Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Five days later General Stulpnagel asked Jodl for written
assurance that the OKH would be informed five days in
advance about the pending action. In the evening Jodl
conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the coordination of
ground and air operations at the start of the attack. The 8
September entry in General Jodl's diary states:
"8 September:
"General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that
the Army High Command will be informed five days in
advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add
that the overall meteorological situation can be
estimated to some extent only for two days in advance,
and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this
moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).
"General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he
wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not
being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers
would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as
if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though
he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added
that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is
reserved.
"I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing
the change of opinion about political and military
potentialities, according to directives of 24 June
1937, 5 November 1937, 7 December 1937, 30 May 1938,
with the last statements.
"In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that
the other nations will do everything they can to apply
pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but
because only very few people know the art of
withstanding this pressure successfully, the only
possible solution is to inform only a very small circle
of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and
[Page 536]
not to have it circulate through anterooms as
heretofore. "1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with
Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff
of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber,
Sternburg and myself) .
"We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-
Befehl), (X-1, 4 o'clock) and pre-announcement to the
Air Force (D-Day-1, X-1 day, 7 o'clock). The 'Y time'
has yet to be examined; some formations have an
approach flight of one hour." (1780-PS)
Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September,
Hitler met with Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and
Halder at Nurnberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer,
later joined the conference, which lasted from 10 in the
evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt's minutes
are Item 19 in his file (388-PS). In this meeting General
Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of the German
armies being committed to the attack: the 2d, 10th, 12th,
and 14th. With his characteristic enthusiasm for military
planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic
considerations which should be taken into account as the
attack developed. The discussions proceeded as follows:
"General Oberst v. Brauchitsch: Employment of motorized
divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in
Austria and the difficulties in getting other divisions
(ready to march) into the area at the right time. In
the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of
Sept. if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the
23rd, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to
decision by Army Command 2.
"The Fuehrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return
home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are
also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars,
they will stand around unnecessarily later on.
"General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction
of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West.
Trains must be assembled.
"v. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will
be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed
(also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the
West." (388-PS, Item 19)
From this date forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied
with the intricate planning required before the attack. On
11 September Jodl conferred with a representative of the
Propa-
[Page 537]
ganda Ministry about method of refuting German violations of
International Law and exploiting those of the Czechs. The 11
September entry in the Jodl diary reads as follows:
"11 September:
"In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State
Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda on imminent common tasks.
"The joint preparations for refutation (Wiedrlegun) of
our own violations of international law, and the
exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were
considered particularly important." (1780-PS)
This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by
Section L, Jodl's section of the OKW (C-2). Seven copies of
this captured document were prepared and distributed on 1
October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftaffe, and the
Foreign Office. In this study anticipated violations of
International Law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are
listed and counter-propaganda suggested for the use of the
propaganda agencies. This document is presented in a tabular
form, in which possible incidents are listed in the left-
hand column. In the second column are given specific
examples of the incidents; in the third and fourth columns
the position to be taken toward these incidents under
International -Law and under the laws of warfare is set
forth; the fifth column, which is blank, is reserved for the
explanation to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. The
first 10 hypothetical incidents, for which justification
must be found, and which are listed in column b of the table
are as follows:
"la. In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is
destroyed.
"2. Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed.
"3. The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on
Prague. "4. On account of a report that the Czechs have
used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.
"5. Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are
caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of important
bridges, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are
discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and
thereupon shot.
"6. Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are
detailed to do road work or to load munitions.
"7. For military reasons it is necessary to requisition
billets, food stuffs and fodder from the Czech
population. As a result the latter suffer from want.
"8. Czech population is, for military reasons,
compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.
[Page 538]
"9. Churches are used for military accommodation.
"10. In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly
over Polish territory where they are involved in an air
battle with Czech aircraft." (C-2)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia<(Part 11 of 29)