Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression G. Final Preparations for the Attack.
The setting in which these events took place was that of the
Munich Pact and the international crisis which led to it. As
this crisis was developing in August and September 1938,
frantic efforts were being made by the statesmen of the
world to preserve the peace of the world. These-statesmen,
unfortunately, were unaware of the plans and designs of the
Nazi conspirators.
The documents captured by Allied troops reveal the hitherto-
unknown story underlying the Pact of Munich. These papers
reveal the fraud and deceit practiced by the Nazi
conspirators in negotiating the Pact of Munich as a stepping-
stone toward further aggression. The hope for peace which
came with the Munich Pact, which later turned out to be a
snare and a deceit, was a trap carefully set by the Nazi
conspirators. The nature of the trap is indicated by the
events of the weeks just preceding the Munich agreement.
With a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a
[Page 533]
noticeable increase in the tempo of the military
preparations in late August and September. Actual
preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well
under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators were devoted
to technical details: the timing of X-day, questions of
mobilization, questions of transport and supply.
On 26 August Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled "Timing of
the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures" (388-PS,
Item 17). This memorandum demonstrates clearly the
complicity of the OKW and of Keitel and Jodl, in the
fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals
the character of the attack that Germany was preparing to
launch. The memorandum reads as follows:
"TIMING OF THE X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE
MEASURES
"The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces
by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably
leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-
order and to the demand that the X-order itself be
given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the
fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to
Czechoslovakia on that day.
"The army's efforts are tending in the opposite
direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance
measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will
contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the
mobilization. With this in mind OKW also demands that
the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1.
"To this the following must be said:
"Operation (Aktion) Green will be set in motion by
means of an 'incident' in Czechoslovakia which will
give Germany provocation for military intervention. The
fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the
utmost importance.
"It must come at a time when weather conditions are
favorable for our superior air forces to go into action
and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it
to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.
"It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of
the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.
"On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely
receive an advance warning.
"If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action,
all further discussion is superfluous.
"For then no advance measures may be taken before X
minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation
as we
[Page 534]
shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the
incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance
measures must be given in good time and camouflaged
with the help of the numerous maneuvers and exercises.
"Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to
whether all Germans should be called back in time from
prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to
the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any
German subjects before the incident.
"Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in
Prague is impossible before the first air attack,
although the consequences could be very grave in the
event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.
g., death of representatives of friendly or confirmed
neutral powers.)
"If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be
considered desirable for the incident, then the
following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day
after that.
"In any case we must act on the principle that nothing
must be done before the incident which might point to
mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action
must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)
"It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a
great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and
that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in
good timeinsofar as the Abwehr Section is not also
charged with the organization of the incident.
"I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on
these points.
"J [Jodl] 26/8. (388-PS, Item 17)
In handwriting at the bottom of the page are the notes of
Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant. These reveal that the
memorandum was submitted to Hitler on 30 August; that Hitler
agreed to act along these lines; and that Jodl was so
notified on 31 August.
On 3 September Keitel and von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at
the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference (88-PS, Item 18). The first three paragraphs of these minutes state:
"Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch: Reports on the exact time of
the transfer of the troops to 'exercise areas' for
'Gruen'. Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From
here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes
known, field units carry out exercises in opposite
directions.
"Fuehrer: Has objection. Troops assemble field units a
2-
[Page 535]
day march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.
" ?: OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27
September." (388-PS, Item 18)
During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views
on the strategy the German armies should employ and the
strength of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He
spoke of the possibility of "drawing in the Henlein people."
The situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt noted:
"The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the
Western fortifications; improvement of advance
positions around Aachen and Saarbrucken. Construction
of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery
pieces.)" (388-PS, Item 18)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia<(Part 10 of 29)