Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression (d) Assurances and Reassurances. The German Government did
more than keep up a pretense of non-interference with
Austrian groups. It employed the psychological inducement of
providing assurances that it had no designs on Austria's
independence. If Austria could but hope for the execution of
those assurances, she could find her way clear to the
granting of concessions, and obtain relief from the economic
and internal pressures.
A letter from Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated 17
May 1935, indicated that a forthright, credible statement by
Germany reassuring Austria would be most useful for German
diplomatic purposes and the improvement of relationships
between Austria and German groups in Austria (2247-PS).
Papen had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Social-
Christian forces against Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor of
Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. He hoped to persuade
Schuschnigg to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to
emerge victorious over Starhemberg. Papen indicated that he
obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the
illegal National Socialists. His letter states in part:
"*** I suggest that we take an active part in this
game. The fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg
and his Christian-social Forces, who are opposed to a
home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The
possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between
Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to him, in
such way that he would submit the offer to the
government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise
of interests. According to the convincing opinion of
the leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the
totalitarian principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be
replaced in the beginning by a combination of that part
of the Christian-elements which favors the Greater
Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the
national independence of Austria and guarantees full
freedom to the Austrian national opposition, then as a
result of such a compromise the Austrian government
would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of
these forces. A further consequence of this step would
be the possibility of the participation of Germany in
the Danube pact, which
[Page 468]
would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the
settlement of relations between Germany and Austria.
Such a measure would have a most beneficial influence
on the European situation and especially on our
relationship with England. One may object, that Mr.
Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to follow such a
pattern, that he will rather in all probability
immediately communicate our offer to our opponents. Of
course, one should first of all explore the possibility
of setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the
use of 'Go betweens'. The possibility exists. If Mr.
Schuschnigg finally says 'No' and makes our offer known
in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse but,
on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich government to
make peace with Austria would be revealed -- without
prejudice to other interests. Therefore even in the
case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I
consider it completely possible, that in view of the
far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-
Italian course and in view of the sharp tensions within
the federal government (Bundesreich), Mr. Schuschnigg
will grasp this last straw -- always under the
supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as
a trap by the opponents, but that it bears all the mark
of an actually honest compromise with Austria. Assuming
success of this step, we would again establish our
active intervention in Central European politics,
which, as opposed to the French-Czech and Russian
political maneuvers, would be a tremendous success,
both morally and practically. Since there are 2 weeks
left to accomplish very much work in the way of
explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is
necessary. The Reich Army Minister (Reichswehrminister)
shares the opinion presented above and the Reich
Foreign Minister (Reichsaussenminister) wanted to
discuss it with you my Fuehrer.
(Signed) Papen". (2247-PS)
In other words, Papen wanted a strong assurance and credible
assurance, of Austria's independence. As he put it, Germany
had nothing to lose with what it could always call a mere
effort at peace. And she might be able to convince
Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition government
with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen
her position in Europe. Finally, Papen urged haste.
Exactly four days later (21 May 1935) in a Reichstag address
Hitler responded to Papen's suggestion, asserting:
"Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the
[Page 469]
internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to
conclude an Anschluss". (TC-26)
Despite this assurance, Papen suggested and Hitler
announced, for a complexity of reasons, a policy completely
at variance with their intentions, which had been and
continued to be to interfere in Austria's internal affairs
and to conclude an Anschluss.
(e) Temporary Countenance of a Quiet Pressure Policy. On 1
May 1936 Hitler branded as a lie any statement that tomorrow
or the day after Germany would fall upon Austria. His words
were published in the Voelkische-Beobachter, SD, 2-3 May 1936, p. 2. (2367-PS)
If Hitler meant what he said, it as only in the most literal
and misleading sense that he would not fall upon Austria
"tomorrow or the day after". For the conspirators well knew
that the successful execution of their purpose required for
a while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in
Austria.
A memorandum of a conversation which occurred when William
Bullitt, American Ambassador to France, called upon von
Neurath, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 18 May
1936, recounts von Neurath's explanation why Germany was
trying to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the
Nazis in Austria (1150). The Nazis ere growing stronger in
Austria, anyway, in view of their appeal to the young
people. And the German Government was doing nothing active
in foreign affairs until the Rhineland, reoccupied two
months before, had been "digested", and until fortifications
were constructed on the French frontier. Finally, Italy
still had a conflicting interest in Austria, and Germany
wished to avoid any involvement with Italy.
(f) The agreement of 11 July 1936. But if Germany was not
yet ready for open conflict in Austria, its diplomatic
position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which
influenced Austria's willingness to make concessions to
Germany and come to terms. As Mr. Messersmith points out,
Italy, formerly a protector of Austria, had em,barked on her
Abyssinian adventure, and this, together with the
refortification of the Rhineland, strengthened Germany's
position (1760-S). This weakening of Austria helped pave the
way for the Pact of 11 July 1936. (TC-22)
The formal part of the agreement of 11 July 1936, between
the German Government and the Government of the Federal
State of Austria, looks like a great triumph for Austria. It
contains a confusing provision to the effect that Austria,
in its policy, especially with regard to Germany, will
regard herself as a German state. But the other two
provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full
sovereignty of Austria, and that it regards
[Page 470]
the inner political order of Austria (including the question
of Austrian National Socialism) as an internal concern of
Austria upon which it will exercise neither direct nor
indirect influence.
But there was much more substance to the day's events. Mr.
Messersmith's summary, as set forth in his affidavit, is
more revealing:
"Even more important than the terms of the agreement
published in the official communique, was the
contemporaneous informal understanding, the most
important provisions of which were, that Austria would
(1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the
Chancellor's confidence but friendly to Germany to
positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to
give the 'national opposition' a role in the political
life of Austria and within the framework of the
Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis save
those convicted of the most serious offenses. This
amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government
and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first
penetration of the Deutsche Nationaler into the
Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment
of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister
Without Portfolio". (1760-PS)
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Austria
(Part 6 of 19)