS). The Henlein party, it
appears from this telegram, was directed from Berlin and
from the German Legation in Prague. It could have no policy
of its own; even the speeches of its leaders had to be
coordinated with the German authorities. This telegram reads
as follows:
"Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have
thrashed out matters with Henlein, who recently had
shunned me, and with Frank separately and received
following promises;
"1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by
the German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy
and tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives
are to be complied with implicitly.
"2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated
uniformly with my approval. The editorial staff of
"Zeit" (Time) is to be improved.
"3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent
line which in the end might lead to political
complications and adopts a line of gradual promotion of
Sudeten German interests. The objectives are to be set
in every case with my participation and to be promoted
by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection
of nationalities (Volksschutzesetze) and 'territorial
autonomy' are no longer to be stressed.
"4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required
or desired before Henlein issues important statements
on his program, they are to be applied for and prepared
through the Mission.
"5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for
German agencies is to be transmitted through the
Legation.
"6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week,
and will come to Prague at any time if requested.
"I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm
control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming
developments in the interest of foreign policy. Please
inform ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central
Office for Racial Germans) and request them to support
this uniform direction of the Sudeten German Party." (3060-PS)
The dressing-down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had
the desired effect. The day after the telegram was
dispatched from Prague, Henlein addressed a humble letter to
Ribbentrop, asking an early personal conversation (2789-PS).
This letter,
[Page 547]
dated 17 March 1938, and captured in the German Foreign
Office files, states:
"Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:
"In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of
events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our
gratitude to all those ho had a share in this new grand
achievement of our Fuehrer.
"I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept
accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans
herewith.
"We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by
doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German
policy.
"The new situation requires a reexamination of the
Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask
you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk.
"In view of the necessity of such a clarification I
have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress,
originally scheduled for 26 March 1938 and 27 March
1938, for 4 weeks.
"I would appreciate if the Minister, Dr. Eisenlohr, and
one of my closest associates would be allowed to
participate in the requested talks.
"Heil Hitler,
This letter makes it clear that Henlein was quite aware that
the seizure of Austria made possible the adoption of a new
policy toward Czechoslovakia. It also reveals that he was
already in close enough contact with Ribbentrop and the
German minister in Prague to feel free to suggest "early
personal" talks.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia<(Part 15 of 29)
"Loyally yours,
"/s/ Konrad Henlein."