Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression A satisfactory solution appears to have been arrived
at. The last two paragraphs read:
"Thus it s proposed:
"Attack by the Army -- independent of the attack by the air
force -- at the time desired by the Army (0615) and
permission for limited operations to take place before
then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm
the entire Czech front.
"The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to
them. (J) " (388-PS, Item 54)
On the same day, 27 September, Keitel sent a most secret
memorandum to Hess and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, for
the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is
Item 2 in the Schmundt file. It directs the Party officials
and organizations to comply with the demands of the Army
during the secret mobilization in such matters as turning
over equipment and facilities. The first four paragraphs of
this message read:
"As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and
Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the
Armed Forces, without the political situation being
aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or
corresponding codewords.
"Within the framework of these mobilization measures it
is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue
demands to the various Party authorities and their
organizations, which are connected with the previous
issuing of the mobilization order, the advance measures
or special code names.
"The special situation makes it necessary that these
demands be met (even if the code word has not been
previously issued) immediately and without being
referred to higher authorities.
"OKW requests that subordinate offices be given
immediate instructions to this effect so that the
mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out
according to plan." 388-PS, Item 2)
Two additional entries from Jodl's diary reveal the extent
to which the Nazi conspirators carried forward their
preparations for attack even during the period of the
negotiations which
[Page 541]
culminated in the Munich Agreement. The entries for 26 and
27 September read:
"26 September:
"Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through
the Army High Command, has stopped the intended
approach march of the advance units to the Czech
border, because it is not yet necessary and because the
Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in
any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier
need be given on the 27th only.
"In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of
Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of
the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda for interference with possible Czech
propaganda transmissions. "Question by Foreign office
whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross
Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command: yes.
"1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
informs General Stumpf about the result of the
Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's
opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.
"It is important that e do not permit ourselves to be
drawn into military engagements because of false
reports, before Prague replied.
"A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply
that on account of the weather situation, a
simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army
cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air
Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.
"The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commander
in chief who is to have priority.
"The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the
Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any
decision as yet about commitment against Prague.
"2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an
important speech at the Sportspalast.
"27 September:
"1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of
attack being advanced to a line from where they can
arrive in the assembly area by 30 September." (1780-PS)
The order referred to by General Jodl in the last entry was
also recorded by the faithful Schmundt. It appears as Item 3
of the file. It is the order which brought the Nazi armies
to the jumping-off point for unprovoked aggression:
[Page 542]
"At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault
units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off
points.
"The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7
divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against
'Gruen' on September 30, the decision having been made
one day previously by 1200 noon." (388-PS, Item 33)
There follows a pencil note by Schmundt:
"This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320
through Major Schmundt." (388-PS, Item 33)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia<(Part 13 of 29)