Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Von Weizsacker's memorandum reads as follows:
"Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary's attitude would
be if the Fuehrer would carry out his decision to
answer a new Czech provocation by force. The reply of
the Hungarians presented two kinds of obstacles: The
Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured if Hungary
marches towards the North and perhaps the East.
Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been
started and 1 or 2 more years' time for its development
should be allowed.
"Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that
the Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were
between the pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone
would therefore not move. England and France would also
remain tranquil. England would not recklessly risk her
Empire. She knew our newly acquired power. In reference
to time, however, for the above-mentioned situation,
nothing definite could be predicted since it would
depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop repeated
that whoever desires revision must exploit the good
opportunity and participate.
"The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one.
[Page 531]
Upon the question of von Ribbentrop, what purpose the
desired General Staff conferences were to have, not
much more was brought forward than the Hungarian desire
of a mutual inventory of military material and
preparedness for the Czech conflict. The clear
political basis for such a conferencethe time of
Hungarian interventionwas not obtained.
"In the meantime, more positive language was used by
von Horthy in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not
to hide his doubts with regard to the English attitude,
but he wished to put Hungary's intention to participate
on record. The Hungarian Ministers were and remained,
even later, more skeptical since they feel more
strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary with
its unprotected flanks.
"When von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in
the afternoon, he was very relieved when the Fuehrer
explained to him, that, in regard to the situation in
question, he demanded nothing of Hungary. He himself
would not know the time. Whoever wanted to join the
meal would have to participate in the cooking as well.
Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs,
he would have no objections." (2796-PS)
By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to
note that in the event of a German-Czech conflict Hungary
would be sufficiently armed for participation on 1 October.
Another captured German Foreign Office Memorandum reports a
conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August 1938.
The last paragraph of this memorandum states:
"Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of
a German-Czech conflict von Kanya mentioned several
days ago that his country would need a period of one to
two years in order to develop adequately the armed
strength of Hungary. During today's conversation von
Kanya corrected this remark and said that Hungary's
military situation was much better. His country would
be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take
part in the conflict by October 1st of this year." (2797-PS)
The signature to this document is not clear, but it appears
to be that of von Weizsacker.
These accounts of the German-Hungarian conference are
corroborated by General Jodls diary. The entry for 21-26
August reads as follows:
"21-26 August:
"Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsver-
[Page 532]
weser). Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz.
"They arrive with the idea that in the course of a
great war, after a few years, and with the help of
German troops, the old state of Hungary can be
reestablished. They leave with the understanding that
we have neither demands from, nor claims against them,
but that Germany will not stand for a second
provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be
tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment,
it is up to them.
"Germany, however, will never play the role of
arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians
agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a
period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to
find out Yugoslavia's attitude." (1780-PS)
The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a
staff conference on 6 September. Jodl's diary entry for that
day states:
"6 September:
"Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder,
has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General
Staff Fischer.
"Before that he is briefed by me on the political
attitude of the Fuehrerespecially his order not to give
any hint on the exact moment. The same with Jodl,
General v. Stuelpnagel." (1 780-PS)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia<(Part 9 of 29)