Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler
issued the revised military directive for Case Green. This
directive is Item 11 in the Schmundt file (388-PS). Entitled
"Two front war with main effort in the Southeast," this
directive replaced the corresponding section, Part 2,
Section II, of the "Directive for Unified Preparation for
War" promulgated by von Blomberg on 24 June 1937 (C-175).
This directive represented a further development of the
ideas for political and military action discussed by Hitler
and Keitel in their conference on 21 April. It is an
expansion of a rough draft submitted by Keitel to Hitler on
20 May, which may be found as Item 5 in the Sclnnundt file
(388-PS). It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were
made. Three copies were forwarded with a covering letter
from Keitel to General von Brauchitsch for the Army, to
Raeder for the Navy, and to Goering for the Luftwaffe. In
his
[Page 522]
covering memorandum Keitel noted that its execution must be
assured "as from 1 October 1938 at the latest". (388-PS,
Item 11)
This document, which is the basic directive under which the
Wehrmacht carried out its planning for Case Green, reads as
follows:
"1. Political Prerequisites.
"It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia
by military action in the near future. It is the job of
the political leaders to await or bring about the
politically and militarily suitable moment.
"An inevitable development of conditions inside
Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe
creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one
which may never come again may cause me to take early
action.
"The proper choice and determined and full utilization
of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of
success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at
once.
"2. Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the
Action.
"The following are necessary prerequisites for the
intended invasion:
"a. suitable obvious cause and, with it
"b. sufficient political justification,
"c. action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him
prepared to the least possible degree.
"From a military as well as a political standpoint the
most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as
the result of an incident through which Germany is
provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part
of world opinion will grant the moral justification of
military action.
"But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a
war, must terminate in sudden action on our partwhich
must have the elements of surprise as regards time and
extent before the enemy is so advanced in military
preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.
"3. Conclusions for the Preparation of "Fall Gruen".
a. For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise
element as the most important factor contributing to
success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory
measures already in peace-time and by an unexpectedly
rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to
create a situation within the first four days which
plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to
intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian
military situation and which at the same
[Page 523]
time will give nations with territorial claims on
Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately
against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by
Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be
expected, especially if Francedue to the obvious pro-
German attitude of Italy fears, or at least hesitates,
to unleash a European war by intervening against
Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to
Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be
expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the
land operations within the first few days, a European
crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give
commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold
action.
"b. The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate
Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of
resistance, on the other hand issue directions to
national groups for support in the Armed War and
influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I
reserve further directions and determination of the
date.
"4. Tasks of the Armed Forces.
"Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the
following basis:
"a. The mass of all forces must be employed against
Czechoslovakia.
"b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be
provided as rear cover which may be required, the other
frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are
merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be
watched.
"c. The sections of the army which can be rapidly
employed must force the frontier fortifications with
speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia
with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk
of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost
speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed
in such a way that the sections of the army which can
be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed
time at the same time as the penetration by the Air
Force before the enemy can become aware of our
mobilization.
"For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to
be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to
me for approval.
"5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces.
"a. Army: The basic principle of the surprise attack
against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the
inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of
the field
[Page 524]
forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be
wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the
army that as many assault columns as possible be
employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the
Air Force. These assault columns the composition of
each, according to their tasks at that time must be
formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing
to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization
and to special measures of readiness. It must be the
purpose of these thrusts to break into the
Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points
and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve
a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear.
"For
the success of this operation, cooperation with the
Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from
the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or airborne
troops and with units of the sabotage service will be
of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of
frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of
preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into
Slovakia, of forcing a battle, of beating the
Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia and
Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart
of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest
possible motorized and armored units using to the full
the first successes of the assault columns and the
effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover
provided for the West must be limited in numbers and
quality to the extent which suits the present state of
fortifications.
"Whether the units assigned this will be
transported to the Western frontier immediately or held
back for the time being will be decided in my special
order. Preparations must however, be made to enable
security detachments to be brought up to the Western
frontier even during the strategic concentration
'Gruen'. Independent of this, a first security garrison
must be improvised from the engineers at present
employed in constructing fortifications and from
formations of the Labor Corps. The remaining frontiers
as well as East Prussia, are to be only weakly
protected. But, always depending on the political
situation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the
bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the
Reich must be taken into account.
"b. Air Force. While leaving a minimum of defensive
forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in
bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The
frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is
crossed by the first section of the Army ***" (388-PS, Item 11)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
[
Previous ]
Index |
Next ]
Home ·
Site Map ·
What's New? ·
Search
Nizkor
© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012
This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and
to combat hatred.
Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.
As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may
include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and
provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist
and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.
Volume
I Chapter IX
The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia<(Part 5 of 29)