Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression [Page 525]
After detailed instructions for action by the Luftwaffe and
by the Navy the directive continues as follows:
"In war economy it is essential that in the field of
the armament industry a maximum-deployment of forces is
made possible through increased supplies. In the course
of operations, it is of value to contribute to the
reinforcement of the total war-economic strength by
rapidly reconnoitering and restarting important
factories. For this reason the sparing of
Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations
insofar as military operations permitcan be of decisive
importance to us." (388-PS, Item 11)
In other words, the Nazi conspirators, four months before -
the date of their planned attack, were already looking
forward bo the contribution which the Czech industrial plant
would make to the Nazi war economy. The last paragraph of
this directive reads as follows:
"All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be
made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and
according to the requirement of the branches of the
Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the
operations of the Army and Air Force.
"(Signed) ADOLF HITLER
Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new
directive was prepared and initialed by Keitel. It does not
supersede the 30 May directive. It reads, in part:
"The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem
by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground
of my political intentions. I am determined to use to
the full every favorable political opportunity to
realize this aim."
"However, I will decide to take action against
Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the
case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and
the entry into Austria that France will not march and
therefore England will not intervene." "The directives
necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be
issued by me from time-to time "
"K [Initialed by Keitel]
[Page 526]
The second and third parts of this directive contain general
directions for the deployment of troops and for
precautionary measures in view of the possibility that,
during the execution of Case Green, France or England might
declare war on Germany. Six pages of complicated schedules
which follow this draft in the original have not been
translated into English. These schedules, which constitute
Item 15 in the Schmundt file (88-PS), give a time table of
specific measures for the preparation of the Army, Navy, and
Luftwaffe for the contemplated action.
Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is
found in three entries in General Jodl's diary written i the
spring of 1938 (1780-PS). Although the first entry is not
dated, it appears to have been written several months after
the annexation of Austria:
"After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that
there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because
Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless
preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out
energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on
the basis of the changed strategic position because of
the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see
memorandum L Ia of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on
21 April.
"The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech
problem as yet is changed because of the Czech
strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs
without any German threat and without the slightest
cause for it.
"Because of Germany's self restraint, its consequences
lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is
not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order
is issued for 'green' on 30 May."
*******
"Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further
conferences, which gradually reveal the exact
intentions of the Fuehrer take place with the Chief of
the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 8 and 9
June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)."
*******
"30 May: "The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he
states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia
soon and thereby initiates military preparation all
along the line. The previous intentions of the Army
must be changed considerably in the direction of an
immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-
Day (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the
Air Force. Further details are derived from directive
for strategic concentration of the army. The whole
contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's
intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion
of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most
certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are
not as yet equal to them." (1780-PS)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia<(Part 6 of 29)
"Certified copy "
(Signed) Zeitzler
"Oberstleutnant on the General Staff."
(388-PS, Item 11)
"Z [Initialed by Zeitzler]"
(388-PS, Item 14)