Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit:
"Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the
German program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany
began to woo neighbors of these countries with promises
of a share in the loot. To Yugoslavia in particular
they offered Carinthia. Concerning the Yugoslav
reaction, I reported at the time:
*** The major factor in the internal situation in the
last week has been the increase in tension with respect
to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. *** There
is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his
trip to various capitals in Southeastern Europe about
six months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get
a part of Carinthia, when a National Socialist
Government came into power in Austria. *** The Nazi
seed sown in Yugoslavia has been sufficient to cause
trouble and there are undoubtedly a good many people
there who look with a great deal of benevolence on
those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in the days
following July 25.
"Germany made like promises of territorial gains to
Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their
cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the
proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I learned
from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and
von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were
spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in
which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to
get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive
any of these countries for they knew that the intention
of Nazi Germany vas to take all.
"The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make
inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate
objectives. I recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna
saying to me in 1934 or 1935, that Germany had made
promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the
same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian
territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave
me the same information.
"I should emphasize here in this statement that the men
who
[Page 477]
made these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool
Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had
begun to willingly lend themselves to the Nazi program.
In an official despatch to the Department of State from
Vienna dated 10 October 1935, I wrote as follows:
*** Europe will not get away from the myth that
Neurath, Papen and Mackensen are not dangerous people
and that they are "diplomat of the old school." They
are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just
because the outside world looks upon them as harmless,
they are able to work more effectively. They are able
to sow discord just because they propagate the myth
that they are not in sympathy with the regime." (2385-PS)
In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these
divisions and increase its own aggressive strength by using
as its agents in making these promises men who on outward
appearances were merely conservative diplomats. It is true
that Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of international
obligations. It is true that the real trump in Germany's
hand was its rearmament and more than that its willingness
to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various countries
was not influenced by those considerations alone.
Schuschnigg laid great stress upon, and was willing to go to
some lengths to obtain, an assurance of independence. All
these countries found it possible to believe apparently
substantial personages, like von Neurath, for example. They
were led to rely on the assurances given, which seemed more
impressive since the diplomats making them ere represented
as men who were not Nazis and would not stoop to go along
with the base designs of the Nazis.
Germany's approach toward Great Britain and France was in
terms of limited expansion as the price of peace. They
signed a naval limitations treaty with England and discussed
a Locarno Air Pact. In the case of both France and England,
they limited their statement of intentions-and harped on
fears of Communism and war.
In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by
notions of the sanctity of international obligations. High
ranking Nazis, including Goering, Frick, and Frank, openly
stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany would observe her
international undertakings only so long as it suited
Germany's interests to do so. As Mr. Messersmith states in
his affidavit:
"High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain
official contact, particularly men such as Goering,
Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darre and others,
repeatedly scoffed at my
[Page 478]
position as to the binding character of treaties and
openly stated to me that Germany would observe her
international undertakings only so long as it suited
Germany's interests to do so. Although these statements
were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made to
others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing
any secret for on many occasions they expressed the
same ideas publicly." (2385-PS)
France and Italy worked actively in Southeastern Europe to
counter Germany's moves. France made attempts to promote an
East Locarno Pact and to foster an economic accord between
Austria and the other Danubian powers. Italy's effort was to
organize an economic bloc of Austria, Hungary, and Italy.
But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling its promises
of loot, by continuing its armament, and by another
significant stratagem. The Nazis stirred up internal
dissensions to disunite and weaken their intended victims.
They supported the Austrian Nazis and the Henlein Party in
Czechoslovakia. They probed hat Goebbels called the "sore
spots." In Yugoslavia they played on the differences between
the Croats and the Serbs, and in particular played on the
fear of the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria, a fear
which was very real in Yugoslavia. In Hungary, Poland, and
Rumania they stirred up other fears and hatreds. These
measures had considerable effect in preventing these
countries from joining any which were opposed to German
designs.
The Nazis consolidated their power in Germany very quickly.
The German people became increasingly imbued with the Nazi
military spirit. Within Germany, resistance to the Nazis
disappeared. Army officers, including many who originally
aided the Nazis with the limited objective of restoring the
German Army, increasingly became imbued with aggressive
designs as they saw how remarkably their power was growing.
The power of Nazi Germany outside the borders of the Reich
increased correspondingly. Other countries feared its
military might. Important political leaders in Yugoslavia,
in Hungary, and in Poland became convinced that the Nazi
regime would gain its ends and that the best course as to
play along with Germany. These countries became apathetic
toward the development of Anschluss with Austria and
cooperative toward the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Mr.
Messersmith's despatches from Europe to the State
Department, setting out the developments in these countries,
are included in his second affidavit. (2385-PS)
As for Italy, Germany's initial objective was to sow discord
between Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia
Italian territory, particularly Trieste. This was to prevent
France from
[Page 479]
reaching agreement with them and to block an East Locarno
Pact. A Mr. Messersmith states:
"While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with
Austria in 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia
provided Germany with the opportunity to sow discord
between Italy and France and England, and to win Italy
over to acceptance of Germany's program in exchange for
German support of Italy's plans in Abyssinia." (2385-PS)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Austria
(Part 9 of 19)