Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression (7) Later Communications with London -- Misleading
Explanations. On Sunday, 13 March 1938, the day after the
invasion, Goering, who had been left in charge of the Reich
by Hitler, telephoned Ribbentrop in London. Their
conversation disclosed the way in which the Nazis soothed
and misled other nations:
"G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the
administration of the current government procedures
(Fuehrung der Regierungsgeshaft). And therefore I
wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in
Austria, that you can hear over the radio.
"R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn't it?
"G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is
completely overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved,
when he talked to me last night. You must remember it
was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now,
I mainly want to talk about political things. Well,
this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just
foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National
Socialist ministers and the representatives of the
people (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum.
Later on, more and more prominent people of the
Movement Party participated, and as a natural result,
the Austrian National Socialist ministers asked us to
back them up, so they would not be completely beaten up
against and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then
we told them we would not
[Page 499]
allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under no
circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg's direct order,
or with consent the Communists and the Reds had been
armed, and were already making demonstrations, which
were photographed with "Heil Moskau" and so on;
naturally, all these facts caused some danger for
Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that
Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the
Fatherland Front (Vaterlandsche Front) would fight to
its last man; one could not know that they would
capitulate like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who
already had taken over the government asked us to march
in immediately. Before we had already marched up to the
frontier since we could not know whether there would be
a civil war or not. These are the actual facts which
can be proved by documents. ***"
"******
"G: No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if
you spoke already to these people. I want that you once
more, but no not at all once more, but generally
speaking tell the following to Halifax and
Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given
any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because
the ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, Glaise-
Horstenau and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we
have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President,
but it also was given by the others and as far as I
know just a military attache came along, asked by S-I,
because of a technical question; he was supposed to ask
whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German
troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore,
I want to state that S-I asked us expressly by phone as
by telegram to send troops because he did not know
about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so
on; because arms had been distributed there. And then
he could not know how the Fatherland Front might react
since they always had had such a big mouth.
"R: Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in
Vienna, is everything settled yet?
"G: Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with
some companies, in order to secure the airfield and
[Page 500]
<>they were received with joy. Today the advance unit of
the 17 division marches in, together with the Austrian
troops. Also I want to point out that the Austrian
troops did not withdraw but that they got together and
fraternized immediately with the German troops,
wherever they were stationed." (2949-PS, Part W)
In view of the previous conversations, these are interesting
explanations -- that the ultimatum was made by Seyss-Inquart
alone and not by Goering; that Lt. Gen. Muff, the military
attache, came along merely to answer a technical question;
and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and by
telegram for troops. But perhaps this conversation can best
be understood in light of the actual physical scene of time
and place:
"G: Well, do come ! I shall be delighted to see you.
"R: I shall see you this afternoon.
"G: The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am
sitting here on my balconyall covered with blankets in
the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to
drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds are
twittering, and here and there I can hear over the
radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful over
there.
"R: That is marvelous." (2949-PS, Part W)
The British Foreign Office had protested the tactics
employed by the German Government. In a letter dated 12
March 1938 Ambassador Neville Henderson, at the British
Embassy, Berlin, wrote to Lord Halifax, Foreign Minister, as
follows:
"With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th,
I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith
a copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron von
Neurath in accordance with the instructions contained
therein and which was delivered on the same evening.
"The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to
Baron von Neurath at the same time." (3045-PS)
The enclosure was the note of March 11th from the British
Embassy to Von Neurath and it reads as follows:
"Dear Reich Minister,
"My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was
delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding inter
alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his
replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new
Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be
National Socialists, and the re-
[Page 501]
admission of the Austrian Legion to the country with
the duty of keeping order in Vienna.
"I am instructed by my Government to represent
immediately to the German Government that if this
report is correct, H.M.G. in the U.K. feel bound to
register a protest in the strongest terms against such
use of coercion backed by force against an independent
State in order to create a situation incompatible with
its national independence.
"As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already
been informed in London, such action is found to
produce the greatest reactions of which it is
impossible to foretell the issues." (3045-PS)
Von Neurath wrote a letter of response dated 12 March 1938.
He first objected to the fact that the British Government
was undertaking the role of protector of Austria's
independence:
"In the name of the German Government I must point out
here that the Royal British Government has no right to
assume the role of a protector of Austria's
independence. In the course of diplomatic consultations
on the Austrian question, the German Government never
left any doubt with the Royal British Government that
the formation of relations between Germany and Austria
could not be considered anything but the inner concern
of the German people and that it did not affect third
Powers." (3287-PS)
Then, in response to the assertions regarding Germany's
ultimatum, Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true
version of events:
"*** Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced,
on the evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and
arbitrary resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an
election within a few days which, under the prevailing
circumstances, and especially according to the details
provided for the execution of the election, could and
was to have the sole purpose of oppressing politically
the predominant majority of the population of Austria.
As could have been foreseen, this procedure, being a
flagrant violation of the agreement of Berchtesgaden,
led to a very critical point in Austria's internal
situation. It was only natural that the members of the
then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the
decision for an election protested very strongly
against it. Therefore, a crisis of the Cabinet occurred
in Vienna which, on the 11th of March, resulted in the
resignation of the former Chancellor and in the
formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich
used forceful
[Page 502]
pressure to bring about this development. Especially
the assertion which was spread later by the former
Chancellor, that the German Government had presented
the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is
a pure invention; according to the ultimatum he had to
appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and to form
a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German
Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German
troops was held in prospect. The truth of the matter is
that the question of sending military or police forces
from the Reich was only brought up when the newly
formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already
published by the press, to the German Government,
urgently asked for the dispatch of German troops as
soon as possible in order to restore peace and in order
to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately
threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria,
the German Government then decided to comply with the
appeal addressed to it.
"This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that
the attitude of the German Government, as,asserted in
your letter, could lead to some unforeseeable
reactions. A complete picture of the political
situation is given in the proclamation which, at noon
today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the
German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation
can take place only if eventually a third party should
try to exercise its influence, contrary to the peaceful
intentions and legitimate aims of the German Government
on the shaping of events in Austria, which would be
incompatible with the right of self-government of the
German people." (3287-PS)
In light of the documents already. adverted to, this version
of events given by von Neurath is palpably untrue.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Austria
(Part 17 of 19)