Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression From Nurnberg, on 10 September, Hitler issued an order
bringing the Reicharbeitsdienst, the German labor service,
under the OKW. This top secret order, of which 25 copies
were made, provides as follows:
"1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command
of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15
September.
"2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments
of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs
Labor Leader (Reichsrbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments
from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy,
Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard
to competency he will make a final decision in
accordance with my instructions.
"3. For the time being this order is to be made known
only to the departments and personnel immediately
concerned.
"(signed) ADOLF HITLER."
Four days later, on 14 September, Keitel issued detailed
instructions for the employment of specific RAD units. This
order is item 21 in the Schmundt file. A further order
issued by Jodl on 16 September specified RAD units which
would receive military training. This is Item 24 in the
Schmundt file. (388-PS)
Two entries in Jodl's diary give further indications of the
problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September, just
two weeks before the anticipated X-day. The entries for 15
and 16 September read as follows:
"15 September:
"In the morning conference with Chief of Any High
Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air
Forces; the question was discussed what could be done
if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due
to the rapid development of the situation.
"16 September:
"General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours.
He graphically describes the results of the conference
between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next
conference will take place on the 21st or 22nd in
Godesberg.
"With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the
[Page 539]
evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army
High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up
the VGAD along the Czech border.
"In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to
have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness
clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the
Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September." (1780-PS)
The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available
which General Jodl referred to appears as Item 22 in the
Schmundt file. In this order Keitel told the railroads to be
ready by 28 September but to continue work on the western
fortifications even after 20 September in the interest of
camouflage. The first and fourth paragraphs of this order
provide:
"The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in
great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of
mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence
over all others."
"However, in accordance with the Fuehrers directive,
every effort should be made to continue to supply the
materials in as large quantities as feasible even after
20 September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage
as well as in order to continue the important work of
the Limes." (388-PS, Item 22)
The penultimate stage of the aggression began on 18
September. From that day until the 28th a series of orders
were issued advancing preparations for the attack. These
orders are included in the Schmundt file (388-PS). On the
18th the commitment schedule for the five participating
armiesthe 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14thwas set forth (388-
PS, Item 26). Hitler approved the secret mobilization of
five divisions in the west to protect the German rear during
Case Green 388-PS, Item 31). Further discussions were held
between the Army and the Luftwaffe about the time of day for
the attack. Conference notes initialed by Jodl and dated 27
September reveal the difference in views. These notes are
Item 54 in ie Schmundt file. The first three paragraphs
read:
"COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X
DAY.
"As a matter of principle, every effort should be made
for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X
Day.
"The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615.
It also wishes to conduct some limited operations in
the previous night, which however, would not alarm the
entire Czech front.
"Air Force's time of attack depends on weather
conditions.
[Page 540]
These could change the time of attack and also limit
the area of operations. The weather of the last few
days, for instance, would have delayed the start until
between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria."
(388-PS, Item 54)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia<(Part 12 of 29)
(388-PS, Item 20)